Sinai-based militant Adel Habara (Photo: Al-Ahram)

 

A terrorism department at Egypt's Criminal Court sentenced late Tuesday Sinai-based militant Adel Habara and eight others to death on charges of possessing ammunition, explosives and targeting police and army personnel.

Among the defendants, four were present including Habara, while five others were tried in absentia.

On 24 February, the court sent its preliminary death sentence against all the defendants in the case to the country's Grand Mufti, the most senior Muslim cleric in the country, for a consultative review as required by Egyptian law, and the cleric approved the death sentence.

Meanwhile, the defendants have the right to appeal at the Court of Cassation against the death sentence.

The prosecution charged the convicted of "joining a jihadi group that aims to overthrow the government and target the army and police, possessing explosives, having connections with the Islamic State group, and receiving funds from outside parties to achieve this goal."

Habara and the other defendants were all arrested in Egypt's Sharqiya governorate, northeast of Cairo, in September 2013 while possessing ammunition and explosive devices.

This is the second death sentence that the Sinai militant Habara has received.

In December, Cairo Criminal Court confirmed death sentences against Habara and six others for carrying out an execution-style killing of policemen in an ambush in August 2013. Some 25 soldiers were killed in the attack.

Habara, who hit the headlines over his involvement in the attack, is also accused of involvement in another major militant attack in Rafah against the Egyptian army in August 2012, which left 16 soldiers killed. Further, he is accused of involvement in other militant operations against security forces.

A large number Islamists have been sentenced to death in similar cases over the past year. The latest was a preliminary death sentence to ousted president Mohamed Morsi and 105 other defendants in the trial known in the Egyptian media as the Natroun jailbreak case.

Federal prosecutors announced new charges Friday against two men accused in the Boston terror attack plot foiled last week when officers killed suspect Usaamah Rahim.

David Wright and Nicholas Rovinski are accused of conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS, the Department of Justice said Friday.

Rovinski and Wright are accused of plotting with Rahim to carry out violent attacks inside the United States in support of ISIS, the extremist Islamic group that occupies parts of Iraq, Syria and Libya and which has encouraged its followers to stage "lone wolf" terror attacks around the world.

Rovinski, of Everett, Massachusetts, was arrested Thursday night without incident, according to Boston FBI spokeswoman Kristen Setera. He was scheduled to appear before a U.S. magistrate Friday afternoon. Wright, who is also charged with obstruction of justice, was arrested shortly after Rahim's June 2 death. He is set for a June 19 court date.

The plot unraveled last week when authorities -- who had been secretly listening in on Rahim's telephone conversations -- concluded an attack on police officers was imminent.

When officers confronted Rahim, he pulled a knife, and after they initially backed away from him, officers fired upon the attacker, killing him.

Law enforcement believed Rahim, Wright and Rovinski had been radicalized by ISIS and initially planned for Rahim to behead conservative blogger Pamela Geller. But Rahim switched targets and decided to knife police officers instead, because they were more accessible, according to the FBI and prosecutors.

During questioning, Wright waived his Miranda rights and spoken openly with police, the FBI has said. In his arrest affidavit, Rovinski is not named but described as attending a meeting on May 31 with Rahim and Wright on a beach in Rhode Island, where the three discussed "their plans," including the idea of beheading Geller.

CNN contact with Rovinski

In March, Rovinski had shared with CNN his Islamist extremist beliefs and motivation to act on them.

A producer exchanged messages with Rovinski, and during the conversation, the Rhode Island resident described exchanges with an alleged ISIS fighter who urged him to come to Iraq and Syria and join the terrorist group.

The communications were part of research into Americans identifying with jihadists online. Rovinski told CNN he considered following the fighter's call.

On his Twitter account, the Rhode Island resident spoke out against the United States: "Living amung (sic) the enemy."

"Who wishes to see flag of tawheed upon white house," he wrote on March 28. Tawheed, a fundamental principle and saying of Islam, is also a favorite inscription on jihadi flags -- namely ISIS and al Qaeda.

In an online conversation, he said, "I am not violent at heart but push the wrong button and its (sic) not pretty."

On his Twitter account were messages directed at people connected with ISIS, including Mujahid Miski, the online alias of Mohamed Abdullahi Hasan, a former Minnesotan believed to be fighting with Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Miski also had been in direct contact with Alan Simpson, one of the two shooters in the Texas attack on Geller's "Draw Your Own Mohammed" event in May.

Rovinski told CNN in the online exchanges that he would attend services at a mosque near his home but said he never shared his fundamentalist interpretation of Islam with his imam. Prior to his conversion to Islam, he said he was agnostic, but sought "truth and guidance" and found Islam.

A Woodbridge teenager admitted in court Thursday that he was the secret voice behind a pro-Islamic State Twitter account, which once counted more than 4,000 followers, and that he helped another teen travel to join the Islamic State in Syria.

Ali Shukri Amin, 17, a former student at Prince William County’s Osbourn Park High School who was arrested earlier this year, pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist organization. As part of a deal with prosecutors, he admitted that he helped arrange a successful trip to Syria for an 18-year-old Prince William County man who wanted to fight with the Islamic State.

That man, Reza Niknejad, has been charged with conspiring to kill and injure people abroad and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and the Islamic State, though he apparently remains overseas, prosecutors said.

Amin also unmasked himself as the person who ran the controversial and prolific @AmreekiWitness Twitter handle, an unabashedly pro-Islamic State account whose manager drew news coverage for sparring with the State Department, postulating how digital currency might be used to fund the Islamic State and opining on the unrest in Ferguson, Mo.

[What a former teacher had to say about Ali Amin around the time of his arrest]

America’s suspected ISIS supporters View Graphic

Amin appeared in court for only about 10 minutes, wearing a blue-gray jail jumpsuit. He spoke clearly, answering most of Judge Claude M. Hilton’s questions about his understanding of the proceedings, with a polite, “Yes, sir.” His hair was unkempt, and he had a thin mustache.

His mother, Amani Ibrahim, sat one row back, watching her son intently. She declined to comment. Joseph Flood, Amin’s defense attorney, said the teen was a “good person” who made a “youthful indiscretion.” He said Amin, a devout Muslim, had become upset about the brutal regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and what he perceived as America’s support of it, and when he became frustrated by his inability to impact the situation, he turned to the Internet and the Islamic State.

“He was blogging on the Internet,” Flood said. “It’s as simple as that.”

The plea deal is the culmination of legal proceedings that have played out in secret for months while Amin has remained in federal custody, charged as a juvenile.

The case is also the latest example of a young person connecting with the Islamic State online — at first, to nurture radical ideas, and then, to lend tangible support. U.S Attorney Dana Boente said prosecutors had charged nearly 50 people with helping or trying to help the terrorist group, which was using social media in an “unprecedented way.”

“They’re just kind of flooding the airwaves, so to speak,” he said.

[Tracking the rise of the Islamic State abroad]

An undated image posted on a militant website in 2014 shows fighters from Islamic State group marching in Raqqa, Syria (Uncredited/AP)

Amin was first arrested in late February and accused as a juvenile of helping a man not much older than himself travel to Syria and join the Islamic State, officials familiar with the case have said. Charges against that man, Niknejad, were filed under seal Wednesday and announced by prosecutors just as Amin pleaded guilty.

Amin’s role in the trip seemed to be that of a facilitator and radicalizer. According to his plea, he began an effort in September to convert Niknejad to radical Islam, and in late November or early December, he put Niknejad in touch with an Islamic State supporter overseas through an encrypted chat messenger. Federal prosecutors declined to specify the relationship between Amin and Niknejad. Flood, Amin’s defense attorney, said the two were friends.

Amin, according to the plea, arranged for the overseas Islamic State supporter to send Niknejad a thumb drive, a letter and a phone he could use during travel. FBI agents seized such a package from Amin on Jan. 7, but it not seem to derail Niknejad’s trip, according to the plea.

Niknejad, according to the plea, bought a plane trip from Dulles International Airport to Greece with a layover in Istanbul, Turkey, and on Jan. 14, Amin and another person gave him a ride to the airport. Niknejad told his family he was going on a camping trip, according to the plea.

According to Amin’s plea, Customs and Border Protection records show Niknejad made it to Turkey on Jan. 15 but never boarded the plane to Greece. An Islamic State supporter told Amin the next day that Niknejad had successfully crossed over into Syria, and Amin and another person delivered to his family members a letter and thumb drive in which Niknejad indicated he did not plan to see them again, according to the plea.

[Graphic: The Islamic State’s suspected inroads into America]

Officials have said the person who drove with Amin and Niknejad to the airport was another 17-year-old student at Osbourn Park High School. It’s not clear precisely what that teen know about the plans of the other two, though Amin told Niknejad during the ride where to go once he arrived in Turkey.

Those who knew Amin have said in previous interviews that he seemed like most any Northern Virginia teenager. In the months before his arrest, a former teacher and employer said, he was lining up references for college applications. He did not yet know where he wanted to go to school or what he wanted to study, but he had shown interest in economics, computer science and cryptography.

Amin wrote for a digital currency news Web site, and on the Internet — even under his own name — seemed to represent himself as much older than he was. He wrote on a LinkedIn profile, for example, that he was a “Computer Hardware Professional” and “Media Representative” and had co-founded an organization that built personal computers.

According to his plea and news clippings, his online postings extended far beyond a few exaggerations on his resume.

Andrew McCabe, the assistant director in charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office, said Amin was once an “influential online figure” who was able to make radical ideas accessible to Westerners and possessed “particular cyber savvy.” Boente, the U.S. attorney, said Amin was “very articulate.”

Under the “AmreekiWitness” handle — which, according to his plea, Amin started in June 2014 and which at one time counted more than 4,000 followers — the teen wrote of developing financial support for the Islamic State through Bitcoin or another, secure digital currency.

Such a system, he wrote in one article, would not only avoid government taxes, but it would fund foreign fighters in a way that was “untrackable.”

Amin — who, according to his plea, authored more than 7,000 Tweets — was not shy about interacting with others or drawing attention. Rita Katz of SITE Intelligence Group wrote in a Time column that the AmreekiWitness account once had a back-and-forth with the State Department’s anti-radicalization account — an exchange sparked by an Amin Tweet that said, “IS has flaws, but the moment you claim they cut off the heads of every non-Muslim they see, the discussion is over.”

The Daily Mail wrote about the teen in August 2014, when his AmreekiWitness account opined about the unrest and police actions in Ferguson, Mo.

“They cower in fear of us whilst they massacre and oppress you! It’s time to strike fear into the hearts of the oppressors. #FergusonUnderIS,” he wrote on the account, which has since been suspended.

Amin also ran an ask.fm page, according to his plea, answering questions about his faith and the Islamic State, an al-Qaeda offshoot also known as ISIS or ISIL.

The page — which Amin seemed to stop updating about five months ago — was undeniably radical. Amin’s biography said only: “Dedicated to raising awareness about the upcoming conquest of the Americas, and the benefits it has upon the American people.” Amin asserted, at one point, that “jihad is also an obligation,” and said, at another, “The American government that calls me a ‘terrorist’ must feel some kind of terror that compels them to call me that. See how American soldiers feel when they see those black flags and swords that thirst for their necks, and ask me if no one fears us.”

But Amin, at times, also demonstrated he was not completely brainwashed or violent. He wrote, for example, of suicide bombing: “I disagree with it personally, but the proofs aren’t weak.” Asked if his views represent those of the Islamic State, he responded: “Not at all, I only represent my views, and they do occasionally contradict official IS views.”

“If I could, I would be gone tomorrow,” he wrote. “May Allah make it so.”

Flood said his client has never been violent and noted he had long cooperated with authorities, hoping to serve as an example for other youths. “He understands that what he did was a crime, and he takes responsibility for that today,” Flood said.

Even McCabe, of the FBI, said his guilty plea was indicative of the “seductive” nature of the Islamic State online and rued that two families had, in some ways, lost teenagers.

“Make no mistake,” McCabe said. “This case is a tragedy.”

Pro-Islamic State (IS) groups have issued their first online periodical in Turkish. Believed to be designed by veteran IS digital experts at Al-Hayat Media Center, which is known for its highly professional work, the periodical launched its first edition last week, titled "Konstantiniyye" — referring to Constantinople, Istanbul’s name before its conquest by the Ottoman army.

The 46-page periodical includes symbolically relevant visual material that offers important clues to IS’ strategic vision of Turkey.

The main theme of the first issue is the conquest of Konstantiniyye, as it coincides with the anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul on May 29, 1453. The unsigned lead editorial explains that the periodical is published because of a “lack of access for Turkish people, especially Muslims, to news, articles and videos that are published in the Islamic State.”

The first article is about the city's conquest. The article states that although the city was conquered by Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II on May 29, 1453, Konstantiniyye was not really conquered; it has to be conquered again, this time by the "armies of Islam." The article begins with the Prophet Muhammad extolling the importance of Istanbul. The strategic vision of IS for Istanbul is inspired by the hadiths (the prophet’s sayings), especially the one that predicts that the Islamic armies will first engage the Romans in a major war at Aleppo, close to the Day of Judgment; following that war they will go to Konstantiniyye to conquer it "without arms."

The article ends by stating, “As you will understand from these hadiths, this city now called Istanbul will be conquered without weapons and without bloodshed — only with chants of 'God is great.' The new army of the caliphate, rebuilt as ordained by the prophet, with God’s blessing, will thus capture the city.”

The articles in this first issue, in general, do not advocate violence against Turkey. This may be interpreted as IS refraining from declaring Turkey as an enemy, at least for the time being. It is not clear whether this attitude reflects their opinion of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Why such a careful attitude toward Turkey? The answer to this question can be found in another article, titled "Immigration." The message in that article implies that IS does not see Turkey as a battlefield but as a rich source of human resources. All Muslims of Turkey, in particular those in the fields of engineering, health care, education and the military, are invited to emigrate to the Islamic State. Hence, it becomes clear that capturing and holding on to territory is important in the strategic narrative of IS.

A poem that promises the conquest of Istanbul with chants of God’s greatness is seen as a way of praising the glory of the Ottomans, making one wonder whether there is some strategic reason behind it and whether IS is trying to assume the label of "protector of the Sunni world," against Iranian expansionism. If so, then it would mean a radical shift in the strategic vision of IS. The ambition to take over the role of the Ottoman Empire by challenging the nearby enemy of Iran and Shiite expansionism, and the distant enemy of the West and its values, suggest that IS has global aspirations.

It is possible to interpret the article titled "Who is an Apostate?” as a discreet threat to political decision-makers in Turkey, particularly the AKP elites. The basic message to the AKP in this article is that "if you don’t mess with us, we will not mess with you as long as you don’t become apostates." IS here openly warns the AKP that if it takes action against IS, those involved will be declared apostates and their legitimacy will be questioned in front of the Sunni world.

The article "Democracy on Fire," accompanied by a photo of coffins of US soldiers wrapped in US flags, without a doubt reflects IS' perception of democracy as the worst enemy. The article explains, "Democracy can never be compatible with Islam. These are two different religions. No other religion and ideology is compatible with Islam. You cannot add a qualifier to a Muslim. There cannot be a democratic Muslim, communist Muslim, socialist Muslim, Jewish Muslim or Buddhist Muslim. This calls for the Islamic world and Turkey to fight against democracy.” The article is perceived as a reaction to the Kurdish radical Islamist Huda-Par (Free Cause Party). Pro-IS thinkers in Turkey are thus saying the recent elections are not legitimate in their eyes while trying to attract the Huda-Par voters to its ranks.

However, the IS periodical does not include any distinctly anti-Kurdish articles and visual material, apart from challenging Huda-Par. This indicates that radical Islamist Kurds in Turkey constitute for IS a major source of manpower, and that IS is focused on attracting Islamist Kurdish youths.

The article "After Blowing Up the White House, We Want Paris” is a collection of stiff messages to Europe and the United States. After stating that the Kobani resistance of the Kurds succeeded with the efforts of the coalition forces under US leadership, the article resorts to sarcasm: "Congratulations, Pentagon. May the Crusaders enjoy the rubble at Kobani … If you are dreaming of Mosul, Tikrit, Shengal and a piece of a forest in Nigeria we will make your life miserable and blow up your White House, Big Ben and Eiffel Tower.”

From this first online periodical in Turkish, one can conclude — at least for the time being — that IS does not see Turkey as a battlefield, and that Turkey will not be conquered with weapons. Hence, IS is expected to continue to appeal primarily to the hearts and minds of Kurdish youths. The publication also makes it clear — with its message, “We are the soldiers of the mission declared by the prophet" — that there is strong emphasis on Aleppo and the prophet’s visions.

For the first time, we see how closely IS is monitoring the changes in political Islam in Turkey, and how it is looking for a place for itself in that transformation. There is no doubt that Turkish Islamism represented by the AKP has been tarnished with corruption allegations. IS appears to be fusing its ideology with Islamism and Ottomanism in Turkey to create a new radical Islamist school of thought there that could motivate the Islamist masses already disengaged from socio-economic life and democracy closer to IS.

That IS has a long-term strategic vision for Turkey is the most important message the periodical is sending. It emphasizes the popular-centric approach aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Turks, instead of armed violence and terror; hence the call to conquer Istanbul not with weapons but with Islamist spiritual action.

The rebel group that has seized power in Yemen has taken at least four U.S. citizens prisoner, according to U.S. officials who said that efforts to secure the Americans’ release have faltered.

One of the prisoners had been cleared for release in recent days only to have that decision reversed by members of the Houthi rebellion that toppled the U.S.-backed government earlier this year and now controls most levers of power in Yemen.

The Americans are believed to be held at a prison in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, which has been bombed repeatedly as part of an air campaign led by Saudi Arabia aimed at dislodging the Houthis from power. The United States has provided intelligence support to that operation.

The detention of the Americans has complicated U.S. efforts to navigate the chaotic aftermath of the Houthi takeover, which displaced a government that had cooperated extensively with the United States on drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations against a dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate in the country.

U.S. officials said three of the prisoners worked in private­sector jobs and that a fourth, whose occupation is unknown, has dual U.S.-Yemeni citizenship. The officials said none of the four were employees of the U.S. government.

The Washington Post is withholding some details about the prisoners at the request of U.S. officials and relatives who cited concerns for their safety.

A fifth U.S. citizen, Sharif Mobley, is also in Houthi custody, in connection with terrorism­related charges brought against him by the previous government more than five years ago. Mobley’s incarceration has been previously reported.

The recently detained prisoners are among dozens of U.S. citizens who were either unable to leave Yemen or chose to remain in the country after the U.S. government closed its embassy in February and began pulling out its employees and U.S. military personnel.

Details of the Americans’ detention remain murky, including where they are being held and whether they are together. In part this lack of detail is because there is little if any direct exchange of information between the United States and the Houthi movement, which has frequently employed chants of “Death to America.”

With no formal contact, U.S. officials said efforts to secure the prisoners’ release have gone mainly through intermediaries, including humanitarian groups that continue to have a presence in Sanaa.

U.S. officials said there is no indication that the prisoners have been physically harmed or are being treated as hostages. Still, they expressed concern about the well-being of one of the prisoners, who began to behave erratically in recent days as efforts to arrange for his departure unraveled.

The prisoner was initially detained “because he overstayed his visa,” a senior U.S. official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. But Houthi leaders early this week cleared him for release, with flights arranged by the International Organization for Migration.

The Houthis abruptly withdrew that travel authorization on May 27, however, and accused the prisoner of having traveled without permission to “sensitive” regions in the country, the U.S. official said. Among those locations, the official said, was Abyan province in southern Yemen, which has been a stronghold for al-Qaeda fighters who are adversaries of the Houthis.

After being returned to a Yemeni prison, the American “acted as if he were mentally unstable” and removed his clothes, the U.S. official said, citing reports from sources in the Yemeni capital.

A member of the prisoner’s family declined to comment when reached by phone on Friday.

The Houthis are part of a Shiite sect that receives backing from the government of Iran. The United States and Iran are engaged in tense negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program, and U.S. officials have denounced Iran’s detention and trial of Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian. But U.S. officials said there have been no contacts with Iran over the Americans being held in Yemen.

Saudi airstrikes have reportedly killed more than 1,600 people in Yemen over the past several months.

In telephone conversations with his lawyers, Mobley has said he is being held in an area of the capital that has been targeted repeatedly. The site appears to have been struck again this week, killing 40 people, according to a statement released Friday by the Reprieve organization, which has represented Mobley.

“This raises some pretty disturbing questions about U.S. support for the bombing campaign,” said Namir Shabibi, a Reprieve official. Shabibi said that Reprieve has repeatedly asked U.S. officials to persuade the Saudis to avoid bombing Mobley’s location, but that “given the established Saudi record of hitting the same spot multiple times, there’s a high risk Sharif will be hit again.”

Brig. Gen. Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan, commander of the Iranian army's ground forces, attended a closed-door session of the Iranian parliament May 24 and warned the members about the Islamic State (IS) threat.

“Today, the terrorist and takfiri forces are near our borders," he said. "A year ago this time, it came down from general staff headquarters that Daesh forces are in Jalawla and Saadiya and their next step would be Khanaqin, and then Iran. The takfiri terrorists of Daesh [the Arabic acronym for IS] had recruited supporters and had planned a series of explosions and terrorist activities inside Iran until Daesh forces could reach the borders. However, their plots were unfolded by the Ministry of Intelligence."

He went on to say that five brigades were sent to fight against IS and Iran's infantry and helicopters penetrated into Iraq.

This is the first time that a high-ranking military official of Iran has officially commented on the IS presence near Iranian borders, or that IS is planning to attack Iran. There are usually reports of conflict between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IS forces in the media. Now, however, it has become clear that Iran’s army has been fighting IS during the last few months. It's a rare event for the military forces of the Islamic Republic to enter Iraq without informing the United Nations. By acknowledging that five brigades were sent to fight IS, Pourdastan has acknowledged that more than 30,000 military personnel of Iran have been involved.

Four days before the general’s comments, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said, “I have heard that some, not all but some, of the weak-minded officials of the Persian Gulf region are trying to bring proxy wars close to the Iranian borders. They should know that if they cause mischief, the Islamic Republic’s reaction will be very harsh.”

Intelligence Minister Seyed Mahmoud Alawi said, “Supporters of a terrorist jihadist group were trying to poison the food of a committee in Tehran and there were also two bombing plots planned for last year’s Quds Day rallies in the cities of Zahedan and Shiraz. They had also taken an international swordsman hostage in Zahedan for a while. We started an operation against a group known as Ansar Al Furqan in south east of the country during which a certain individual named Abu Hafs was arrested alongside a group of suicide attackers.”

After reviewing these statements made by the senior military and security officials in the country, it becomes clear that the possibility of IS attacking Iran has increased. Unlike last year, when the Iranian officials sounded confident, this year, Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli warned that if IS comes within 40 kilometer (25 miles) of Iran’s borders, Iran will officially engage them.

So why have the Iranian officials started to worry about IS entering Iran? Possible reasons include:

• IS is determined to overthrow Iran which they refer to as the Safavid state.

• IS military victories in different provinces of Iraq in the past few months.

• The existence of high military, social and religious potentials in the border provinces of Iran such as Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Khuzestan and Kermanshah.

• The Iranian army's ground forces’ lack of proper weaponry. (Pourdastan had asked the Iranian parliament members to allocate budget for the army to buy new tanks and helicopters.)

The reality is that when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, warning bells started ringing in Tehran.

Because of the Shiite rule of the past three decades, Sunni Iranians living in the border provinces have political and ethnic grievances. In Sistan, terrorist groups such as Jundallah declared their existence, in Khuzestan takfiri groups started killing police officers, and in Kurdistan there were conflicts between the Salafists and both the IRGC and local Shiites.

A journalist who lives in the Kurdish region of Iran and wished to speak on condition of anonymity spoke to Al-Monitor about the presence of Salafi forces. “Unfortunately we do not hear about them in the news," he said. "They have repeatedly attacked the Dervish groups and the police forces. Intelligent forces have managed to control them but people's peace of mind has been disturbed.”

In the last three decades, because of the eight years of war with Iraq as well as sanctions, the weaponry of Iran's armed forces has become outdated and obsolete. Iran’s attempts to produce modern tanks has been unsuccessful and all the helicopters in the Iranian fleet were made before the 1979 revolution. Iran’s military weakness compared to its neighbors such as Turkey or Pakistan is evident in the Military Balance Book of 2015. In case of a war, Iran is faced with certain problems including the possibility of collaboration between fundamentalist Sunni forces in the border regions with IS and Al-Qaida and the inadequacy of Iran's air fleet. All the Iranian helicopters and airplanes are a few generations older than those of neighboring countries. Right now, Iranian helicopters are similar to the models used during the Vietnam War.

The condition of Iran’s armor forces is the worst of its forces. The M-60, T-55, T-62, T-72 and Chieftain tanks are not suitable for modern-day battlefields. In many countries in the world, these type of tanks have already been overhauled. By asking for money to buy tanks, Pourdastan has clarified that Iranian tanks are not capable of resisting against modern anti-tank weaponry used by terrorists, and the Zulfiqar tank production project has been unsuccessful.

If Sunni jihadi forces attack Iran, the limited military forces of Iran have only one option. They must withdraw from Syria and Iraq to return and defend the borders of Iran. In that case, the government of Iraq and Syria are likely to face serious challenges and the government of Syria may even be toppled. All the various scenarios are a strategic threat to Iran’s national borders.

A year ago, at the height of Isis's social media rampage, a shy, 19-year-old Finnish convert to Islam, who had never even been to the Middle East, was one of the terror group's most devastating propaganda weapons.

Abdullah was prolific. His Mujaahid4Life Twitter account, with close to 11,000 followers, was the second most-followed English pro-Isis account after Shami Witness. He tweeted graphic photos and videos, snippets from religious texts, battlefield updates and violent, hateful propaganda. At the time, Abdullah told Newsweek he was "a diplomat for Isis". He was a virtual jihadi, an advocate for violence in the name of Islam. Today, he's just another awkward adolescent tweeting from behind a mess of food wrappers in a darkened flat in a mid-sized European city.

Abdullah has recanted his support for Isis and says he wants to help other acolytes do the same. He's one of few people to renounce his violent extremism, and, to those combating online jihadism, he brings a rare view from inside its echo-chamber. "When I was in that Isis bubble, I was thinking so emotionally," he says. "When you're younger you don't have the intellectual capabilities to process it. It was an obsession, just blind devotion."

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Abdullah chose an unknown Isis fighter, pictured above, as his screen avatar

It's an alarmingly short path from hip-hop fan to radical jihadist: "The internet is such a huge part of recruiting these days, it's not even funny," says Abdullah. "It's like, 99% online. For the kids who do this, it's easy to conceal it." Abdullah, raised in an atheist home, had become curious about religion as he wrestled with teenage questions of identity and belonging. He found Islam and felt it made sense of the world. He converted in November 2012, declaring the Shahada, or testimony of faith, alone in his bedroom.

His mother, who asked not to be named to protect her family's privacy, watched as her intelligent, emotionally fragile son become increasingly absorbed in his new faith. "At first, I thought it would be a passing thing, like many other phases before. He was 17 at the time and had no friends and no social life," she recalls. "Knowing my son, I wasn't worried that he would leave the country to join the fighting. My worry was the connections he was making online and how much he was sharing about his 'real' identity on the internet."

Abdullah tweeted graphic photos and videos but was revolted by the killing of British aid worker Alan Henning last October

Abdullah spent most of his time online, looking for people who shared his desire to follow what he calls "a more pure understanding of Islam". He connected with Jabhat al-Nusra supporters, who steered him to Inspire, the al-Qaida franchise's English-language magazine. "Inspire really affected me. And that, coupled with the oppression of Muslims I saw on the news, had an emotional effect," he says.

By the spring of 2013, Abdullah was tweeting support for Jabhat al-Nusra. By summer, he was doing press-ups and crunches, packing a bag and planning to go and fight in Syria. Agents from Finland's security services, Supo, were soon at his door: they had noticed his activity online and asked him not to go. Rumbled, Abdullah continued to support Nusra's jihad from afar.

When Nusra and the upstart Islamic State of Syria and al-Sham (Isis) came head to head in late summer 2014, Abdullah felt he couldn't remain neutral; he had to choose a side. He chose Isis, and waded deeper into an online community built around sharing what he now describes as a "cherry-picked" interpretation of Islam.

As his profile rose, Abdullah knitted deeper into this community. For someone who had been bullied viciously in primary school, the sense of being part of something important resonated. "What drew me in was actually doing something, explaining stuff. You disseminate that propaganda, so it makes you feel part of something bigger. Especially after Isis declared the caliphate," he says.

Charlie Winter, a researcher with the Quilliam Foundation think tank, says this is a common feeling among online propagandists: "It's an easy way to take part in jihad without putting themselves at risk." In Finland, disseminating propaganda the way Abdullah did isn't illegal unless there is an overt recruitment element – something Abdullah says he carefully avoided.

According to Supo, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, a little more than 60 Finns have travelled to Syria to fight, and, already, a third of them have returned. Supo's Tuomas Portaankorva says: "The possible threat from the returnees is our priority at the moment. Web monitoring is only one line of our work. What we see online is mostly connected to those who have travelled, or are about to, or are returning."

Although Supo reached Abdullah before he could go, there's no telling how many of the foreign fighters who continue to stream into Syria were inspired by him, or others like him. The agency won't comment on individual cases, but Portaankorva admits that the issue of how to handle online supporters is a thorny one. "Without these individuals, there would definitely be, in general, fewer travellers," he says.

Abdullah began to question Isis when the group killed the British aid worker Alan Henning in October 2014. He looked to classic scholarship for justification for the violence but couldn't find any. He tried to start discussions around theological texts, but no one wanted to talk: "It's all see no evil, hear no evil."

By the end of the year, Twitter was shutting down pro-Isis accounts and Abdullah wasn't interested in the daily scramble to create a new account and propagate a worldview to which he no longer subscribed: "When I went back to what Islam teaches, I saw no justification for these things. My message to young people is to go back to Islamic roots, stop living in the bubble. As Muslims we should go back to the religion itself, not what anyone claims." Abdullah's experience points to a need to counter Isis on an ideological level – one that feels authentic to participants and has the theological authority to give them something to hold onto as they reject extremism.

After months out of the social media loop, Abdullah has returned to Twitter as an anti-extremist to convince would-be jihadis to reconsider. Going back hasn't been easy. The vitriol has been immense – and familiar. "To go from someone who is making takfir on people to someone who has takfir made on him..." Abdullah sighs. "I didn't think it was going to be this harsh. There's a weird, dark irony to it."

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

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Ahrar al-Sham Spiritual Leader: The Idol of Democracy Has Shattered

By Sam Heller

On 26 May, Ahrar al-Sham’s chief shari’ah officer “Abu Muhammad al-Sadeq” issued a treatise on Twitter titled “And the Idol Has Shattered” – the “idol,” in this case, being democracy. Drawing on Algeria and Egypt’s aborted democratic experiments, Abu Muhammad argued that democracy is, in real practice, a trap for would-be Islamist participants.

Abu Muhammad was, on one level, stepping into the middle of an intra-Islamist and -jihadist controversy that has been roiling over the past several weeks. In that sense, his tweets (translated below) are another example of Ahrar threading the needle, reconciling the forces of the Syrian revolution with global jihadism in the interest of rebel unity and victory. And on another level, Abu Muhammad’s argument provides further insight into what might be an acceptable post-Assad Syrian political order for Ahrar al-Sham – which by now is arguably the strongest, most relevant fighting force within the Syrian rebellion.

The intramural Islamist/jihadist blowup into which Abu Muhammad inserted himself dates back to McClatchy’s 20 May interview with Jeish al-Islam commander Zahran Alloush. Alloush – one of Syria’s most powerful Islamist rebel chieftains – seemed to moderate his earlier rejection of democracy, saying, “After the fall of the regime, we’ll leave the Syrian people to choose the sort of state it wants.” (To their credit, McClatchy’s Roy Gutman and Mousab Alhamadee challenged Alloush on his reversal.)

Salafi-jihadist ideologue “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi” then weighed in on Alloush’s comments, seemingly implying that Alloush was guilty of apostasy (translation). Al-Maqdisi employed a Quranic verse (12:103) originally intended for non-Muslims and, more bluntly, said that “surrendering the fruits of jihad on the path of God to the whim of the people” amounted to “a betrayal of God, His Prophet, and the martyrs’ sacrifices.”

This sort of back-and-forth is not purely abstract. Insofar as Alloush is among Syria’s top rebels and al-Maqdisi is the prime ideological reference for Jabhat al-Nusrah, this is the sort of argument that gets people shot. (Alloush is himself a Salafist, but he reportedly hews more to the less radical ‘Ilmiyyah school of Salafism and is seen with distrust by many Salafi-jihadists.)

Abu Muhammad al-Sadeq seems to have consciously staked out a middle ground in this debate. He devotes much of his treatise to mini-histories of the Algerian and Egyptian coups, which he uses to argue that democracy, merits aside, is basically a trick. If Islamists win democratically, in his telling, the West will simply conspire with the “Deep State” to subvert those elections and crush the Islamists. He is sympathetic to the Brotherhood, who “bear an Islamic project,” but he makes it clear that the path forward is armed revolution and jihad. Currying favor with the West, as the Brotherhood did, is a waste of time. Abu Muhammad’s closing line seems like a reminder to Alloush that it’s pointless to pose as a “good Islamist” to the West. The West ultimately won’t make those intra-Islamist distinctions – Islamists, he says, will rise or fall together.

Abu Muhammad seems to reserve stronger language for his critique of al-Maqdisi’s position. Those who target Muslims who participate in the democratic process are, flatly, “wrong.” Waging war on democracy is “foolish,” “reckless” and likely to “shed sacrosanct (Muslim) blood” – a grave offense. When Abu Muhammad says that an appropriately Islamic electoral process “is not a squandering of the fruits of the jihad,” he seems to be clapping back directly at al-Maqdisi. Abu Muhammad warns that rebels must unite around their own Islamic project “before any claim can be imposed on them from without,” maybe a reference to regional or Western meddling, or maybe another allusion to al-Maqdisi – who, after all, is not Syrian and has not himself come to Syria to join the fight.

It doesn’t seem like a throwaway point when Abu Muhammad emphasizes the need for the warrior’s jihad to be coupled with “wise, just policy,” siyassah shar’iyyah hakimah. “Siyassah shar’iyyah” is frequently invoked by Ahrar, and it seems to translate roughly to being realistic and savvy, or to setting priorities. “Siyassah shar’iyyah” means you adhere to your ideological precepts but, within those lines, you also don’t do something ignorant – like announcing a war on the whole world, all at once.

In terms of what Abu Muhammad’s treatise reveals about Ahrar’s preferred political end state, his argument is long on the need for Syria’s Islamic factions to unify around an Islamic project and short on the details of what that project should look like – and deliberately so, by all appearances. When Abu Muhammad references the Quran’s Surat Ali ‘Imran (3:7), he seems to be telling his audience of fellow rebels to focus on the points that clearly unite them and leave the ambiguous details for later.

What can be taken from Abu Muhammad’s points are that Ahrar doesn’t necessarily object to something democracy-like, or to a representative electoral process with a clearly Islamic reference. If Syrians want to elect representatives who will deliberate on how best to implement the rule of God as expressed in an Islamic constitution, fine.

This, of course, is not a new position for Ahrar. One of the threads that has run through the Syrian revolution is that Ahrar al-Sham – which went from some motivated Salafists in Lattakia and Hama to the premiere rebel fighting force – has basically remained a political and religious constant. The revolution around Ahrar al-Sham has changed with time; Ahrar has not. What Ahrar’s Abu Muhammad al-Sadeq is saying in May 2015, then, is basically what Ahrar (or the Ahrar-dominated Syrian Islamic Front) was saying in January 2013 (see page 19 of Aron Lund’s report on the SIF). Ahrar refuses to put the sovereignty of God up for a vote, but electoral structures are acceptable as part of the implementation of Islamic rule. In a later piece, Lund aptly compared this political arrangement to “a Sunni version of Iran,” a “republican theocracy.”

Given Abu Muhammad and Ahrar’s emphasis on rebel unity, it seems possible that Ahrar would sign onto a maximally inclusive political order within its religious conditions. And there is more than one way to have an Islamic state, ranging from the ultra-literal application of non-codified Islamic law to something as comparatively modern as a civil-looking body of law with the teachings of Islam enshrined as the supreme constitutional reference.

The fundamentally Islamic character of a post-Assad Syria, however, does not seem to be up for debate. Ahrar has seen the Algerian and Egyptian experiences and – as Abu Muhammad drives home with a recurring Quranic reference (Quran 59:2) – taken warning of democracy. Ahrar may be politically flexible, but any settlement in Syria that doesn’t satisfy Ahrar’s religious terms is apparently off the table.

Abu Muhammad al-Sadeq’s collected tweets, 26 May 2015:

And the Idol Has Shattered

Musings on Events in Egypt

Sayeth God Most High: “So take warning, O you with eyes to see!” [Quran 59:2] There is truth in the saying, “History repeats itself,” and yet are there those who take warning?!

The events of Egypt have recalled the events of Algeria some twenty years previous, demonstrating to all those with foresight the falseness and failure of democracy. I do not speak here about democracy in terms of the religious ruling on it. Rather, I speak about democracy’s practical utility as a means of change when those bearing the Islamic project are the leading candidates.

In Algeria in 1990, the Islamists won elections with more than 80 percent of the votes, empowering them, according to the principles of democracy, to form a government and change the constitution. The West and the East quickly took heed of that, and so they suggested to their associates that they dissolve the parliament. The Islamists started with protests and peaceful sit-ins, just as happened in Egypt recently. And in the same way, the military brought down its troops and tanks to suppress the demonstrators based on flimsy, worn-out pretenses. It drove the protesters to arms and tossed them into prisons and detention centers.

For man, by his nature, rejects humiliation. So [his choice], then, is either a defense of his freedom to decide and choose; or the life of sheep, chicken, and baby chicks!

And that is exactly what happened in Egypt some twenty years after the Algerian experience. The truth is that the same scene plays out once again!

Between the two experiences – Algerian and Egyptian – there are similar aspects. In fairness, though, the Egyptian play was more developed, as the Islamists governed the country for a year. Then a stick was jammed in the wheels, and the Brotherhood were obstructed from carrying out their duties and implementing their project. The coup took place, enforced by the military, and the idol of democracy shattered for the thousandth time.

And despite the West’s flirtation with the Brotherhood’s thought in previous decades – treating it as a necessary alternative and presenting on the political stage as an substitute for the growing jihadist project – that flirtation swiftly expired in favor of a Deep State that could safeguard the West’s interests. So now you have Morsi and his Brotherhood sentenced to death, while Mubarak leaves jail exonerated. Are there those, then, who take warning?

Indeed, the Algerian experience of old and that of Egypt in recent years puts us in front of a reality: Democracy is nothing but a lie tailored to the interests of the powerful.

It is naïve to look at what is happening in Egypt as if it is a matter of Morsi and his Brotherhood – rather, it is a matter of Islam, before which the idol shatters for the thousandth time. We call, then, for the support of all oppressed Muslims in Egypt, and we wish for the success of all who bear an Islamic project. We take these stands, urging others to take up the truth and searching for admonition.

Soft opposition and silent [ballot] boxes cannot uproot tyrants that have sunk their fangs into the depths of our land, gorged themselves on our bounty, and been imposed by the West through naked force [lit., “with iron and fire”].

It is among God’s set universal and religious lessons on the defense [of truth] and on change that there must be wise, just policy alongside a Godly, righteous jihad.

And while we state definitively that democracy is invalid, we see as wrong those who target Muslim peoples on whom democracy has been imposed, as our duty towards them is to make clear [the truth] and call on them to take up their religion. Just as democracy is an illusion that has failed time and again, so confronting an imposed democracy with a foolish, reckless war that sheds sacrosanct blood is also something that has proven a failure.

While jihadist groups are working now to correct their path and comprehend their errors, they still require more clarity, discipline, and openness. We call on and wait for those Islamic groups that have decided to ride the vessel of democracy to be open and undertake a review now that the vessel has crashed – and the idol has shattered.

The solution is for people to know the falseness of democracy and for the revolution’s factions to unite around the totalities of shari’ah and work to end people’s suffering in a legitimate way that satisfies God on High.

Our greatest objection to democracy is not just its hypocrisy, rather it is that it grants the right of unbounded legislation to man, whereas we hold that this is among God’s characteristics. When people choose those in whose righteousness and qualifications they trust under an Islamic constitution protected by these factions, however, then that is not a squandering of the fruits of the jihad.

Before then, it is inappropriate to make hasty statements and accusations, for the meaning is in the substance. When it is possible, one must turn from that which is ambiguous to that which is clear and defined [Quran 3:7], and it is thus that this revolution will not disobey its Islam, God willing.

The test of seriousness now is whether the factions can come together on an Islamic constitution, on a body to protect and implement that constitution, and on a project to save the country, before any claim can be imposed on them from without.

It is in this way that the absolute truths of religion might be protected; people’s suffering might be relieved; and benefit might be drawn from those things deemed permissible and in the public interest in terms of our dealings with our international surroundings, in keeping with religious constraints.

Any partial treatment or individual initiative that does not address this comprehensively will only divide us and push us further from realizing the fruits of the jihad and the aims of the revolution.

The West was able to abort the nascent Islamic projects that grew from the revolutions of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and finally Egypt. Now it can devote itself entirely to Syria, the neighbor of its beloved Israel.

If only I could say how much the Syrian people have suffered; massacres and murder around the clock, dragging on for years. How many battles now rage on their land, and how many nations plot against them?

And how many idols have shattered on this people’s threshold?

The idol of democracy and human rights.

The idol of the United Nations and Security Council.

The idol of the conferences of the Friends of Syria.

And so are there those who take warning?

Let everyone know that our fate is one. To the West, there is no difference between the revolution’s factions – however their names might differ – so long as they carry an Islamic project.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps line up while participating in military maneuvers held near the Afghanistan border, file photo from Sept. 2, 1998. (photo by REUTERS/archive)

On May 19, the Tasnim News Agency, which has ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was the first to break the story: “A political delegation of the Taliban led by Tayyeb Aghahas traveled to Tehran and held talks with certain Iranian security and military officials. They had also previously visited Iran during the Islamic Awakening Conference.”

In Iran and Afghanistan, media outlets quickly reported this news, which generated curious reactions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman, Marzieh Afkham, said, “I am not aware of any such visit. We should follow up on this and find out which sources have published this news and based on what information.” The government spokesman, Mohammad-Bagher Nobakht, stated, “I am not aware of any such visit. It does not make any sense, and in any case I do not confirm that this visit has taken place.”

Meanwhile, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid published a statement on the group's website confirming the visit, stating, “This visit was among the many visits that the delegation of the Islamic emirate has made with the aim of discussing various issues as well as forming, expanding and strengthening mutual relations with different countries.” Mohammed Ismail Qasimyar, a member of the International Relations Committee of the Afghanistan High Peace Council, also confirmed the visit, telling the Shargh newspaper, “A delegation of seven or eight people from the political office of the Taliban, which is located in Doha, Qatar, have traveled to Tehran and have had meetings with Iranian officials.” Qasimyar also said the visit touched on Islamic world affairs and the issue of Afghan refugees in Iran, but he emphasized that the topic of the refugees should be addressed with the government of Afghanistan, not the Taliban.

Nozar Shafie, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament, acknowledged that the visit had taken place, stating, “The Taliban has influence and credit with the groups that are responsible for instability and chaos in the region. Therefore, they can play a role in managing the current regional developments and solving regional problems. This might be the reason why Iran has taken them into consideration.”

Give these statements, it appears that high-ranking Taliban officials did indeed travel to Iran and while there held meetings with Iranian security officials. What, however, might be the reason behind Iran and the Taliban developing diplomatic relations?

The two have been enemies since the 1990s, when the Taliban was formed. In 1998, Iran had been on the verge of attacking Afghanistan after nine of its diplomats were killed there by Taliban forces. In 2001, in the wake of 9/11, Iran provided logistical and intelligence support to the United States during the international coalition's military campaign targeting the Taliban, al-Qaeda's ally, in Afghanistan.

Today, however, the prolonged war between the United States and the Taliban has resulted in Iran adopting the logic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Iran’s interest in challenging the United States in the region has created common ground between Tehran and the Taliban. Also, the Taliban has learned a number of lessons during the past two decades and has, in a way, emerged as the neo-Taliban.

In a conversation with Al-Monitor, Taliban spokesman Mujahid talked about the foreign policy of the neo-Taliban. He said, “Strengthening good relations with other Muslim countries, especially our neighbors, is very important. Back then, because of certain problems, we were not able to improve our relations with our neighbors. What we have learned is that we should have had relations with other countries so that we could communicate our thoughts and reasons to them in order to battle the negative propaganda against us.” It is clear that the new leaders of the Taliban, unlike former heads, do not believe in antagonizing countries and instead intend to engage in active diplomacy.

The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in northern Afghanistan and a series of suicide attacks has created a new challenge for both Iran and the Taliban. At the moment, Tehran is threatened by IS from the east and west. The Taliban also views IS as an alternative to itself on the Afghan war scene. Thus, Iran and the Taliban have two common enemies: the United States and IS.

In addition to this, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s May visit to Afghanistan, accompanied by his army chief, served as a warning to the Taliban that they can no longer rely on Islamabad for aid and comfort. Iran and Pakistan have had troubled relations during the past decade because of terrorist activities in the Baluchistan region of both countries. Therefore, there is room for these three parties to exploit or at least leverage their relationships with one another in the pursuit of extracting concessions.

For whatever reason the Taliban delegation traveled to Tehran, it seems that not all of Tehran was on board with the trip. As noted, President Hassan Rouhani's administration claims to have no information about whether such a visit actually took place, while an Iranian news agency with close ties to the IRGC claims that the visit was indeed a reality. This could mean that security and military officials have decided, contrary to the administration's official policy, to negotiate with an opposition group in Afghanistan.

The outcome of this event could affect Tehran-Kabul relations and also cast a shadow over the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1). The Iranian government needs the nuclear agreement more than ever, so it also must keep tensions low with the P5+1. On the other hand, IRGC officials oppose the negotiations and are trying to raise obstacles. A visit from the Taliban just might be an obstacle meant to prevent Rouhani’s administration from moving forward with its regional and international policies.