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(Audio) Islamic State (ISIS) - Statement by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi - "But Sufficient Is Your Lord as a Guide and a Helper" - 28 September 2017

Submitted by Hylda Fenton on Thu, 2017-09-28 13:04

Hylda FentonJasmine OppermanMost Usefulhttps://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/audio-islamic-state-isis-statement-abu...

TRAC Analysis

The audio message is notable for several reason. First, its the first release from Baghdadi since 02 November 2016, secondly, and perhaps more importantly its the first release since the Russian's declared Baghdadi dead on 16 June 2017.

The audio message sets the tone as if Islamic State has a place at the table with other nations of the world, making references to North Korea both threatening Japan and the United States. Yet, ultimately its a call to jihad. Interestingly, the only two IS areas he mentions outside Syria and Iraq are Yemen and Libya (Sirte).

Timing Is of the Utmost Importance

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as symbolic leader of the Islamic State (the Caliph) message is aimed at encouraging support for the Islamic State against what is referred to as the humiliation of Muslims. The centrality of “us versus them” remains a constant in Islamic State propaganda;
The reference to the North Korean crisis serves as evidence of a recent recording countering reports that he has been killed;
That territorial losses and fighters killed will not deter the Islamic State in opposing the kufr nations. He does not refer to any specific strategies and tactics, which is to be expected as al-Baghdadi is not involved in directing Islamic State tactics and strategies;
The international context remains of importance to the Islamic State. In reference to the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Europe as collaborating against the Islamic State, the future pathway for Islamic State propaganda is set: the Caliphate was not only opposed by Western forces but betrayed by countries such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, henceforth remaining legitimate targets.

Audio Message

TRAC Summary

Al-Baghdadi released an audio statement that is 46 minutes long. In the first 10 minutes, he makes references to Qur'anic verses and hadiths and then moves onto talking about the period of the prophet's companions and the righteous Caliphs. He further makes references to North Korea threatening Japan and the United States, which indicates that his is a recent recording.

Partial translation provided by: @AbdullahKhaled

“Contrary to the early glorious days, Muslims are now humiliated at the hands of jews and crusaders, if it wasn't for the few mujahideen, led first by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and then Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. The US isn't the only superpower any more, burdened by huge debts, which prompted Russia to capitalise on this weakness to assert itself and control the "Syrian file" away from the US, which happened in Astana.
North Korea now threatens US and Japan / US, Russian and European are in fear of mujahideen attacks / Turkey worried about Kurds but won't fight. Saudi,despite its tension with Iran, is supporting Baghdad government under the order of the US despite that being in the interest of "majous" Iran. "We in the Islamic State" see in light of such changes that causes of the demise of kufr nations are present, and we lay in wait. The road towards achieving victory is patience and steadfastness in the face of hardship. "We" proved that we are the first line of defence against the Houghi/rafidhi/majousi/Nusayri enemy; the proof is Mosul: soldiers of IS fought hard and didn't surrender it except on their dead bodies!
This is a call to Sunnis in Iraq/Sham/Yemen and everywhere to wake up, join jihad with IS, and disregard other treacherous/apostate factions. Sacrifices in Mosul, Sirt, Hama, Ramadi and Raqqa won't go to waste…as we are still remaining. Another call and appeal to Sunnis everywhere to join in defence of "the Islamic State." The Turkish ikhwani (in reference to the MB) and the apostate factions won't help or benefit you in front of the nusayris and their supporters."

There is an interesting du'a (supplication) towards the end for God to grant him hajj (pilgrimage) this year. In short, it's a call to be patient, steadfast and continue with jihad.

Thu, 2017-09-28Archive.org Ideological Sources of Radical Islam - Religious (Islamic)Jihadist Terrorist Groups - Religious (Islamic)Propaganda and Terrorism Recruitment Tactics Psychology for Recruiting Terrorists Islamic State (IS) / Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS) / Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS or ISIL, IS)New details on the hunt for ISIS leader Baghdadi TRAC Incident Report: IS Leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Released and Audio Statement - 02 November 2016 TRAC Op/Ed: Unverified Reports on Baghdadi Killed Unlikely True; Second Time in as Many Months- 11 July 2017 Syria North Korea Japan Saudi Arabia Iran Russia

(PDF) ISIS IN EUROPE UPDATE - SEPTEMBER 2017

Submitted by Hylda Fenton on Fri, 2017-09-22 13:59

Hylda FentonMost Usefulhttps://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/pdf-isis-europe-update-september-2017

ISIS in Europe Update September-2017.pdf

CLICK FOR FULL REPORT

Key Takeaway: ISIS’s attack campaign in Europe is expanding despite ISIS’s losses of terrain and senior leadership in the Middle East and North Africa. ISIS continues to plan, resource, and execute attacks from its remaining safe havens in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. ISIS has successfully expanded its coordinated attack campaign in Europe to target the UK and Spain. Rising levels of ISIS-inspired attacks in Sweden and Finland may signal growing online ISIS activity targeting vulnerable populations in those states and receptivity among those populations to the ISIS message. Coordinated attack attempts could follow. ISIS is sustaining its attack efforts in its initial target states of France and Germany, meanwhile. ISIS’s activity in Belgium, also an initial target state, is much lower, but the lack of ISIS attacks in Belgium does not signal incapacity. ISIS may be using its networks in Belgium to support attack cells elsewhere in Europe. ISIS also appears increasingly successful at inspiring low-level attacks in Europe despite its territorial losses, indicating its messaging is still resonant. ISIS’s campaign in Europe will continue and may even increase despite its losses in Iraq and Syria.

Methodology

ISW has refined its methodology for assessing ISIS’s campaign in Europe to leverage new published information such as details from the trials of arrested ISIS members. ISW has curated its database of terrorist attacks in Europe, ranging from clear instances of coordinated ISIS attacks to low-level attacks that may have little to no direct ISIS involvement. This broad collection aperture enables ISW to analyze the rising levels of Salafi-jihadi violence in Europe that ISIS uses to justify and advertise its methodology and ideology. This collection aperture also enables ISW to assess how much of the trend of Salafi jihadi violence in Europe ISIS is actually commanding and controlling.

ISW sorts each attack into one of three categories: coordinated ISIS attacks, inspired ISIS attacks, and unknown attacks. ISW also collects all instances of attempted attacks, which also range from low-level would-be attackers with unknown links to ISIS to complex, coordinated ISIS attack plots. ISW maps both successful attacks and the arrests of thwarted attack cell members to gain insight into where and how ISIS is attempting to penetrate European security and to evaluate the success of ISIS’s campaign. The Appendix discusses ISW’s methodology for assessing attempted attacks in more detail. The four categories of attacks

– both attempted and successful – that ISW has collected are:

Coordinated ISIS attacks are deliberate, planned attacks that ISIS has designed, resourced, and supported from Syria, Iraq, or Libya. Senior ISIS leaders are often involved in planning these attacks and training recruits. Coordinated ISIS attacks vary in scale and complexity from relatively low-level attacks such as vehicle rammings to sophisticated operations such as the 2015 Paris attacks.*

ISW has subcategorized each coordinated ISIS attack based on the type of attacker in order to gain insight into how ISIS is executing its campaign. The attackers in ISIS coordinated attacks to date have been returning ISIS foreign fighters, ISIS refugee operatives, or local ISIS recruits who conducted or attempted to conduct an attack while in contact with an ISIS “cyberplanner.” ISIS cyberplanners are foreign fighters who conduct online recruitment for ISIS, but also perform remote logistical and other support functions by leveraging criminal and other networks in Europe to enable ISIS recruits to access resources necessary for an attack. US-led coalition airstrikes against the ISIS external attack network in Syria and Iraq have focused on eliminating these nodes.1

Inspired ISIS attacks are attacks consistent with ISIS’s methodology and calls for attacks in Europe. ISW assesses an attack to be inspired if the attacker(s) have demonstrated pro-ISIS sympathies such as possessing ISIS propaganda or pledging allegiance to ISIS online. Some of the attacks ISIS has inspired in Europe are consistent with the US military’s doctrinal definition for a “complex attack.”† Many of these attacks may actually be coordinated by ISIS cyberplanners, but ISW assesses them to be inspired until or unless the involvement of a cyberplanner has been adequately documented in publically available information.

Unknown attacks fit ISIS’s methodology and calls for “lone jihad” but have no clear links to ISIS or in some cases even terrorism in publically available reporting. The attackers may have been inspired by ISIS or other jihadist groups such as al Qaeda, which has also sent operatives to Europe, but ISW cannot assess such links with confidence. ISW categorizes these attacks as “unknown” due to a lack of sufficient evidence of ISIS or al Qaeda sympathies. ISW has included this data because these attacks support ISIS’s claim of momentum and narrative of a growing global war between Sunni Muslim populations and the majority non-Muslim world.

ISW updates its assessment of each attack when new information emerges. The assessment presented below is based on publicly available information as of September 14, 2017.

The Coordinated ISIS Campaign in Europe

* ISW derived this type of attack from the US military’s doctrinal definition of a coordinated attacks which is: “an attack that exhibits deliberate planning conducted by multiple hostile elements, against one or more targets from multiple locations. A coordinated attack may involve any number of weapon systems. [The] key difference between complex and coordinated is that a coordinated attack requires the indication of insurgent long term planning.”

† “An attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED and surface to air fire) against one or more targets.”

ISIS successfully expanded the scope of its coordinated attack campaign in Europe to the United Kingdom and Spain in 2017.

The initial waves of ISIS’s coordinated attacks in Europe primarily targeted France, Belgium, and Germany in 2014-2016. Returnee foreign fighters conducted most of these attacks. ISW assesses that ISIS returnee foreign fighters also tried and failed to conduct attacks in at least the UK, Spain, Morocco, Italy, Albania, and Kosovo in that timeframe.

The EU Counterterrorism Chief stated on September 12, 2017 that ISIS still has as many as 2,500 European foreign fighters in its ranks in Iraq and Syria and that at least 1,500 have returned to Europe to date. ISIS’s European foreign fighter population in Iraq and Syria will continue to provide the organization with links to jihadist and criminal networks in Europe even if the foreign fighters do not return to Europe. The foreign fighters that have already returned to Europe provide ISIS with latent capability to conduct attacks in addition to logistical and other support operations. ISIS is likely leveraging its foreign fighter cadres to attack new states rather than execute coordinated attacks in states where levels of ISIS-inspired attacks are rising.

ISIS’s success demonstrates that it continues to generate attack capability faster than security services can disrupt new ISIS cells. In the UK, an ISIS returnee foreign fighter detonated a suicide vest (SVEST) at a concert venue in Manchester on May 22, 2017 in the first attack in the UK to date that fits ISW’s definition of a coordinated attack. The attacker met with members of an ISIS external operations cell in Libya prior to the attack, indicating that ISIS is leveraging command and control outside of Syria and Iraq to support its European operations. In Spain, members of an ISIS cell conducted two separate car-ramming attacks in Barcelona and Cambrilis as a contingency operation after an explosion at the cell’s TATP factory killed its leader and other members of the cell. TATP is an explosive that ISIS operatives in Europe commonly use. The cell’s original plan was to conduct a coordinated attack using TATP against the Sagrada Familia Church, a popular tourist destination in Barcelona. The extent of ISIS’s direct support to this attack cell is unclear, due in part to the death of the cell’s leader and numerous other cell members in the explosion of the TATP factory. Reports that the cell’s leader traveled to Belgium in late 2016 could indicate that ISIS has a command-and-control node in Belgium that supported the attack.

More coordinated ISIS attack plots in Europe are likely underway. Unconfirmed reports indicate that ISIS’s external operations node in Libya has also dispatched foreign fighters to Belgium and France in addition to the UK. It is possible that a failed coordinated attack in Paris in 2017 was linked to the Libyan node. ISW cannot confirm any coordinated attack cells in Belgium in 2017, but French and Belgian police arrested one cross-border cell with likely links to ISIS in July 2017. This cell may have been planning attacks. The returnee foreign fighters may also be using Belgium as a base for command and control and logistical operations instead of a base for attacks, as the travel of the Spanish cell’s leader to Belgium suggests. They may have joined a pre-existing ISIS network in Brussels comprised of the initial wave of returnee foreign fighters that reached Belgium before ISIS’s major successful attacks in Paris and Brussels in November 2015 and March 2016, respectively.

Sustained ISIS attempts to conduct coordinated attacks in France and Germany in 2017 indicate that ISIS continues to prioritize those countries. ISIS’s Iraq-based French cyberplanner, Rachid Kassim, planned a coordinated attack in Paris, France involving TATP before a coalition airstrike killed him near Mosul, Iraq in February 2017. French police successfully disrupted the attack and arrested 2 cell members on September 6th, at least one of whom had been in contact with Kassim. German police meanwhile disrupted what could have been a coordinated ISIS attack attempt in Essen by a German foreign fighter in March 2017 who was reportedly recruiting people in the area to conduct an attack.

Future ISIS success are also likely in the states that thwarted coordinated ISIS plots from 2014- 2016, which include at least Italy, Albania, and Kosovo. ISIS’s links to criminal networks in Italy may reduce the group's incentive to attack there in the near term, since law enforcement responses to such attacks could disrupt important support nodes. ISIS could also risk alienating business partners such as elements of the Italian Mafia if it attacks Italy. The anti-ISIS coalition has eliminated numerous ISIS external operators in Syria tasked with managing ISIS’s attack campaign in Albania and Kosovo in airstrikes in June 2017, meanwhile. These strikes may have disrupted ISIS’s ability to generate attack cells in the Balkans. ISIS may be attempting to leverage Balkan foreign fighters to conduct attacks elsewhere in Europe, however. Italian police arrested a Kosovar cell including at least one returnee ISIS foreign fighter in March 2017 that was planning an explosive attack against the Rialto Bridge. Available reporting does not confirm that ISIS provided direct support to this cell, which could have been merely inspired by ISIS. ISW will update this assessment as new details become available.

Coordinated ISIS attacks using refugees

ISIS’s coordinated attack campaign in Germany relies less on a foreign fighter cadre than elsewhere in Europe. ISIS is also using recruited and possibly trained refugees to conduct coordinated attacks in Germany. ISIS has conducted two successful coordinated attacks in Germany using one returnee foreign fighter and one refugee operative to date. The refugee was a Syrian who had reportedly fought with ISIS before leaving for Europe in 2013. He detonated an SVEST outside a concert in Ansbach on July 24, 2016. German police later discovered chemicals and other bomb-making materials in his room at a refugee center in Germany. German authorities have reportedly thwarted six coordinated ISIS attack attempts, involving three refugees, two returnees, and one local who was likely in contact with an ISIS cyberplanner. Germany authorities have reportedly thwarted an additional nine attacks that could include attempted ISIS coordinated attacks, but for which adequate information does not yet exist.

Refugees have conducted attacks in other countries, but ISW cannot assess any coordinated ISIS involvement with confidence at the time of writing. ISW’s assessment places ISIS-inspired attacks conducted by refugees into the same category as all other instances of ISIS-inspired attacks. Future ISW products will examine the trend of ISIS-inspired attacks in Europe in more detail, to include when and where refugees have conducted such operations.

Attacks consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone Jihad”

ISIS seeks to create momentum behind a campaign of attacks in Europe that will require less direct input from ISIS over time. ISW assessed in November 2015 that ISIS’s goal in Europe was to provoke overreactions by European governments that would alienate Muslim communities and radicalize them over time. ISIS designed a campaign to inject violence into European societies in order to jumpstart a campaign of low-level attacks against non-Muslim populations in Europe that would further polarize European communities.

The scope and volume of low-level attacks that fit ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” in Europe nearly quadrupled in Europe from January 2014 to September 2017. This trend could signal a growing resonance of ISIS’s messaging to vulnerable populations despite ISIS’s territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. If so, this trend would demonstrate ISIS success generating a campaign of violence in Europe that requires progressively less direct input from ISIS to sustain.

It is still possible that ISIS cyberplanners or returnee foreign fighters coordinated many of these attacks, however. Available information does not enable ISW to assess these attacks to be coordinated at the time of writing. Attacks consistent with the ISIS calls for “lone wolf” jihad expanded to Spain,2 Italy,3 Switzerland,4 and Finland5 in 2017. The attacks in Finland and rising levels of similar attacks in Sweden are the most likely to have been coordinated by ISIS, since they are in a new theater. Finland raised its threat level in early 2017, which could signal intelligence indicating ISIS was actively attempting to coordinate attacks. The chief of Sweden’s security service (SAPO) warned in June 2017 that extremist activity was rising in multiple Swedish cities. Norway also raised its threat level in early 2017, possibly indicating new ISIS attack efforts. It is also possible that some of these attacks have been inspired or enabled by al Qaeda rather than ISIS, but the available data does not confirm al Qaeda links.

Conclusion

The success of anti-ISIS operations in Europe remains limited. ISIS continues to generate and inspire attacks on a scope and scale larger than European security services can handle. New countermeasures such as “vehicle mitigation barriers” can reduce the lethality of ISIS tactics but are unlikely to disrupt ISIS’s ability to inspire and recruit attackers. Anti-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq have not severed the link between ISIS’s senior leadership and its operatives abroad, moreover. Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria have eliminated many ISIS external operatives, but have not sufficiently degraded ISIS’s capability. ISIS also continues to use safe haven in Libya as a base from which to support attacks in Europe even after its loss of Sirte, demonstrating how removing ISIS from cities is insufficient to prevent ISIS from conducting attacks. The anti-ISIS coalition is unlikely to dismantle the global ISIS attack network without broadening the scope of anti-ISIS operations beyond a narrow terrain focus. ISIS can use safe-havens in rural and even desert areas to plan, coordinate, and support the conduct of attacks in the West.

It must also refocus on addressing the grievances and fears of vulnerable Sunni populations that make them vulnerable to ISIS messaging. The widespread perception that European states and the U.S. are aligned with Iran and the Assad regime against Sunni populations in Syria and Iraq, as well as the rise of anti- Muslim sentiments and perceived anti-Muslim policies in Europe and the U.S. will continue to fuel toleration of and limited but growing support for ISIS (and al Qaeda) attack operations in the West. ISIS is waging a social and informational campaign to gain support among Western populations—Western states will not be able to kill and arrest their way out of this problem.

Appendix: ISW methodology for analyzing attempted attacks

The first graphic in this report depicts the number of attacks and attempted attacks per month in Europe from January 2014 to September 14, 2017. The chart begins in January because it is the month when the first known ISIS attack operative entered Europe after ISIS’s separation from al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in mid-2013. French police arrested that operative, named Abdelkader Tliba, thereby preventing what would have been the first coordinated ISIS attack in Europe. ISW’s data set includes every such known attempted attack in Europe since January 2014.

ISW’s data set most likely under-represents the number of thwarted ISIS attack cells in Europe, which are the most difficult to discern from openly available reporting. The “count” of attempted attacks per month in Europe is the number of thwarted attack cells with proven links to ISIS or that ISW assesses are possibly linked to ISIS based on openly available reporting. The “count” is not estimate of the number of attacks that any given cell would have conducted if not arrested. The actual number of attacks that ISIS has attempted to conduct in Europe may be higher than the graphic in this report conveys, therefore.

The “count” also does not measure the complexity of the thwarted attack cell’s structure or geographic disposition. Some of the attack cells included in this data set are individual attackers who were planning to conduct a single operation based on instructions from an ISIS cyberplanner. Others are larger networks of operatives spread between numerous safe houses in numerous countries. Many fall somewhere in between, or reflect instances where European security services arrested a cell before it had finalized an attack plan.

Comparing attempted vs successful attacks in Europe

The “count” for the successful attacks in Europe is the sum of the locations at which successful attacks occurred. For example, the ISIS attack in Paris November 2015 has a “count” of six. ISW has coded the attack data based on each attack location because each separate attack location reflects a separate successful attack operation that ISIS chose to coordinate and execute simultaneously. This approach is in line with the methodologies used by U.S. military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, which tally each individual kinetic event even when multiple attacks take place in a coordinated fashion simultaneously, but in different locations.

The comparison of attempted attacks versus attacks provides a proxy for assessing the success of ISIS’s campaign in Europe. The ratio favors ISIS, as ISIS appears to be able to generate attacks faster than European security services can disrupt them.

ISW’s data set does not include instances of partial disruption of an ISIS attack cell. An example of a partial disruption would be the arrest of one of five suicide bombers that reduced the “count” of the successful attack to the observed four attacks. This data set is not an exhaustive accounting of all of the successes of European security services against ISIS, therefore.

ISW has sorted attempted attacks into the same four categories as successful attacks based on available evidence as of September 14, 2017: attempted coordinated ISIS attacks, attempted ISIS-inspired attacks, and unknown attempted attacks for which few details are publically available. ISW routinely updates and re-evaluates the assessment of each attempted attack as new details become available, such as new information about a given would-be attacker’s links to ISIS cyberplanners. ISW will publish updates and refined assessments as appropriate.

ISW’s Data Set vs. Official European Reporting

ISW’s data set includes more events and counts differently than official European reports. For example, ISW’s data for 2016 includes eleven more attacks in EU countries than the EU’s 2017 counterterrorism report and dozens more attempted attacks. The primary reason for these differences is that ISW counts events that the EU member states have not definitively ruled as terrorism. European states must discuss terror attacks on the basis of definitive evidence and the proper application of European laws. ISW’s approach enhances analysis of the ISIS campaign in Europe by widening the aperture to include the entire set of events that likely fit within the ISIS campaign even if insufficient evidence exists at present confidently to designate each event as a terrorist attack. ISW also seeks to inform analysis of the perceived trend of attacks in Europe, which ISIS and other jihadist groups use to recruit even if based in part of false attribution of some acts of violence, as this report explains.

ISW’s methodology to consider each attack location a separate attack also contributes to differences between ISW and European reporting. The EU report considers the March 2016 ISIS attack in Brussels to be a single attack, for example; ISW counts it as three separate, coordinated attacks.

1 For example, the US killed ISIS’s Albanian foreign fighter and attack planner Lavdrim Muhaxeri in an airstrike on June 7, 2017 near Mayadin, Syria.

2 An attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” targeted a Spanish-Moroccan border post on July 25, 2017 before the ISIS cell in Barcelona conducted its attacks.

3 The first attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” to target Italy occurred on May 18, 2017. ISW assesses the attacker was inspired by ISIS.

4 The first attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” to target Switzerland occurred on July 24, 2017.

5 The first attack consistent with ISIS’s calls for “lone jihad” to target Finland occurred on August 18, 2017. ISW assesses the attacker was inspired by ISIS.

Wed, 2017-09-20Institute for the Study of War (ISW)Jihadist Terrorist Groups - Religious (Islamic)Ideological Sources of Radical Islam - Religious (Islamic)Terrorism and the Lone Wolf 11/13 Paris Attacks and The Paris 20 Attackers TRAC Focus on: Spain - Foreign Fighters and Recruitment Cells Islamic State (IS) / Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS) / Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS or ISIL, IS)(Infographic) Mass attacks by IS soldiers- Barcelona, Spain - 23 August 2017 (Two Videos) The Chronological Order of How the Terrorist Cell Planned the attacks in Cataluña, Spain: In Barcelona and Cambrils -17 August 2017 - 23 August 2017 Man with knife attacks soldier in Paris TRAC INCIDENT REPORT: Car Rams soldiers in a pedestrian zone near Barracks in Levallois-Perret, Paris Suburb, France - 09 August 2017 Barcelona attackers dodged anti-terror security checks, says interior minister (CGI) Poster attempts to justify Barcelona attacks- 26 August 2017 Syria Iraq United Kingdom France Spain Germany

(PDF) al-Malhamah Issue #3 - al Wa'd Media Foundation

Submitted by Hylda Fenton on Wed, 2017-05-10 13:01

Hylda FentonMost Usefulhttps://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/pdf-al-malhamah-issue-3-al-wad-media-f...

al-Malḥamah Magazine Issue #3.compressed.pdf

al-Wa'd Media Foundation releases Issue #3 of al-Malhamah Magazine.

Wed, 2017-05-10TRAC Propaganda and Terrorism Jihadist Terrorist Groups - Religious (Islamic) Islamic State (IS) / Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS) / Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS or ISIL, IS)Malhama Tactical (JFS /Conquest of al-Sham Front) Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS /Conquest of al-Sham Front) / Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) / Nusra Front (PDF) al-Malhamah Issue #2 Magazine Inspiring Lone Wolf Attacks Across Europe with CGI (CGI) Islamic State Propaganda: It is a single soul and a single paradise, so sell it to Allah and purchase Jannah (heaven) - 02 May 2017 Syria Uzbekistan Cyberspace

US sends dozens of troops to Somalia, 1st time in decades

Submitted by Hylda Fenton on Mon, 2017-04-17 09:23

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MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) — The U.S. military is sending dozens of regular troops to Somalia in the largest such deployment to the Horn of Africa country in roughly two decades.

The United States pulled out of Somalia after 1993, when two helicopters were shot down in the capital, Mogadishu, and bodies of Americans were dragged through the streets. Even now, Somalia's fragile central government is struggling to assert itself after the nationwide chaos that began with the fall of dictator Siad Barre in 1991.

The U.S. Africa Command on Friday said this deployment is for logistics training of Somalia's army, which is battling the extremist group al-Shabab that emerged from the country's years of warlord-led conflict. About 40 troops are taking part.

The U.S. in recent years has sent a small number of special operations forces and counter-terror advisers to Somalia, and President Donald Trump recently approved an expanded military role there. It includes carrying out more aggressive airstrikes against al-Shabab and considering parts of southern Somalia areas of active hostilities.

The country's new Somali-American president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, last week declared a new offensive against the extremist group, which is based in Somalia but has claimed responsibility for major attacks in East Africa, including the Garissa University attack in neighboring Kenya in April 2015 that killed 148 people.

Al-Shabab also caused alarm in February 2016 when it claimed responsibility for the bombing of an airliner that made an emergency landing with a gaping hole in the fuselage shortly after taking off from Mogadishu.

The extremist group this week announced that its recent escalation of deadly attacks in Mogadishu and elsewhere is in "doubled response" to Trump's approval of expanded U.S. military efforts. On Sunday, Somalia's new military chief survived a suicide car bomb attack following his swearing-in, while 13 people were killed. A day later, a suicide bombing at a military academy in Mogadishu killed at least five soldiers.

Al-Shabab was chased out of Mogadishu several years ago by national and African Union multinational forces but still controls some rural areas. Meanwhile, fighters pledging allegiance to the Islamic State group have emerged in the northern part of the country.

Pressure is growing on Somalia's army to assume full security for the country as the 22,000-strong African Union force plans to leave by the end of 2020. Last month, the head of the AU mission said Somalia's army has been unable to take charge as expected.

The AU force will begin withdrawing in 2018, "and if this departure begins prior to Somalia having capable security forces, large portions of Somalia are at risk of returning to al-Shabab control or potentially allowing ISIS to gain a stronger foothold in the country," the head of the U.S. Africa Command, Commander General Thomas Waldhauser, said last month.

Fri, 2017-04-14Associated Press Deterring Terrorism al Shabaab United States Somalia

COMMENTARY — Jihadists Who Decapitated Priests In Syria Got Help From Turkey’s Intelligence

Submitted by Hylda Fenton on Fri, 2017-04-14 09:20

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Photo: Magomed Abdurakhmanov posing with other Jihadists in al-Qaeda affiliated Katibat al-Muhajireen (Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa'l-Ansar)

Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) had willingly and deliberately helped known Jihadists of Russian nationals who decapitated Aleppo’s Greek Orthodox Bishop Boulos Yaziji and Syriac Orthodox Bishop Yohanna Ibrahim in 2013.

They were caught in Turkey after a video emerged in June 2013 but they received lesser sentences on charges other than a murder of these priests when the Turkish intelligence and the Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ intervened into the case. These bloody Jihadists are set to be free next month in Turkey.

Their name are Magomed Abdurakhmanov (AKA Abu Banat who was born on Nov.24, 1974 in Dagestan, a federal republic of Russia in the Northern Caucasus) and Ahmad Ramazanov (born on March 12, 1986 in Grozny, the capital city of the Chechen Republic, Russia). They are believed to be part of Jihadist group that decapitated prominent priests after their abduction in Syria. Abdurakhmanov personally beheaded one and helped decapitate the other based on seized murder weapon, forensic examination, his own testimony that corroborated by his accomplice. The shocking part is that these murderer were recruited by the MİT, provided with arms and logistical support while fighting against Bashar al-Assad regime.

KNOWN AL-QAEDA TRAFFICKER MOVED THEM AROUND

Both men had been in contact with a Turkish national Mevlüt Kuşman, a radical figure who was already under the investigation by Turkish police as part of an investigation into an al-Qaeda cell that was operating out of the Eastern province Van and İstanbul and that led by İbrahim Şen, a former Gitmo detainee and a convicted senior al-Qaeda militant. Kuşman (born on November 8, 1966 in Van province) had maintained a residence in İstanbul’s Bağcılar district and worked as a trafficker and supplier for al-Qaeda affiliated Jihadist groups.

The wiretap conversation that was recorded on June 20, 2013 showed Kuşman delivered military supplies, clothing and food to a man identified with only first name as Hasan who used a cell phone registered to a man Saeed Ameen Hussein al-Juboori. The delivery took place in the village of Başpınar on Turkish-Syrian border located in Kırıkhan district of Hatay province. Following the transaction, Kuşman picked up Jihadists who illegally crossed to Turkish territory from Syria and started driving towards Konya province with final destination being İstanbul.

Kuşman’s car was stopped by police units at Konya’s Cihanbeyli district where Abdurakhmanov, Ramazanov and a woman named Fatim Maden (24), a foreign national, were all detained along with another Turkish man named Sait Alp. Both Kuşman and Alp were released while foreign nationals were transferred to foreigners’ unit in Konya provincial police department. Although Abdurakhmanov was listed as a foreigner who are banned from entry into Turkey, he and the other two foreigners were all released to continue their journey to İstanbul. That shows these people were protected by Turkey’s intelligence agency.

Photo: Magomed Abdurakhmanov, a Russian Jihadist from Dagestan region, seen in the video as decapitating the abducted priest in Syria.

JIHADIST WHO WAS LET GO TURNED OUT TO BE MURDERER OF PRIESTS

On June 28, 2013, the murder footages of Aleppo’s Greek Orthodox Bishop Boulos Yaziji (also listed as Yazigi or Yazıcı), the Syriac Orthodox diocese of Aleppo Bishop Yohanna Ibrahim, and a third priest were emerged in Turkish media. Yaziji went into Syria on April 22, 2013 to meet Bishop Yohanna and they were kidnapped by unknown gunmen in the village of Kafr Dael, about 10 km from Aleppo. It turned out the priests were kept prisoners by a Jihadist group called Katibat al-Muhajireen (Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa’l-Ansar), designated as terrorist group by the US and Canada. When the horrible pictures of decapitation emerged in June 2013, Konya police units identified Abdurakhmanov as the man who appeared in the picture.

That verification prompted İstanbul police to raid several addresses in İstanbul’s Bağcılar and Başakşehir districts on July 4, 2013, detaining Kuşman, Ramazanov and Abdurakhmanov, among other suspects. In the home and workplace of Kuşman, police found hand grenades, AK-47 clips, 186 bullets, walkie talkies, video cameras. In a bag that was found during the house search, police found clothes that resembled to the ones seen in the video as the outfit of Abdurakhmanov. Police also discovered a knife with sheath that looked identical to the knife used in the beheading according to the forensic examination.

SO MUCH INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE

Investigating judge at İstanbul No.2 Court formally arrested all three on charges of belonging to a terror group and possessing illegal explosive materials and they were jailed in İstanbul Maltepe L-type prison. Kuşman’s son Abdullah and Sait Alp was also named as suspects in the case but released pending trial. Alerted by the Interpol, Russian police also searched the home of Abdurakhmanov in Chechnia and found two grenades, two explosives, and fifty bullets.

There was enough evidence to charge Russian Jihadists on terror, violations of firearms and ammunition laws but to charge Abdurakhmanov on crimes against the humanity for the murders of priests which took place outside the borders of Turkey, prosecutors needed a permission from the Justice Ministry. The ministry turned down the permission request by the prosecutor’s office in İstanbul, saying that there is no need for such a permission in the investigation stage but required for the trial phase according to the Turkish Penal Code articles listed in the Law No.5237.

Photo: Turkey’s Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ signals prosecutor for dropping murder charges against Magomed Abdurakhmanov.

TURKISH JUSTICE MINISTER PREVENTS FILING MURDER CHARGES

In fact, responding to a Parliamentary question on this matter, Turkey’s Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ said on August 25, 2014 that he advised prosecutors to continue the investigation and come back for a permission during the trial phase. But when his response was examined in detail, it was clear that Bozdağ was discouraging prosecutors to move on with charges of murder of priests, by saying that there is already a valid treaty on extradition agreement and mutual legal assistance with Syria that dated back on March 18, 1983 according to Official Gazette records.

The Article 12 of the Law no.5237 says a foreigner can be tried for crimes committed in another country if there is no extradition agreement or the recipient country refuses to take the suspect back. He said if there is sufficient evidence found on the murder, then the prosecutor may resubmit a permission request to the government. In short, with so many words, Turkish minister effectively telling the prosecutors to drop the charges against Abdurakhmanov.

In fact, that is exactly what happened in the case. Reading the messages of Turkish Justice Minister between the lines, prosecutors decided not to include murder charges in the indictment, citing the fact that murders took place in a foreign country and difficult in collecting evidence. They did not even bother to ask a renewed permission to charge the suspect on murder for the trial stage.

This was totally wrong from so many angles. For one, police criminal lab examination clearly identified Abdurakhmanov as the man who decapitated the priest from the video footage and the murder knife was discovered during the house search. Abdurakhmanov himself confirmed that he was the man on the footage during his testimony in the court (He even acknowledged he was the one who decapitated the priest in police questioning but recanted that in court hearing). Second, there is no practical application of existing extradition treaty between Turkey and Syria because of civil war in Arab country and Assad’s lack of control in many parts of Syrian territory. Third, this also contradicted Turkey’s official government position with respect to Bashar al-Assad regime for which it declared as illegitimate and instead recognized an interim government set up by opposition.

JIHADIST TESTIFIES HOW HE WORKED WITH TURKEY’S INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The court testimony of Abdurakhmanov clearly indicated his close working relationship with Turkey’s intel MİT. He said he and other fighters had been in a continuous contact with the MİT. “After I was jailed here, I wrote letters to the intelligence [MİT] but did not receive any response. While we were in Syria, help was being provided to us from Turkey in the form of arms, funds and vehicles. I do not understand my current predicament and why I was kept in prison now”.

These words suggest Turkish intelligence dumped him after Abdurakhmanov got exposed but nevertheless helped him to get reduced sentence on lesser charges. Perhaps, the MİT also tried to protect itself from a host of international legal troubles by manipulating the case so that there were no charges filed on the murder of priests. Turkish government played along because it was Turkey’s autocratic President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then as a Prime Minister, was personally overseeing the Jihadists’ fights against Assad regime, hoping to replace him with his own proxy Islamist figure.

In his testimony, suspect Ramazanov said he was fighting as an Emir in Katibat al-Muhajireen, training other fighters, and met Abdurakhmanov there. He said the man in the murder video is Abdurakhmanov who decapitated one priest according to the Sharia court decision and help getting another one beheaded.

MURDERERS TO BE FREED FROM JAIL NEXT MONTH

A trial prosecutor, most likely selected especially for this case by the government, even asked for the acquittal of both Russian nationals. However the panel of judges disagreed. Perhaps a close interest in the case by both Russia and the US that have requested the turnover of the case file and evidentiary documents to them might have played a role in preventing a total hush-up of this case.

In the end, both men were sentenced to seven and a half years in prison each with charges of being a member of the terror organization. No murder charges filed and the court acquitted them of the charge on firearms violations. Kuşman was convicted on charges of terror membership (7 years 5 months), possession of dangerous material (4 years 2 months), and possession of unlicensed gun (1 year 3 months). Kuşman’s son Abdullah and Alp were acquitted.

US AND RUSSIA SHOULD INTERVENE

That means Abdurakhmanov and Ramazanov would be conditionally released on May 6, 2017 after serving only 3 years and nine months in the jail according to early parole rules. That is of course if no other charges filed against them by Turkish government which seems very unlikely given the fact that how it treated the case from the start. Both the US and Russia may want to take up the case from where the Turkish government left off, by asking their extradition so that they can be punished for the heinous murders of the priests. Erdoğan would not want that of course, fearing that their extradition may expose him to criminal liabilities. But it is worth to try at least for naming and shaming this Islamist leader who aided and abetted all sorts of radical fanatics in Syria.

Thu, 2017-04-13Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF)Torture, Murder and Beheadings as a Terrorist Tactic Deterring Terrorism State Sponsored Terrorism Arms Supplies and Terrorism Turkish National Intelligence Organization al Qaeda Central Command (AQC)Army of the Emigrants and Helpers / Jaish al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar Syria Orthodox Easter marred by bishops in captivity Syria Turkey Russia - Republic of Dagestan Russia, the Caucasus, & Islamic State -- Wilayat Kavkaz / Qawqaz Russia - Chechen Republic

Kabul, Afghanistan: At Least 20 Killed In Taliban (IEA) claimed Twin Bombing Outside Ministry of Defense-- 5 September 2016

Submitted by Abdul Azizi on Mon, 2016-09-05 08:23

Abdul AziziMost Usefulhttp://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/27106-at-least-20-killed-in-twin-bombing-...

Officials have confirmed that at least 20 people were killed in two separate explosions outside the Ministry of Defense in Kabul on Monday afternoon.

The first explosion took place shortly after 2.30pm and was followed by a second explosion which appeared to have targeted the first responders to the scene.

Ministry of Interior spokesman Sediq Sediqqi confirmed that at least 20 people were killed and over 40 injured.

Among the dead are Sayed Zaman, the police chief for PD2, and Razaq, the deputy chief of support for the Afghan National Army's (ANA) Regiment Unit. Also killed were Zaman's deputy and the head of the intelligence unit for PD2.

A number of other senior police officials are also among the dead.

According to security officials the first bomb was detonated remotely while the second had been a suicide bomber.

Officials also said the suicide bomber had been wearing an ANA uniform.

Reporting from the scene, TOLOnews Wali Arian said that security officials had cordoned off the area and were only letting security personnel and ambulance in.

Meanwhile President Ashraf condemned the incident and said that Afghanistan's enemies have once again shown that they are against progress in the country.

"Terrorist groups are trying to reach their nefarious aims by conducting terror attacks in the country," he said.

Afghanistan's enemies have lost the capability of facing security forces on the battlefield and therefore attack highways, cities, mosques, schools and other public places."

Ghani also extended his condolences to the families of the victims and wished all those wounded a speedy recovery.

The Taliban has claimed responsibility for the attack.

Mon, 2016-09-05tolo news Bombings Taliban / Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)Afghanistan

Report: 'Black Power Political Organization' Takes Credit For Dallas Massacre

Submitted by Hylda Fenton on Fri, 2016-07-08 13:48

Hylda Fentonfalsehttp://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/report-black-power-political-organizati...

A group called the Black Power Political Organization is apparently taking credit for the Dallas police massacre that has left five officers dead and seven wounded, according to the UK paper The Mirror:

“More Will Be Assassinated In The Coming Days! Do You Like The Work Of Our Assassins? Get Your Own Sniper”
read a post on the Black Power Political Organisation Facebook account

It should be stressed that it can not be confirmed whether this group or the Facebook account is actually connected to the Dallas massacre.

The Facebook page of the Black Power Political Organization has been removed, but acached copy of the page shows that it mentions a number of black liberation groups including the New Black Panther Party, and the Huey P Newton Gun Club, a paramilitary organization that has been doing training in Dallas for several years.

One section posted on February 10 reads:

Black Power Political Organization – BPPO #‎BlackPower! #‎BlackKnights! Our Mission Is To Free Africa And All Black Based Countries From Non Black Control! And Give Black People The Opportunity They Need To Develop Themselves And Reach Their Full Potential!
We Are A Powerful Political Group Of Patriotic, Pro Black, Pan African Leaders! Who’s Job Is To Rule And Control Africa, And All Black Based Countries! So To Avoid Corruption, Bribery, Exploitation, Non Black Control And Every Form Of Ailments Preventing Black People And Africa From Reaching It’s Full Potential!
To Accomplish Our Goal! We Will Be Working With (Black People Protection Agency AKA “BLACK KNIGHTS”)! A Powerful Group Of Well Trained Professional Sniper Assassins, With Tens Of Thousands Of Assassins Located All Over The World, In Every Country! Who’s Job Is To Hold Government Leaders And Other Powerful People All Over The World Responsible When They Fail To Give Black People Equal Rights And Justice In Their Countries. By Relentlessly Target And Assassinate Government Leaders And Other Powerful Influential People And Their Families, When They Refuse To Do Right By Us Black People!

Another entry mentions the Huey P Newton Gun Club, the New Black Panther Party and Minister Louis Farrakhan.

While it is unclear where the shootings have anything specifically to do with the groups who are named, the groups seem to share a militant black power ideology that Breitbart News has been covering in detail.

Earlier this year, Breitbart News covered an event where members of the Huey P Newton Gun Club showed up carrying long guns to protest against an anti-Islam group. A standoff between the two groups ended quickly when Dallas police shut down the event after black counter protesters broke through a barricade and tried to attack the group.

The New Black Panther Party is a nationally known black power group headed by Dr. Malika Zulu Shabazz that is been involved in protest against the George Zimmerman verdict, was involved in organizing the Ferguson protest, and did it to rallies after the Charleston, South Carolina shooting of nine black church attendees.

Just as there are different terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban that share a common ideology the various black power groups have different organizations but all share a far left, self-determination ideology that considers the United States a restless, imperialist oppressors state that must be destroyed in order to give minorities “freedom.”

Some of this ideology is embodied by groups such as the Freedom Road Socialist Organization, a group that is in favor of both Chicano self-determination and black determination. One of the founders of Black Lives Matter, Alicia Garza is connected to the Freedom Road Group. Another Black Lives Matter founder, Patrice colors, was mentored under 1960s Weather Underground radical Eric man, who shares the same far left “self-determination” ideology.

The Black Power Political Organization’s website links to the PBS film the Vanguard of the Revolution, a taxpayer-funded film that Breitbart News has previously exposed as being full of lies and mythology about the 1960s Black Panther party. The Black Panthers remained a powerful influence on current day black liberation movements and groups such as Black Lives Matter.

Among the organizations “liked” by the Black Power Political Organization is George Soros’s Open Societies Foundation.

Fri, 2016-07-08BreibartNew Black Panther Party (NBPP)Black Panthers TRAC INCIDENT REPORT: Sniper Ambush on Dallas protest over Police Shootings, Dallas, Texas, United States - 07 July 2016 United States United States - Texas

TRAC INCIDENT REPORT : al-Shabaab Twin IED Attack at SYL Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia - 26 February 2016

Submitted by Eli Banghart on Fri, 2016-02-26 13:04

Veryan KhanJasmine OppermanEli BanghartMost Usefulhttp://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/incident-report-al-shabaab-attack-syl-h...

26 February 2016 Image of Explosion from SYL Hotel

Image of Peace Gardens

Al Shabaab statement claiming credit

Updates

13:23 EST Witnesses on the ground have seen eight (8) killed, four of which are reported to be soldiers, and twenty-four (24) wounded from the two car explosions at near Mogadishu peace garden and Hotel SYL. Two attackers are also reported to be dead.

13:41 EST new reports claim 12 died at the scene. Conflicting reports are between the situation is under control to al Shabaab now has complete control of the hotel.

14:08 EST Reports that a total of 4 VBIED were used by al Shabaab during attack and 4 attackers killed

15:02 EST Reports that 1 VBIED was parked at Bulaleyaashe, the other one was targeting the rescue team.

GIMF reported that the attack was carried out by al Shabaab's Istishadi Brigade. (see claim below)

Two Sets of Explosions

On 26 February 2016, an explosion near the Presidential Palace Villah Somalia at the Somali Youth League (SYL) hotel was claimed by Islamic puritanical group al-Shabaab. The hotel, which was targeted by al-Shabab January 2015, is next to a public garden which would have been busy with families enjoying their weekend. The first explosion was a car bomb in front of gate of Mogadishu's peace garden.

A second explosion occurred shortly after, reports state. Witnesses claim that the second bomb exploded 40 minutes after the first car bomb went off, another explosion of the same magnitude was heard.

al Shabaab Claim

"We started with a car bomb and then stormed the hotel. We are inside it and fighting continues," al-Shabab's military operations spokesman, Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, told Reuters. He said it was the Somali Youth League hotel, known as the SYL hotel.

On 25 February 2016, just the day before, al-Shabab fired mortars at the presidential palace in Mogadishu, killing at least three people and wounding nine. Given location of SYL Hotel & Peace Garden, likely yesterday's mortars on nearby Villa Somalia were a decoy.

GIMF Claim

An announcement from Global Islamic Media Front's Telegram channel claimed credit for the attack:

26.02.2016 Image of SYL Hotel before bombings

al Shabaab fan on Twitter posted image purporting attack

Previous al Shabaab Hotel Attacks

For More on TRAC INCIDENT REPORT : Al Shabaab Attack on Central Hotel in Mogadishu February 2015

For More on TRAC INCIDENT REPORT : al Shabaab attacked Jazeera Palace Hotel killing 12 July 2015

For More on TRAC INCIDENT REPORT : One of Mogadishu's most famous hotels, the Sahafi Hotel attacked by Al-Shabaab November 2015

For More on TRAC INCIDENT REPORT: Al Shabaab attacks Beach View Hotel at Lido beach - Mogadishu January 2016

Fri, 2016-02-26TRAC INCIDENT REPORT Bombings Jihadist Terrorist Groups - Religious (Islamic)The Misunderstood Insurgency? Al Shabaab Italian al-Shabaab (Somalia)al-Shabaab Video: “Evil Will be the Morning for Those Who Were Warned”Somalia's al-Shabaab 'seizes missile armed drone'TRAC Incident Report: al Shabaab Twin SBVIED attacks at Security Checkpoint Near Peace Garden not far from SYL Hotel, Mogadishu, Somalia - 14 July 2018 Al Shabaab Suicide Car Bomb (VBIED) Attack on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia - 22 January 2015 Somalia

TRAC INCIDENT REPORT: Islamic State Bombings and Armed Assault near the Sarinah shopping mall in Thamrin, Central Jakarta, Indonesia - 14 January 2016

Submitted by Clemmie Douchez... on Thu, 2016-01-14 04:26

Clemmie Douchez...Most Usefulhttp://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/trac-continuous-update-several-explosio...

A series of bomb blasts, followed by shootings, have shaken the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, killing at least 7. The attack has been claimed by the Islamic State (IS).

Several explosions occurred in Jakarta's city centre, targeting amongst other places a Starbucks cafe. The choice of this target leads TRAC to assert that Western tourists were the main target of the attack - a claim which is supported by the fact that the attack happened in the city's shopping and business district, very close to embassies and United Nations offices.

An "act of terror"

President Joko Widodo condemned the events as an "act of terror."

The IS-affiliated media outlet Amaq News first released a claim of credit for the Jakarta bombings:

IS then released an official claim of credit for the attacks:

TRAC ASSESSMENT

The cell structure of the Islamic State in the Pacific Rim is very different than what is seen in other areas of activity. Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines IS operations are all inner connected, often using decades old supply and smuggle routes from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well as other groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group. The Islamic State Malaysia, Indonesia & Philippines (IS, ISMIP) started as a funnel of foreign fighters to ash Sham for the Islamic State (often using Indonesia as the launching point). As the cell structure evolved and became more entrenched in the Pacific Rim, the funneling to the Levant waned and operations on home soil increased. Photo and video from the Malaysian and Philippines demonstrated activity that was clearly intended to stay on home soil, opposed to training before leaving for battle in Syria and Iraq. Though Indonesia is arguably the weakest link in terms of operational capacity of the three main locations, small bomb making factories are scattered throughout the Pacific Rim.

The attackers

Five attackers were killed, and two were captured alive, according to Indonesian police. They were reportedly in contact with Syria.

It is reported that up to 14 gunmen were involved in the attack, some of whom would still be on the run. The Indonesian President has ordered security forces to hunt down the perpetrators and their network.

Bahrun Naim - alleged mastermind of the attacks

General Tito Karnavian, Jakarta’s chief of police, identified the group's ringleader as Bahrun Naim, a 32 year-old Indonesian national who he says is currently in Syria. Indoniesian authorities believe Bahrun Naim wants to become the IS leader in Southeast Asia.

Naim is from the twon of Solo in Java (Indonesia); he attended an Islamic high school, and went on to study computer science at a local college. Authorities believe Naim met the son of a preacher who led Jemaah Islamiyah - an al-Qaeda affiliated group that carried out attacks in Indonesia; Naim then joined a radical group.

He was arrested in 2011 for hiding ammunition, but released two years later. He then left for Syria in 2015, where authorities believe he planned the Jakarta attack and sent money to the attackers.

Naim was a member of Aman Abdurrahman's prayer group in Indonesia, likely connecting him to a larger network of Aman's followers and relationships abroad with ISIS.

For More on The rise of Aman Abdurrahman, IS master ideologue

Second Attacker Identified

Recruited by Bahrun Naim, the attacker in blue jeans, black t-shirt and a black hat, Afif. (many Indonesians go by a single name) alias Sunakim, had trained in an Islamic paramilitary camp in Indonesia’s semi-autonomous Aceh region in 2010.

He was sentenced to seven years in jail for his involvement in the camp but was released last year,

Image: Afif. alias Sunakim

Five attackers - all dead

Indonesian authorities have identified four of the five attackers responsible for the Jakarta bombings of 14 January 2016. All five of them died in the attack.

Two of them were previously convicted militants; one of them was Afif Sunakim, who had been sentenced to seven years in prison for attending a militant camp.

Three arrests

Indonesian authorities are now on a manhunt for other terrorist cells linked to the attacks. Police arrested three people on the day after the attack, but it remains unclear if they are connected to the Jakarta bombings or how directly they were involved in the attacks.

Video: In this video, one of the supposed attacker can be seen holding a rifle gun.

Images circulating on social media

The following images have been circulating on social media, and could be showing one of the Jakarta attackers: the man with the red back pack is seen carrying a gun in several photos. He was identified on 16 January as Afif. alias Sunakim.

The victims

At least 7 people were killed in a series of explosions in the centre of Jakarta, which was followed by a shoot out between the assailants and the police.

Police said that the attack resulted in the death of five attackers and two civilians, one of them Canadian and the other Indonesian.

Images have shown several bodies lying on a major road, as well as seriously injured people being carried away from the scene.

The police reports 20 people were injured in the attacks. A Dutch national working for the UN was severly injured, according to Dutch media. Some reports talk about two Dutch citizens among the victims.

The explosions and the shooting

Indonesian police confirmed that the six explosions were caused by a bomb, adding that at least one of the blasts could have been a suicide bomber. One of the blasts was an explosive thrown in a crowd, though the security forces have not yet confirmed whether it was a grenade or a bomb.

A shooting thereby followed between the police and the attackers.

All six blasts occurred about 50 meters apart.

Jakarta Blast

The explosions were centred around Thamrin Street, a major shopping and business district in the city center, also close to embassies and the United Nations offices.

Six gunmen on motorbikes entered the area carrying long rifles and shooting into the crowd, some of them carrying explosives. One of the gunmen reportedly shot a police officer at close range.

Details remain unclear, but at least three of the blasts hit a Starbucks cafe and destroyed a police security post. Eyewitnesses say several attackers entered the Starbucks cafe and detonated explosives.

Gunfire broke out after the police arrived at the scene, in a cinema located in the same building as the Starbucks cafe.

National Police Deputy Chief Commander Gen Budi Gunawan said two of the attackers had been killed during the shootout outside a cinema, and two others blew themselves up at the police post in front of Starbucks.

In the aftermath of the attacks, Starbucks announced they were closing all its cafes in Jakarta "until further notice."

Armed police, snipers and armoured vehicles were deployed on the streets of the capital, while the area around the shopping centre was cordoned off.

Jakarta: on terrorists' radar for a while

Indonesian police was on high alert during the end-of-year celebrations, after they foiled a suicide bombing in Jakarta on New Year; this thwarted attack is believed by some to be linked to IS jihadists.

In December, the police had also arrested five people suspected of being part of an IS-affiliated cell, and four others linked to the extremist terror group Jemaah Islamiyah. The security forces had also seized bomb-making material and an IS-inspired flag.

150,000 police officers had been mobilised from 24 December - 2 january to guard key sites.

Jakarta police had been saying for a while that an attack on Indonesian soil was a high possibility. Although it is unclear whether these attacks are related to earlier threats, the police confirmed that IS recently issued threats to target Indonesia. The warnng said there will be "a concert in Indonesia" and that it would make international news.

These attacks are the first major incidents in Indonesia's capital since the 2009 bombings of two hotels that killed seven people and injured more than 50.

Image: The home of Muhammad Ali, one of the attackers who died in the bomb attack.

Video: Inside the rented room of the attackers.

Thu, 2016-01-14TRAC INCIDENT REPORT Terrorism and Governmental Policy Deterring Terrorism Arson / Fire Bombings as a Terrorist Tactic Suicide Missions (Bombers) as a Terrorist Tactic Inside The Islamic State's external operations branch - Emni, aka Amn al-Kharji Islamic State (IS) / Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS) / Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS or ISIL, IS)Islamic State Malaysia, Indonesia & Philippines (IS, ISMIP, ISISMIP, JAKDN)-- Kuala Lumpur Cell / Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah / Malay archipelago unit for ISEA / Majmu'ah al Arkhabiliy / Jamaah Ansar Khilalaf Daulah Nusantara Bahrun Naim Cell Network (Jemaah Ansharut Daulah in Java, Indonesia /JAD / IS Indonesia) - CELL PROFILE Indonesia scours a jungle for ISIS fugitive Jakarta nabs 4 foreigners with 'ISIS connection'Islamic State Goes Global: ISIL Spreads in Indonesia Indonesian police foil 'jihad' attacks, arrest six suspects: media The rise of Aman Abdurrahman, IS master ideologue Indonesia Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia & Islamic State- Wilayat Philippines

TRAC INCIDENT REPORT: Islamic State Istanbul Suicide Bombing Turkey - 12 January 2016

Submitted by Clemmie Douchez... on Tue, 2016-01-12 06:29

Clemmie Douchez...Most Usefulhttp://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/least-10-dead-15-hurt-blast-central-ist...

Update 08 September 2016

Six suspects in the attack were released on 05 September 2016, brining down the total number of suspects for the 12 January 2016 attack in pre-trial detention from 13 to 7 in the case. The original indictment lists 26 people as suspects, but after trial Turkish court decided to release suspects named

Ahmad Darwish,
Ali Alibrahem,
Ehab Haidar,
Omran Alibrahem,
Zafer Alshal and
Zekeriya Derviş

Ahmad Darwish was indicted on charges of aiding terror because he helped the bomber, Nabil Fadli, to get a Turkish identification card and provided safe place to stay while awaiting the attack.

Questions still remain about Fadli. On 5 January 2016, Fadli applied to get a temporary refugee identification from Zeytinburnu police station in Istanbul, where they took both his fingerprints and his image. The question is why after living in Turkey undetected would he risk applying of refugee status right before the attack?

The Incident

At least 10 people were killed and 15 injured in a violent explosion on Tuesday morning, in the historical site of Sultanahmet in Istanbul - a popular and touristic district. Turkish authorities suspect a Syrian affiliated to the Islamic State (IS) to be the suicide bomber responsible for the explosion which killed at least 8 German citizens.

The victims

Image: The victims of the explosion

On Tuesday morning, at 10:18 a.m. local time, a violent blast in one of Istanbul's touristic districts killed at least 10 people and injured 15 more, according to first official estimates.

Foreign tourists, Germans in particular, are reportedly the majority of the victims of the blast. At least eight of those killed by the blast were Germans; Norwegian tourists have also been reported to be among those wounded, and the Yonhap news agency said a South Korean national was among the wounded.

It is not yet known whether Germans were expressly targeted in this attack, or if the suicide bomber was targting tourists in the broad sense.

The explosion and the suicide bomber

Images: Photos of the explosion in Istanbul's Sultanahmet district

The suicide bomber responsible for the explosion that killed at least 10 people is believed to be Nabil Fadli, a Syrian national born in Saudi Arabia in 1988. Turkish authorities also found out he was affiliated to the Islamic State (IS), and that he had registered as a refugee just a week earlier.

Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus denied that the suicide bomber had been on the country's militant watch-list or on any international watch-lists, and said he was believed to have recently crossed into Turkey from Syria.

The fact that the bomber had registered as a Syrian refugee suggests central planning by IS leaders, potentially to provoke a backlash in Europe against legitimate Syrian asylum-seekers, in the hope of radicalising some of the refugees.

The Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called for an emergency meeting in Ankara, where the Minister of Interior Afkan Ala and the head of Secret Intelligence (MIT) Hakan Fidan were in particular asked to participate.

Accomplices?

Five people have been arrested in connection with the suicide bombing. No details about the suspects have been revealed yet.

The site of the explosion

The explosion happened at the ancient Roman hippodrome near the Saint-Sophia Basilica and the Blue Mosque (the two most visited historical sites in Turkey), in the Sultanahmet district popular with tourists.

The explosion was so violent that it was heard several kilometers from the point of origin.

Turkey: the newest terrorist target?

For several months now, Turkey has been in a state of alert since the twin suicide attack which killed 103 people on 10 October 2015 in front of the Ankara train station. This attack, which was the deadliest yet in Turkey, was claimed by the Islamic State.

In January 2015, a female suicide bomber detonated her explosives in front of a police station in the same district as the most recent explosion, Sultanahmet, injuring two police officers. The attack was attributed to a left-wing group, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C).

On 23 December 2015, the Sabiha Gökçen Airport was hit by a mortar attack which killed one person and injured another. A Kurdish group claimed the attack, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK).

After more than two years of cease-fire, fighting between the Turkish security forces and Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) has been reignited. The peace talks started in 2012 which were trying to put an end to a conflict which has killed more than 40.000 people since 1984 have thus been shattered

For More on TRAC Insight: Islamic State cell activity within Turkey and Turkish Border

Tue, 2016-01-12TRAC INCIDENT REPORT On the Blink of a Marginalizing Turkish Socialism, Extremist Turkish Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) is Signaling for More Actions in 2013 The Islamic State (ISIS) and Turkey’s Political Shuffle within a Chaotic Middle East Attacks on Soft Targets Islamic State (IS) / Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS) / Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS or ISIL, IS)Kongra-Gel (KGK) / Kurdistan People’s Congress / PKK Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C)Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)Turkey arrests: Two held in Ankara over New Year's Eve 'attack plot'Islamic State Kills Second Raqqa Silently Slaughtered Activist in Turkey Turkey