Table of Contents

Welcome from the Editors ........................................................................................................................................1

I. Articles

Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure ...................................................................................... 2
by Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan

Hezbollah’s Man in Egypt ....................................................................................................................................... 24
by Matthew Levitt

Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism ........................................................................... 36
by Heather S. Gregg

Locating Cyberterrorism:
How Terrorism Researchers Use and View the Cyber Lexicon ..................................................................... 52
by Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald

II. Resources

Bibliography: Muslim Brotherhood (Part 1) ........................................................................................................ 66
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Bibliography: (Countering) Violent Extremism and Terrorism ......................................................................... 92
Compiled and selected by Eric Price

III. Book Reviews

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – 27 Books on Terrorism & Counterterrorism Related Subjects ................. 103
by Joshua Sinai

IV. Notes from the Editors

About Perspectives on Terrorism ......................................................................................................................... 113
Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VIII, Issue 2 (April 2014) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, and the Centre for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the University of Massachusetts’ Lowell campus.

The report from a recent conference on conflict and reconciliation in Syria, co-sponsored by TRI and CTSS, is now available on the journal’s home page (www.terrorismanalysts.com), along with the announcement of a new conference – “Religious Extremism in Syria”– to be held May 2 in Vienna, Austria. Also, CTSS is co-sponsoring (with the Society for Terrorism Research) the 8th Annual International Conference on Terrorism and Counterterrorism (17-19 September in Boston, Massachusetts). Please visit the following website for details and the Call for Papers: www.uml.edu/Research/CTSS/STR-Conference/. Finally, the Award Jury has begun to evaluate the 29 verified submissions we received for the “Best Dissertation on (Counter-) Terrorism published in 2013” competition. The award winner will be announced, and a summary of the thesis will be published in the August 2014 issue of Perspectives on Terrorism. TRI will also assist the award winner in finding a publisher for his or her thesis so that the full results of the award-winning research become available to the scholarly community with minimal delay. The August 2014 issue of the journal will also announce the honorable mention of authors whose theses were judged second and third best.

Now in its eighth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has over 4,200 regular subscribers and many times more occasional readers worldwide. Our Twitter account (@Perspectives_T) has over 19,000 followers, further enhancing the visibility of the Journal. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research Notes, Resource and Book Reviews sections are subject to internal editorial review.

The core of this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism is comprised of four thought-provoking research articles. The lead article, by Joseph Young and Laura Dugan, examines the relationship of strategic competition between terrorist groups and the longevity of terrorist groups. Matt Levitt provides an interesting case study of Hezbollah operatives in Egypt. Heather Gregg describes how religious and secular groups differ in their goals, leadership and target selection, and explains why counterterrorism strategies should take these differences into account. Drawing from their survey of researchers in twenty-four countries, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald illustrate the global debate about defining and using concepts like cyberterrorism, cyber jihad, and cyber crime.

Dr. Judith Tinnes has compiled a lengthy literature list on the Muslim Brotherhood. Eric Price has compiled a bibliography on violent extremism and efforts to counter it. Finally, our book reviews editor, Joshua Sinai, presents brief summaries of 27 mostly new publications in the field.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was prepared by Prof. James J. F. Forest, the American co-editor at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell. The June issue will be assembled by Editor-in-Chief, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid.

Sincerely,

Professor James J.F. Forest
Co-Editor, Perspectives on Terrorism
I. Articles

Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure

by Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan

Abstract

Why do terrorist groups endure? This question is relevant to scholars and policy makers alike. In the past, this issue has not been addressed in a systematic fashion. Recent work investigates this question using data on transnational groups and finds that factors associated with the home country can influence the group's endurance. Applying the theory of outbidding to terrorist group survival, we argue that strategic competition among groups predicts group duration. Using the Global Terrorism Database, we develop a dataset using the terrorist group as the unit of analysis to model the duration of group activity and thus include the largest sample of groups yet. Controlling for previous explanations of both group duration and terrorism, we find a robust effect for the impact that group competition has on terrorist group survival.

Keywords: Organisations, decision-making, quantitative analysis

Introduction

Why do some terrorist groups endure? While this question is certain to interest policymakers and scholars, it has received little systematic investigation. Several scholars [1] have investigated why terror groups end, usually focusing on specific actions by the state or by organisational dynamics and decline. These studies have either only examined groups that end [2] or do not provide systematic investigation of the topic [3][4]. Asking why terror groups endure relates to understanding the environment that is conducive to groups that use terrorism. In short, we seek to understand why some groups who use terrorism survive for 40 years while others last fewer than 40 days.

Recent work demonstrates that the capabilities of the organisations [5] and the states in which they operate [6] explain why some groups endure longer than others. We apply the theory of outbidding [7] to this question and argue that the strategic environment for groups affects their survival. In short, both the numbers of competitors and where the group is in the food chain influences its likelihood of survival. Finally, we identify some alternative explanations for terrorist group survival relating to the regime characteristics of the state and its societal factors. Following this discussion, we define terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist group. We then explain how we conceptualize group survival. Next, we discuss the research design issues associated with modeling group survival and describe the data used. After explaining data and methods, we then discuss the results of the statistical analysis. In the conclusion, we discuss some of the limitations of this particular approach to understanding terrorist group survival and suggest some avenues for further research.

Why Some Groups Survive While Others Do Not

Most, if not all terrorist groups end, yet we do not fully understand why. Previous work on this question has been limited to case comparisons [8] or theoretical discussions without empirical tests.[9] As Cronin [10] claims, “[t]he question of how terrorist groups decline is insufficiently studied, and the available research is virtually untapped.” Previous attempts to explain terror group survival and decline have focused on strategic
choices made by governments and groups. These studies generally are single cases that fail to make large comparisons.[11] Using a cross-sectional database of 457 groups, Cronin argues that groups end because of negotiations, decapitation, internal organisational issues, success, a reduction in popular support, state repression, or a transition into other forms of violence.[12] While these factors contribute to the end of terror campaigns, we know less about the underlying conditions or environments that promote or inhibit group survival.[13]

Recent work provides systematic evidence for why groups fail. Blomberg et al. explain some of the variation in transnational group survival by examining the environment in which the group operates.[14] They find that a gap exists between young and old organisations where young groups are the most likely to fail (what they term one-hit wonders). They also find that socioeconomic conditions in the state can influence the duration of the group. Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are likely to outlive groups in North America. Populous states encourage the lifespan of the group, and increases in GDP increase the lifespan of the group. They have the most comprehensive data on transnational groups (1,414 from 1968 to 2007).

Blomberg et al. use a more constrained set of groups (367, 1970-2007) to evaluate the impact that tactics, group size, ideology, region of operation, and base-country characteristics have on duration. [15] They find that larger, religious groups that diversify their tactics and are based in the Middle East or North Africa survive the longest. Democratic institutions also positively influence group survival. To gain information on ideology and group size, they use data from Jones and Libicki that limits their sample size.[16] These two studies, however, provide a baseline of both theory and evidence to suggest that the characteristics the groups and the states in which they operate influence their survival. Fortna, using an extensive database of insurgent groups, finds civilian targeting or terrorism prolongs the conflict but that the tactic is ultimately counterproductive.[17] Abrahms, like Fortna, suggests that terrorism is often self-defeating but does not investigate characteristics of the group or environment to explain the variation in the longevity of groups. [18] Building on this work, we offer an important characteristic that influences longevity: competition among groups.[19]

**Outbidding and Group Survival**

It is fairly uncontroversial to state that violent groups are affected by the competitive environment in which they operate.[20] Outbidding, or the use of increased violence to attract support from a domestic constituency, occurs where “groups try to distinguish themselves from one another.”[21] Bloom [22] argues that violence is a way to “gain credibility and win the public relations campaign.”[23] While a competitive environment may encourage terrorism, it also likely dampens group survival as other organisations drain the pool of potential recruits. Thus, similar to interest groups operating in competitive environments, some will succeed and some will fail.[24] Where there are a limited number of groups, these organisations are expected to live longer.[25]

In contrast, interest groups that experience heavy competition, using Darwinian terms, have a higher probability of being selected out. [26] Similarly, terror groups that are competing for support from populations will survive longer in a state with fewer competing violent organisations. Kydd and Walter claim that, “outbidding should occur when multiple groups are competing for the allegiance of a similar demographic base of support.”[27] Cronin concurs and argues that, “[g]roups may...decline because they lose a competition for members or support with other groups.”[28] This competition should drive groups out of the environment and lead to shorter life spans. As Bloom argues about the role of suicide bombing in competitive environments, “[a]lthough each bombing episode sacrifices one supporter, it recruits many
more.”[29]

Bloom's theory is focused on how intergroup competition influences the probability of suicide terrorism. [30] We extend a more general logic of outbidding to terrorist group survival. For example, Bloom suggests that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) turned to suicide terror as a means to attract supporters.[31] During the second Intifada, Hamas and other more violent organisations successfully attracted more supporters threatening the PFLP's survival. Similar to Blomberg et al., diversifying their tactics, attracted more supporters and thus kept the organisation alive.[32] The outbidding theory has a longer history in the ethnic violence/politics tradition.[33] Others scholars, such as Kaufman [34], have applied the theory to civil conflict. In this formulation elites mobilize civilians by appealing to more extreme demands/tactics vis-à-vis their rivals and other ethnic groups.[35] Whether the goal is to mobilize co-ethnics, civilian supporters, anger towards another group, outbidding is a potential tool to separate a group from its competitors. As Brubaker and Laitin suggest outbidding can easily lead to violence and is a powerful mechanism “and a general one, not confined to ethnic outbidding.”[36] In sum, the goal of outbidding is to attract supporters from a limited constituency of supporters. As the number of groups increase, the less likely any group is to survive.

From this discussion, we can derive the following hypothesis:

**Outbidding Hypothesis:** Terror groups that operate in a more competitive environment are more likely to fail.

As the discussion above suggests, outbidding as an explanation for group survival is a natural extension of previous arguments. Additionally, arguments from organisational theory can also add some refined expectations concerning how certain kinds of groups are more likely to fail than others.

Regardless of the nature of the organisation, Hannan and Freeman (1989) citing Stinchcombe (1965) suggest “that organisations face a liability of newness” or that the failure rates of new groups should be higher than for established groups. New organisations are particularly vulnerable as their members are strangers or at least not properly trained or had enough time to build trust among their participants.[37] As Baum and Mezias argue in a study of hotel competition in Manhattan, if organisations are in a population are not equal competitors, a count of the number of organisations alone may not adequately measure competition among the groups.[38]

In our case, a count of terrorist organisations may not be enough to explain why certain groups fail more readily than others. Resource dependence is also another important predictor of organisational failure.[39] Larger firms and firms with greater resources are expected to survive in an industry longer and the empirical evidence confirms this claim.[40] To generate terrorist violence requires resources. If we assume that groups that are more violent, experienced and thus potentially drawing more resources have an advantage in the market, then we can differentiate these groups from less violent groups. In sum, these characteristics likely separate organisations that are new competitors with industry Top Dogs.

Terrorist groups similarly operate in these competitive markets with differentials in size, starting point, and resource endowments.[41] While the number may matter, we expect that being the dominant group in the market may reduce the risk of failure as compared to being newer/less dominant in the market. In Sri Lanka, for example, during the late 1980s many groups vied to represent the Tamil community in their goal to achieve an independent state from the Sinhalese majority. As Bloom highlights, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) systemically eliminated other competitors and by 2002 was the sole organisation bargaining with the Sri Lankan state.[42] The LTTE was advantaged over rivals as they had greater resources through local tax extraction as well as diaspora support disadvantaging competitors and increasing their
probably. Most importantly, the LTTE was the dominant non-state violent actor in the Sri Lankan conflict during this period. Despite this advantage, the LTTE was dealt a near fatal blow in 2009 after decades of fighting. However, according to the GTD, the LTTE might have perpetrated at least two attacks since then. As the research on organisations and this vignette suggest,

Top Dog Hypothesis: Top Dog Terrorist organisations are less likely to fail than their competitors.

In addition to this linear hypothesis, based on the above discussion, we also expect that Top Dogs are less likely to fail as they experience more competition. As the number of groups increases, we expect that Top Dogs are less likely to fail as compared to their competitors.

In the Palestinian market for violent organisations, Hamas or the PLO may be the Top Dog depending on the year. Their probability of survival may actually increase as the number of competitors increases. Smaller groups, such as Jund al-Sham or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, will be more likely to fail as the number of groups increases. As Blomberg et al. show, terrorist groups, like businesses, often fail in their first year.[43] Assuming that, on average, as the number of groups increase the power differential between any one of these groups and the Top Dog increases, we should expect the Top Dog to persist even longer. These less active groups likely suffer from what Aldrich and Auster call the liability of smallness, which often correlates with the liability of newness.[44] Holding newness constant, the liability of smallness suggests that groups will be more likely to fail when they lack resources.[45] If resources can be proxied by more frequent attacks, we should expect that this liability of smallness will make groups with less resources more susceptible to competition than the Top Dogs.

Interactive Hypothesis: As the number of terrorist groups increase, the less likely Top Dogs are to fail as compared to other groups.

Alternative Explanations

Democracy has held a prominent place in the discussion of terrorism beginning with Wilkinson [46] and has been a correlate of cross-national terrorism, albeit with mixed results.[47] The regime and institutional characteristics where the group operates may also affect likelihood of group survival.[48] Since democratic societies offer institutional recourse for aggrieved individuals, people have formal mechanisms for resolving their anger towards the state. This suggests that terror groups in democracies should be short-lived. While Eubank and Weinberg find that democracies generate more groups, this does not necessarily translate to more attacks.[49] The Peruvian group Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path), operated in an environment with relatively few competitor groups and generated a huge number of attacks. As Li suggests, the effects that democracy has on terror can be contradictory.[50] Civil liberties and democratic participation may encourage groups to organise and generate terror, but a lack of executive constraints may allow states to pursue the requisite counterterror policies to end a group. Aside from these various regime explanations, other societal and contextual factors could influence group survival and trump capability-related explanations. We briefly discuss some of these in the research design section.

To date, one of the most comprehensive studies of how terror groups end and what states do to encourage this process is a study from the Rand Corporation.[51] Jones and Libicki amass a database of over 600 groups and examine the descriptive statistics to explain why some groups end and others do not. While this study moves beyond case analysis or comparison, they fall short of estimating regression models to control for alternative arguments.[52] Jones and Libicki identify eight ways that terrorist groups can end including: the group achieves it goals, it experiences partial success, state repression destroys the group, the group burns
out, the leadership is killed or imprisoned, there is a generational transition, the group loses popular support, or new alternatives for the group emerge. While their arguments may explain why terrorism ended today and not yesterday, the current study is concerned with understanding the underlying country-level causes that extends a terrorist group's survival or facilitates its failure. Thus, we are interested in assessing what factors affect the longevity of the terrorist organisation's life span. To accomplish this task, we amass a large collection of groups from a more comprehensive dataset and estimate the factors that relate to their years of survival. As discussed above, to our knowledge only a few studies attempt to use a similar approach; these have focused, however, only on the transnational organisations found in ITERATE. By limiting their group analysis to only transnational attacks, they capture only part of the picture. In short, the divide between domestic and transnational terrorism may be less important as interactions become more global. In order to better understand the life spans of all terrorist organisations, the data source should include attacks by organisations regardless of whether they only attack within one country or whether they attack across national borders. In the next section, we discuss how to define and operationalize terrorism, terrorist groups, and terror group survival.

Defining Terrorism, Terror Groups, and Survival

Defining terrorism has been an area of heated debate. As Schmid and Jongman noted, the “search for an adequate definition is still on,” yet “consensus on an adequate social science definition of terrorism…is still lacking, we are…somewhat closer to solutions than we were some years ago.” After their careful examination of over 100 definitions, Schmid and Jongman came up with a definition that included many moving parts. This type of definition, or what Munck and Verkuilen call a maximalist definition, includes too many elements, which could be difficult to empirically measure. Further, the definition potentially confuses how these elements then relate to other concepts. For example, over 15% of the definitions that Schmid and Jongman survey include the innocence of victims as an important element of terrorism. This element would likely lead to the exclusion of any attack on the military as a terrorist act, such as the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 or the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. While we recognize the importance of reducing the definition of terrorism to exclude elements that obfuscate the relationship between terrorism and other concepts in the world (i.e., democracy, economic development, and counterterrorism), a minimalist definition is also problematic. A minimalist definition will have more empirical referents, but will also fail to distinguish unlike events, such as terrorism and insurgency or terrorism and genocide. By incorporating into the definition an element that requires the target of the violence to be different from its intended audience, then terrorist events can be separated from genocides and insurgencies. This effort is especially important if we believe that these forms of conflict have different causal mechanisms.

Recent research suggests using different operational definitions of terrorism to explore how sensitive empirical inferences are to definitional specifications. Thus far, analyses that use various definitional components of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) find that the effects of key indicators on terrorism are robust to its different operational definitions. The GTD includes incidents that meet all of the following three conditions:

1. **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. **The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence** – including property violence, as well as violence against people.
3. **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** This database does not include acts of...
state terrorism.[63]

In addition, the incidents must fit at least 2 of the following three criteria:

**Criterion 1:** The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.

**Criterion 2:** There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.

**Criterion 3:** The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non combatants).[64]

By using explicit criteria scholars using the GTD are able to filter the events by adding or subtracting these criteria. For the purposes of this study we need an operational definition that can identify relevant acts, can relate these acts to other important concepts related to terrorism, and is consistent with some identifiable portion of the GTD. For this study we define terrorism as the intentional threat or use of violence by subnational actors for a political goal intended to convey a message to a larger audience than the victims of the violence.[65] This definition is consistent with the GTD, as Criterion 1 suggests that terrorism is used to fulfill a political, religious, social, or economic goal. Consistent with Hoffman [66], we chose to only add “political” to our definition as “terrorism…is fundamentally and inherently political…[it] is…about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change.” Economic interests, religious beliefs, or social change may motivate a group to act together, but their goals are inherently coercive to change another individual or group’s behaviour and are thus political. The final important portion of our definition relates to differentiating the audience of violence from the victim. In other words, the people who are killed are not the audience for the violence. This audience is often a larger population, a government, or some other third party. Distinguishing between these groups helps differentiate terrorism from genocide (where the victim and audience are the same) and other forms of political violence.

A terrorist organisation is then defined as a group that uses terrorism as described above. While this statement has face validity, it leads to some difficult questions. Are all organisations that use terror, terrorist groups? If a group only uses one act of terror and uses nonviolent means in 99% of its other interactions, should it be labeled a terrorist group? Since we are trying to identify why terrorist groups (and thus acts of terror) persist or decline, we need to label any group who uses this act as a terrorist group. When they stop using this tactic, then they are no longer coded as a terrorist group. Using data on terrorist groups from the GTD [67], we created a database of terror organisations. By using terrorist attacks as a way to establish which groups are terror groups, we avoid subjectively labeling groups as terrorist and focus instead on their actions. Groups that use terror thus are considered terrorist organisations. As long as they use this act, the group maintains this label. When the group desists, it no longer fits the criteria. This is consistent with the way scholars who study the reasons why groups deliberately target civilians instead of using some other strategy of resistance, think about the issue. It is also consistent with the concerns of most governments that face terror campaigns: they want to understand what makes terrorism end. In sum, terrorist group survival is conceptualized as the time between a group’s first attack and its last attack. Some operational issues remain
and will be discussed in the Research Design section. We now turn to a discussion of the data and research design.

Data

Terrorist Organisations. The GTD chronicles terrorist incidents across the globe from 1970 through 2010 using media reports and other open sources.[68] When the source attributes an attack to a specific perpetrator, the name is also recorded in the GTD. Over half of the attacks in the GTD (50.3%) were attributed to at least one specific perpetrator.[69] In order to construct this dataset, we combined attacks that were attributed to the same organisation to determine its “start” date and its “end” date. We recognize that this measure of the organisation's life span is only a proxy because organisations might have attacked outside of our documented span without being attributed to the attack.[70] Dugan outlines other sources of error when creating an organisational database from the GTD or any other terrorist event database that relies on open sources.[71] In short, our measure of span represents the lower bound estimate of the true span. Furthermore, these spans can also be considered the best measure of the organisation's visible life span.

Since groups who use this form of violence are trying to change a policy, influence a public, or compel a government, claiming credit or ensuring attribution of credit is necessary. In fact, Rapoport suggests that this issue of taking credit for violent acts is one of the primary differences between terror groups and criminal organisations.[72]

The temporal domain of this study is 1970 to 2010. The unit of analysis is the group-year, although the individual groups play an important role in this research. We initially include all 2,223 groups that committed terror acts during this period as recorded by the GTD.[73] Each group is assigned to the country in which it most often perpetrated attacks over its entire lifespan. By pairing up each organisation with one country, we assume that this country is the organisation’s primary country. Consequently each country has a set of terrorist organisations that primarily operated within its borders over its lifespan. We refer to these organisations as the country's primary groups. This pairing of primary groups with primary countries is key for operationalizing the competitive environment for each terrorist organisation in order to test all three hypotheses. We acknowledge that the primary country of operation might not be the base of operations for every group, but it is an objective measure based on group behaviour rather than unconfirmed sources. Finally, by linking the organisation to a primary country, we are also able to use as covariates measures of that country’s capabilities. However, because we were unable to find measures for all countries, the final number of groups is reduced to 2,051.[74] Although missing data affects a little less than 8% of the cases, the sample is still substantially larger than any another study on terrorist groups. As previously mentioned, Jones and Libicki identify 648 groups from 1968 to 2006, but only analyze the 268 that they code as ending.[75] Blomberg et al. [76] rely on groups identified in the ITERATE dataset to assess the durability of transnational terrorist organisations from 1968 to 2007. While they have considerably more data than Jones and Libicki [77] with 1,414 groups, this is still fewer than the number of groups from the GTD.[78] Furthermore, because the ITERATE groups could still be attacking domestically after they cease transnational attacks, by excluding these attacks, the dependent variable in the Blomberg et al. study is likely vulnerable to measurement error. [79] In fact, a recent study that examines the activity of the 53 most threatening (to the U.S) international organisations found that more than 90% of their attacks against non-U.S. entities were in their home country [80], suggesting that a terrorist organisation’s activity is severely truncated when we only observe their transnational attacks. In the current research, we use about 600 more groups than those found in the ITERATE data. Further, the number of incidents perpetrated by these groups is considerably larger, as they include both domestic and transnational attacks. As LaFree and Dugan explain, about seven out of every
eight terror attacks are domestic in nature.[81]

Because the unit of analysis is the group-year, the total possible number of observations is 6,710, based on number of groups and number of years active. However, once we include the country-level measures to the dataset, the sample size drops to 6,087. Supplemental analysis is conducted on the original observations and without the country-controls and findings are substantively the same.[82]

**Failure.** The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that is coded as one if the group stopped operating after the current year, and zero otherwise.

The independent variables fall under the categories of competitive environment, group capabilities, state capabilities, and control variables. Measures of competitive environment and group capabilities come from the GTD.

**Competitive Environment.** To test the Outbidding Hypothesis, we calculate from the GTD the total number of primary terrorist groups that operated in an organisation's primary country in a given year (*Number of Groups*). This value includes the current organisation that may or may not have perpetrated an attack in its primary country for each year it operated. In order to test the Top Dog Hypothesis, we include in the model an indicator of whether the terrorist organisation was the most active primary group its primary country during the current year. This variable was constructed by first examining the frequencies of attacks by all primary organisations for each country for each year. The organisations that perpetrated the most attacks in their primary country in a given year are marked as *Top Dog*. When two or more groups equally perpetrate the most attacks, all are marked as *Top Dog*. Finally, to test the Interactive Hypothesis, we include in a second model the interaction between *Top Dog* and *Number of Groups* (*Top Dog × Number of Groups*).

**Group Capabilities.** We also include measures that proxy alternative explanations of group survival from previous research. To control for and proxy a group's capabilities, we use two variables that were measured during the first 365 days beginning with the group's first attack.[83] First, we created a dichotomous measure of whether a group ever used multiple modalities of terrorism. The measure is coded a 1 if the group has ever done any combination of the following: bombings, assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, armed assaults, facility attacks, and hostage-taking during its first year (*Multiple-Modality*).[84] Groups that used only one tactic are marked as zero. We expect that groups that have more flexibility to operate differently across attacks are likely to be more capable and to survive longer. We created a second variable that captures group capabilities that measures whether the group perpetrated attacks in more than one country (*Transnational*). This dichotomous measure is coded as 1 if a group attacked in more than one country during their first year of operation and zero otherwise.[85]

**State Capabilities.** Because the capability of the state to control and even dismantle terrorist organisations might influence the competitive environment and a group's capacity for survival, we include three measures of state capabilities in the current analysis. Measures of population and gross domestic product come from the Penn World Table [86], and geological terrain comes from research by Fearon and Laitin. [87] These variables are measured during each year of the analysis, unless they are time invariant. We use a measure of state capability that is often used in studies of civil war onset and duration, GDP. In terrorism research, GDP is generally used as a proxy for the level of development in society (*Development*).[88] GDP is measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars so that the odds ratio will be easier to interpret. Since another potential measure of state capabilities, the Correlates of War state material capabilities index, leads to an increased number of missing observations, we exclude it from our primary estimations. We discuss this variable in greater detail in the appendix. The population of a state (*Population*) might also influence its capabilities and
thus the survival of a terrorist group.[89] We include a logged measure of population from the Penn World Tables.[90] The final measure that proxies state capabilities is the percent mountainous terrain in a country (Mountains).[91] In civil war research, this is argued to increase the likelihood that rebels can hide from the state and thus survive.

Control Variables. Several control variables are also included in the analysis. Political measures come from the Polity IV Data Project.[92] Ethnic and religious measures come from research by Fearon and Laitin.[93][94] In the online appendix, we list the specific variables and their original source. To investigate the effects democracy might have on a group’s lifespan, we use a set of covariates related to regime characteristics and institutions. We use the Polity 2 score as a measure of the level of democracy in a state. The Polity 2 score (Democracy) is created by subtracting the authoritarian score from a general democracy score that results in a measure ranging from −10 (strongly authoritarian) to +10 (strongly democratic). As previous research suggests [95], different aspects of democracy might encourage or discourage terrorist group acts and survival. Democracy has had an inconsistent effect on survival with some evidence that under specific conditions it might encourage group longevity. We also control for the age of the current regime in power in a given state (Age of Regime). Fully consolidated regimes may invite less violent contestation than regimes that are new and have not established regularized means of political participation. On the other hand, regimes that are older are more consolidated which suggests that dissidents who oppose the current order are weak vis-à-vis the state and thus more likely to use terrorism as opposed to some other violent strategy. It may be that the older the regime, the more likely groups will challenge it with terrorism.

We also control for other factors that might correlate with our independent variables and the time to group failure. Ethnic fractionalization or more ethnic groups in society could explain the prevalence of terrorist groups and how long they survive. To control for this possibility we use a measure of the probability that two people randomly chosen from society will be from different ethnic groups (Ethnic Fractionalization). A similar logic applies to religious heterogeneity. To proxy for this concept, we use a measure of the probability that two people randomly chosen from society will be from different religious groups (Religious Fractionalization).[96] Some observers claim that certainly terrorism and possibly group survival might be a function of religious belief, especially the desire to build a global caliphate by adherents of radical Salafi Islam.[97] Religion can bind a group together and make the members see their struggle as a cosmic battle between good and evil.[98] We also use a measure of the percent of Muslims (% Muslim) in society to proxy the effect that this might have on terrorist group survival.[99] Some might argue that the end of the Cold War ushered a new era of conflict.[100] To control for this, we include a dummy variable (Cold War) for whether groups survived longer during the Cold War than in the period after this era.

We also include control variables for four of the five major regions of the world, Europe, Africa, Asia, and America. The reference region is the Middle East. Finally, in order to model the time dependence, we include three measures of number of years the group has been in the data (Life Years, Life Years2, and Life Years3). A simple count of these years would assume a linear hazard. A squared version would assume a quadratic relationship. Inclusion of the cubic term allows us to capture temporal dependence similar to common parametric survival models as well as semi-parametric models like the Cox Model.[101]

Methods

We begin the analysis by estimating the baseline survival rates for terrorist groups through event history modeling.[102] This technique allows the analyst to estimate the time to failure or the time until a particular event of interest. In biomedical research, the event of interest may be the death of a patient after some
treatment. In the study of war, the event of interest may be the beginning of the war. In our case, it is the
number of years until the group stops perpetrating terrorist attacks. We present the baseline survival rates for
all organisations using the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function.

In order to test all three primary hypotheses (outbidding, top dog, and interactive) and the alternative
explanations, we add to the model measures of competition, group capability, state capability, and controls.
Because the data are constructed by year for each organisation, discrete-time survival analysis is conducted
using stacked logistic regression models that estimate the effect of the independent variables on the
probability that the group will fail before the end of the year (i.e., it will not attack again after the current
year). The following model is run:

\[ P(\text{Fail}_t=1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CompEnv}_t + \beta_2 \text{GrCapability}_{t-1} + \beta_3 \text{StCapability}_t + \beta_4 \text{Controls}_t. \] (1)

Recall that the unit of analysis is the group-year. Thus, most of the independent variables are measured for
each year of the study, and are thus denoted by the subscript \( t \). However, some of the measures are time
invariant, and are therefore constant throughout the analysis. Finally, the group capability measures are
only measured during their first 365 days of operation so that longer running groups will not show higher
capabilities leading to simultaneity bias.

Turning to equation 1, we recall from above that the dependent variable is a dichotomous value that
equals one if the organisation stopped operating after the current year, and zero otherwise.[103] The
key independent variables that we hypothesize affects the time that a group endures is a measure of the
competitive environment (\( \text{CompEnv} \) in Equation 1). These variables include \( \text{Number of Groups}_t \), \( \text{Top Dog}_t \), and the interaction between the two (\( \text{Top Dog} \times \text{Number of Groups}_t \)). If the Outbidding Hypothesis is
supported, we would expect the odds ratio for \( \text{Number of Groups}_t \) to be greater than one; and if the Top Dog
Hypothesis is supported, we expect the \( \text{Top Dog}_t \) odds ratio to be less than one in the model that excludes the
interaction. Finally, if the Interactive Hypothesis is supported, we expect the odds ratio of the interaction two
(\( \text{Top Dog} \times \text{Number of Groups}_t \)) to be less than one.

The next set of control variables relate to the relationship between terrorist group survival (\( \text{GrCapability}_{t-1} \)
in equation 1) and state capabilities (\( \text{StCapability}_t \) in equation 1). The group capabilities include \( \text{Multiple-Modality}_{t-1} \) and \( \text{Transnational}_{t-1} \). As both measures indicate group strength, we expect their odds ratios to
be less than one. The state capabilities measures include \( \text{Development}_t \), \( \text{Population}_t \), and \( \text{Mountains} \). As
development and population are proxies for increased state capabilities, we expect their odds ratios to be
greater than one (i.e., increasing the probability of group failure). Conversely, we expect the odds ratio of
mountains to be less than one, increasing the chances of group survival.

\( \text{Controls}_t \) include \( \text{Democracy}_t \), \( \text{Age of Regime}_t \), \( \text{Ethnic Fractionalization}_t \), \( \text{Religious Fractionalization}_t \), \( \text{Percent Muslim}_t \), \( \text{Cold War}_t \), \( \text{Europe, Africa, Asia, America, Life Years, Life Years}^2 \), and \( \text{Life Years}^3 \).

Results

Descriptive Statistics. Before addressing the hypotheses, we first take a look at the data to get a better sense of
how groups in the GTD have operated over time. We begin by examining the patterns of attack and survival
for the 2,223 terrorist organisations found in the GTD. Figure 1 shows the number of terror attacks (solid
line) in the world from 1970 to 2010 and the number of groups (dashed line) who commit more than half
of these acts from the GTD. Most notable is that the two trends seem to track one another relatively closely
(\( r = 0.78 \)). The deviation of these two lines shows that in the 1970s, while there were many groups, the
overall number of attacks per known group was lower than in the 1980s, 90s, or late 2000s (9 to 1 versus 20
This suggests that the number of attacks is not uniform across known groups; and other factors such as the economy, the level of democracy, or the international system may influence these levels. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the high point for both number of known groups and number of attacks was the early 1990s (although attacks per group were not as high as in other periods).[104]

We see in this figure that the number of groups that attacked each year ranges from a low of 42 groups in 1972 to a high of 234 groups in 1992. This number drops again to another low in 1998 with only 80 groups attacking. The last decade in the series shows that the number of active groups ranges between 110 and 175. While the number of active groups never rises above its 1992 peak, we know that there were a total of 2,223 organisations that were attributed to attacks over this period. This means that a large portion of the groups were inactive during each year. In fact, according to Dugan[105] a majority of the groups in the GTD were only attributed to one attack; and about another 20% became inactive within their first year. However, the groups that were active for more than a year were also “responsible” for more than 93% of the attributed attacks.[106]

![Figure 1. Number of Terror Attacks and Groups from 1970 to 2010, Global Terrorism Database](image)

We now examine the survival patterns for the 2,223 terrorist organisations found in the GTD. On average, they operated for 3.33 years, although a vast majority (1,519 or 68%) stopped operating within their first year. This percentage is a little lower than that reported in Dugan’s research finding that 74% of the terrorist organisations between 1970 and 2007 ended within their first year.[107] This suggests that newer groups might be more likely to last longer than one year. In order to get a better sense of the survival patterns of these terrorist organisations, we estimate the baseline survival rate with the Kaplan-Meier survival function of all 2,223 organisations between 1970 and 2010 shown in Figure 2. Also included in that figure is the number of surviving organisations at zero, ten, twenty, thirty, and forty years (i.e, number at risk). By using the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function for the terrorist group data, we can evaluate the probability of surviving conditional on surviving until the current year. As Figure 2 shows, only about 30% of the groups survive past the first year. This leads to the same conclusion that about 70% (or 68%) of the terrorist organisations stop operating within a year of their first attack.[108] After five years, only about
20% of the groups are expected to survive. [109]

![Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate](image)

**Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier Survival Function for 2,223 Terrorist Organisations, 1970-2010**

We turn now to the descriptive statistics for the groups-by-year data presented in Table 1. Because we only include the group-years for those values that are in the final model, the sample size is 6,099 for all variables. Turning first to the dependent variable (failure), we see that in a little more than 30% of the group-years, the organisation becomes inactive by the following year. When we examine the competitive environment, we see that on average a terrorist organisation has about 10 active primary organisations in its primary country (including itself). The wide range of this values shows that there have been as many as 76 primary competitors in a given year. A closer look at the data shows that in 1978 there were 76 active terrorist groups in Italy. Table 1 also shows that in nearly 33% of the group-years, the organisation was a top dog during that year.

Turning to the control variables, we find no surprises. A relative minority of the group-years used multiple-modalities or attacked in more than one country during their first active year. We see that GDP ranges from around $170.90 to $43,697.50 (recall, that it is measured in values of $100K). The remaining summary statistics show that all values are within reasonable range.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Model (n=6,087)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Means (St. Dev.)</th>
<th>Minimum, Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>0.311 (0.463)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competitive Environment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>10.557 (12.773)</td>
<td>1, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Dog</td>
<td>0.328 (0.470)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Capability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple-Modality</td>
<td>0.264 (0.441)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>0.084 (0.278)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Capability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>117.830 (98.412)</td>
<td>1.709, 436.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>10.432 (1.612)</td>
<td>5.515, 13.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains</td>
<td>2.681 (1.143)</td>
<td>0, 4.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>5.469 (5.818)</td>
<td>-10, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of the Regime</td>
<td>34.844 (45.951)</td>
<td>0, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.357 (0.291)</td>
<td>0.004, 0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.306 (0.210)</td>
<td>0, 0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslim</td>
<td>20.019 (34.107)</td>
<td>0, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>0.449 (0.497)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.289 (0.453)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.086 (0.280)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.196 (0.397)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>0.265 (0.441)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Years</td>
<td>4.202 (7.003)</td>
<td>0, 39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survival Model Results.** We now address the hypotheses with the odds ratios generated from the discrete time survival models in Table 2. Model 1 shows the findings for the main effects for the Outbidding and Top Dog Hypotheses, while Model 2 also includes an interaction between Top Dog and Number of Groups for the Interactive Hypothesis. Turning first to the competitive environment we see that in both models the odds ratio is above one. In Model 1, this can be interpreted that with each additional competitor, the odds of failing within the year increases by 0.006, holding all else constant. In essence, we can think of this number as the approximate increase in the probability of failure that is attributed to an increase of one additional competitor (or primary organisation). While at first glance, this might seem like a small effect, the average number of
primary groups that use terrorism in a country year is 10.6 (see Table 1). The 75th percentile for this variable is 15. That means that roughly 25% of all of the terrorist groups are also attacking in a given year. In this case, 15 groups in one country during one year would lead to an expected decrease in the survival time of any of the groups by about 12%. At the most extreme, Italy in 1978 had over 70 groups, substantially decreasing the survival time for any one of those groups. Thus, the Outbidding Hypothesis is supported in these data.

Table 2. Odds Ratios and (St. Errors) for Logistic Discrete-Time Survival Models (n=6,087)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>1.006* (0.003)</td>
<td>1.008** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Dog\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>0.536** (0.046)</td>
<td>0.988 (0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Dog × Number of Groups\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>0.820** (0.037)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Capability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple-Modality\textsubscript{II}</td>
<td>0.488** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.504** (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational\textsubscript{II}</td>
<td>0.493** (0.067)</td>
<td>0.502** (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>1.003** (0.001)</td>
<td>1.003** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>0.898* (0.046)</td>
<td>0.920 (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>0.969 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.978 (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1.010 (0.012)</td>
<td>1.015 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of the Regime</td>
<td>0.996* (0.002)</td>
<td>0.995** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.167 (0.295)</td>
<td>1.125 (0.263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.045 (0.255)</td>
<td>1.077 (0.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslim</td>
<td>1.004 (0.002)</td>
<td>1.004 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>1.612** (0.141)</td>
<td>1.596** (0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.292 (0.353)</td>
<td>1.223 (0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.633* (0.341)</td>
<td>1.469* (0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.113 (0.264)</td>
<td>1.069 (0.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>1.882** (0.440)</td>
<td>1.822** (0.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Years</td>
<td>1.351** (0.069)</td>
<td>1.381** (0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Years Squared</td>
<td>0.966** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.964** (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Years Cubed</td>
<td>1.001** (0.000)</td>
<td>1.001** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared Test Statistic for Favoring Model 2 74.21**

All tests are two-tailed, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Turning now to the findings for Top Dog, we see that when a terrorist organisation is the most active in its primary country during a given year, its probability of failure is about 0.46 lower than the other primary groups in that country. This shows support for the Top Dog Hypothesis. Of course, this finding leads to the question of whether Top Dog organisations do better or worse in a highly competitive environment, which is the topic of the Interactive Hypothesis. The results under Model 2 show that the odds ratio of the Top Dog × Number of Groups interaction is less than one, supporting the hypothesis. The Likelihood Ratio Test comparing Models 1 and 2 favors Model 2 (p = 0.000), showing additional support for the Interactive Hypothesis. While we cannot directly interpret the odds ratio for the interaction term because it needs to be combined with the odds ratio for Number of Groups, we instead present in Figure 3 the predicted probability of failure conditional on the number of competitors in a given year for Top Dog organisations and Not Top Dog organisations.[110] This figure shows that when competition is low, each type of group has a probability
of failing of around 0.60. However, as competition increases, the probability that a Top Dog organisation fails drops dramatically, while that probability increases for all other groups. In a way, this is consistent with the story that a hiker does not have to outrun a bear during an attack, he or she only needs to outrun the person they are with. It is possible that when governments are busy countering weaker terrorist organisations, the stronger groups are better able to safely operate.

This brings us to the findings for Group Capability. We see by the low odds ratios in both models that organisations that were using multiple tactics and/or operating across national borders during their first year are more likely to survive into the following year. In fact, their chances of failing are about half that for other organisations in the same county during the same year.

![Figure 3. Probability that a Group Fails Conditional on the Number of Competitors](image)

NOTE: All significant covariates are set at mean, insignificant covariates are excluded.

Table 2 also shows that controls that influence state capabilities from previous studies also impact survival. Increases in Development significantly shorten the life span of terrorist organisations (or increase their risk of failure). The estimated odds ratio shows that a one unit change in Development, which corresponds to an increase of $10,000 in a country’s per capita GDP, is expected to increase the risk that a group fails by roughly 0.3%. We find weak effects for Population as it is only significant in the model without the interaction, and Mountains is insignificant.

Finally, we see that Age of Regime, Cold War, Africa, America and Life Years all show significant effects. First, every additional year that a regime has been in place (Age of the Regime) leads to an average decrease in the risk of a group ending by around 0.4%. This number seems small, but the average age of a regime in the sample is nearly 35 years with a standard deviation of 46 years. A one standard deviation increase in the Age
of the Regime is expected to increase the survival of a group by about 18%. Second, being involved with the Cold War increases the probability a group will fail by more than half. Third, the geographical indicators show that groups operating in both Asia and the Americas are more likely to fail by the following year than organisations in the Middle East. Similar to other approaches to modeling time dependence like splines, we are not interested in the significance of the life years variables. Instead, we plotted the probability of failure conditional on the average values of the independent variables at different values for the life years to examine their impact. Similar to previous work, the probability of failure is high at the beginning and then subsequently decreases until groups reach the age of approximately 30 years old. After this point, the probability of failure begins to rise. Because only a few groups that make it to this age and the recent endings of older groups, such as the New People’s Army in the Philippines or the Irish Republican Army, this rise is quite large.

Conclusions
As Crenshaw suggests, “[s]ome processes of terrorism may be independent of government action.”[111] Our approach has been to identify some of these processes in a cross-national database of terrorist groups. We find consistent support for our core proposition that as the number of groups who use terrorism in a country increase, the less likely those groups will survive. Others have found an association between the strength of the state and the frequency of attacks. We also find a relationship between state capabilities and terrorist group survival using CINC and GDP. Using more indirect measures like mountainous terrain and population, the result is indeterminate. The capabilities of the group also matter. The more the group kills, uses different kinds of attacks, targets multiple states, or uses the most costly forms of attack, the more likely it will survive longer. While democracy has been associated with the frequency of terrorism events, we find little support for the relationship between democracy and terrorist group survival.[112] While democracies may be the target of more terrorism, groups facing these regimes are likely to last just as long as those facing autocratic regimes. One institutional characteristic, the age of the regime, does influence group survival. Even after controlling for these other known predictors of terrorism and terrorist group survival, the outbidding hypothesis receives unqualified empirical support.

While our approach helps to better understand how certain states encourage or discourage terrorist group survival by evaluating contextual factors like the competitive environment, there are limitations to this study. First, we do not take into account the proximate factors that might lead to the end of a terrorist group. To the extent the proximate causes and contextual factors are independent of each other, our findings should be unbiased from this omission. Instead, investigations of how certain counterterror policies increase or decrease group longevity or how certain organisational choices by groups increase or decrease their likelihood of survival should be complementary to our findings. Further, we investigated how general repression affects group survival but not at a microlevel. While repression increased survival time, it did not change any of the inferences from our other contextual variables. An analysis of these choices looking at events and actions by each group over a shorter temporal unit of aggregation such as daily, weekly or monthly is necessary to model the dynamic interaction between terrorist group and states countering terrorism. This type of research will be possible as more cross-national data is collected on both the organisational characteristics of terrorists groups [113] and the choices made by counterinsurgents.[114]
About the Authors

**Joseph K. Young** is an Associate Professor in the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington DC. His research interests relate to political violence and human rights. He has published numerous peer-reviewed articles across academic disciplines, including political science, economics, criminology, and international studies. The National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) have funded his research. **Laura Dugan** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. Her research examines the consequences of violence and the efficacy of violence prevention/intervention policy and practice. Dr. Dugan is a co-principal investigator for the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Government Actions in Terrorist Environments (GATE) dataset. She received a Ph.D./MS in Public Policy and Management and an MS in Statistics from Carnegie Mellon University.

Notes


[13] Cronin (2006) specifically assesses why groups like Al-Qaeda may end, raising several propositions that are also amenable to empirical verification. Three years later Cronin (2009) tests some of these propositions and finds support for the notion that repression is largely counterproductive, decapitation only works against some groups, negotiations rarely work, and terrorists rarely succeed at achieving large strategic goals. Her analysis uses the now unavailable MIPT data and utilizes only 457 groups, excluding over 400 hundred short-lived groups (1 attack or 1 series of attacks) from the analysis. We do not replicate her findings as she uses data that are non-time varying. In short, she codes actions like negotiations and success but does not code what year these take place, just that they occur sometime in the lifespan of the group.


[21] There is a budding literature on terrorist group cooperation that we do not directly test here. Some of it, such as work by Bacon, is qualitative case comparison. Work by Phillips suggests cooperation can be beneficial for survival and Horowitz and Potter suggests that this cooperation can be more lethal. Horowitz, Michael C., and Philip Potter. (Nd) “Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality.” Forthcoming in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Phillips, Brian J. (Nd) “Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity.” Forthcoming in *International Studies Quarterly*. Bacon, Tricia. 2010. “Strange Bedfellows or Brothers-in-Arms: When Do Terrorist Organisations Form Alliances?” *APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper*.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Bloom (2005) mainly discusses the use of suicide terror as a tactic of outbidding. Kydd and Walter (2006), however, suggest that outbidding is a general strategy of a group that uses terror, suicide or otherwise.


[25] Lowery and Gray (1995) use the term *fitness*, borrowed from population ecology, to discuss the expected time to extinction for interest groups operating in a competitive environment.


[35] Ibid.


[39] Sheppard 1995

[40] Ibid.

group lethality.


[45] When discussing general organisations or businesses, these resources could be the number of people involved or the financial capital held by the company (Bruderl et al. 1992).


[50] Li. “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?”

[51] They also have a much smaller sample of countries than what are available from the GTD or ITERATE datasets. Rand identifies 648 groups and Jones and Libicki (2008) utilize a sample of 268 to perform descriptive analyses. This is a classic case of selection bias as they only examine cases that failed thus selecting their cases based on the value of the dependent variable. This likely biases any inferences from their study.


[56] Their definition has over 100 words and includes at least ten elements.


[64] Ibid.

[65] This definition excludes the state as a possible perpetrator. While states can and do use terror, the reasons they use terror are possibly distinct from the reasons substate actors pursue terror. To date no terrorism database, including the GTD, collects data on state terror, making it impossible to include it in our definition.


[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.


[73] We excluded individual perpetrators like the Unabomber or Timothy McVeigh as the spatial unit of analysis is the group.

[74] We are mainly missing country-year observations for GDP (182), population (566) and Polity 2 (353). Countries that lack a central government, such as Somalia or Lebanon during their civil wars, are the types of countries that are missing. Also, smaller island nations like St. Kitts lack data from Polity. Because these observations lack many of the missing covariates, imputation is quite difficult and imprecise.


[78] As mentioned above, because the ITERATE data only include data on transnational groups and attacks, they exclude purely domestic groups and acts. Whether these types of terrorism, domestic and transnational, have different etiologies is unclear (Enders, Walter, Khusra Gaiulloev, and Todd Sandler. 2010. “Domestic Versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics.” Paper Presented at the Terrorism and Policy Conference, Dallas, Texas. ). By just using transnational groups, however, the two types are being treated differently a priori.


[81] LaFree and Dugan. 2009. "Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism.”

[82] Although the main effects are insignificant in this model, the interaction between top dog and number of groups is negative and significant (p<0.001). With an odds ratio of 0.86, this finding suggests that for top dog groups only, each additional competitor decreases the odds of failure by about 14 percent. A likelihood ratio test confirms that the interaction model is a better fit (p<0.001).

[83] We cannot include measures of group size or ideology as these measures exist for only a small portion of our groups. In the future, we plan to code these data. Abrahms does use a peak group size measure for the members of his more limited sample of terrorist organisations, which consists of 54 groups that make the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organisation list. Abrahms, Max. 2012. “The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited.” Comparative Political Studies 45(3): 366-393.

[84] We also created two indexes of modalities to capture the flexibility of the group. For the first, we created a dummy variable for each kind of attack for each group each year then summed across the dummies, which resulted in an additive variable that ranges from 0 to 7. The second strategy incorporated a weighted index based on the difficulty associated with each kind of attack. The details are explained in the appendix. Both measures are highly correlated with the survival time of a group almost by definition. Groups with very few attacks cannot have a high index of modality. We prefer the dichotomous measure because it is less sensitive to this pitfall. Further, when we estimated models with either index, the results are similar. To also avoid potential endogeneity, we estimated a series of models with measures of Multiple-Modalities and Transnational that only take into account whether a group attacked multiple ways or multiple countries in their first year of existence. This allowed us to compare groups that last a long time and a short time based only on their behaviour in the first year. Results for these models were again quite similar.

[85] Groups that attack once are coded as zero, which could bias this estimate away from null. Thus, in the appendix, we first included a dummy for single-attack groups; and second we estimate the models on only those groups who perpetrate more than one attack in order to confirm that our results are robust to this potential bias. The results show that the substantive findings are consistent.


We use GDP per capita in thousands of dollars. Blomberg et al. (2011) also interpret GDP as a proxy for an attractive state target or as a suitable environment for skilled recruits (Benmelech and Berrebi 2007).


This measure comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and is a logged percentage of terrain in a country that is mountainous. It is constant over time.


Since the data on religious and ethnic fractionalization measures do not vary over time, we brought the data forward to 2010.

Li. “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?”

Both fractionalization measures come from Fearon and Laitin (2003).


Pape suggests that religion has nothing to do with reasons for suicide terrorism. Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 343-361. Using a research design that compares suicide attacks to all attacks, Wade and Reiter find that percent of the country that is Muslim is correlated with more suicide attacks. While this point is not settled, we use it as a control as it remains an alternative claim. Wade, Sara Jackson, and Dan Reiter. 2007. “Does Democracy Matter? Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(2): 329-348.


Carter and Signorino 2010.

This econometric technique is sometimes referred to as event history analysis, hazard modeling, duration analysis, or survival analysis.

We coded all groups as zeroes in 2010 as we could not confirm if they failed in that year or not. We also estimated the model without this year and the results are substantively the same.

The compilers of the GTD caution users about comparing events from the 1970 through 1997 period to those from the 1998 through 2007 period because they were collected according to different methodologies. Since the latter data were collected prospectively, they may systematically record fewer cases than the earlier data ([http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/)).


In a separate set of analyses, we find that 50% of all groups only perpetrate one attack, which leaves 20% of the total number of groups who perpetrate multiple attacks but only within a single year.


When constructing the probabilities for this figure, we set all insignificant values to zero. Further, all other values were set to the average values shown in Table 1. Finally, we limited the range of competitors to thirty in order to focus on the primary changes in the probability that a Top Dog organisation fails. That probability remains close to zero for larger numbers of competitors.


Chenoweth, Erica. 2010. “Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity.” *Journal of Politics* 72(1): 16-30, finds that political competition increases terrorist activity and the emergence of groups but does not examine group survival. This suggests an interesting potential set of results: Democracies create more groups; but
when there is a proliferation of groups, any of those groups is more likely to fail.

[113] Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) have some organisational data that is integrated with the groups from the RAND/MIPT data spanning from 1998 to 2005.

Hezbollah’s Man in Egypt

by Matthew Levitt

Abstract

In November 2008, Egyptian authorities broke up what they said was a Hezbollah network plotting attacks in Egypt. While some of the charges appear to have been exaggerated, and it is clear that not all those arrested were in fact Hezbollah operatives, a careful examination reveals that a Hezbollah network was, in fact, operating on Egyptian soil. That it was originally tasked with carrying out neither surveillance nor attacks makes the case all the more intriguing, especially when compared with other cells that faced similar reassignments. As a case study, the Hezbollah network—which demonstrated the use of several known Hezbollah modus operandi—underscores how Hezbollah operates around the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular.

Keywords: Networks, Hezbollah, trafficking, Egypt

Introduction

In December 2013, Egypt’s public prosecutor filed new charges against former President Mohammed Morsi and other Islamists, including divulging military secrets to a foreign power and conspiring with Hamas and Hezbollah to carry out terrorist attacks in Egypt.[1] The original charges also involved Hamas and Hezbollah, in particular allegations that the two militant groups helped thousands of prisoners escape from Egyptian jails in the chaotic first few days of the revolt that toppled the Mubarak regime.[2] While claims that Hamas and Hezbollah plotted attacks in Egypt are being received skeptically—and with good reason, given Cairo’s recent crackdown on anyone seen as sympathetic to Islamists, including puppets[3]—Hezbollah and Hamas prisoners did escape from Egyptian jails during the revolt. Whether they sought to free other prisoners as well remains to be established, but the history of the Hezbollah network that operated in Egypt from 2005 to late 2008 is a matter of fact, and a telling example of how Hezbollah networks operate in the Middle East and elsewhere beyond Lebanon’s borders.

While Hezbollah purports to be a strictly Lebanese “resistance” organisation, it has a significant track record of carrying out operations outside Lebanon, in locations as far afield as Argentina and Thailand. In 1994, it bombed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and wounding some 150 more.[4] In Bangkok that same year, a plot to bomb the Israeli embassy was foiled by sheer luck.[5] Closer to home, Hezbollah also established relationships with militant Palestinian groups. Although fundamentally a Shia outfit, cooperation with Sunni Palestinians against the “Zionist occupiers” lent the organisation additional legitimacy, and won it broad support across the Arab world.

Hezbollah’s mentor Iran also encouraged these Palestinian contacts. Typically acting through its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular the elite Qods Force wing, Iran has wielded a commanding influence over Hezbollah since it first sent IRGC officers to help found the Shia group in the early 1980s. As a rule, the IRGC is responsible for overseeing all of Iran’s terrorist activity and supervising its proxies. In the early to mid-1990s, with the Oslo peace accords signed and Palestinian autonomy slowly growing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, opponents of peace were funded, supported, and executed terrorist attacks to undermine the prospects for peace. Iran was especially active in promoting terrorism targeting Israel at this time. According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “in February 1999, it was reported that Palestinian police had discovered documents that attest to the transfer of $35 million to Hamas from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), money reportedly meant to finance terrorist activities against
Israeli targets.”[6] Iran’s primary proxy group, however, has always been Hezbollah. It should therefore not be surprising that Hezbollah increased its support for Palestinian groups in the 1990s, invested in its own terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, and went to great lengths to infiltrate operatives into Israel to collect intelligence and execute terror attacks. Hezbollah established a dedicated unit to pursue these goals – Unit 1800.

Beginning in 1995, a select group of operational leaders within Hezbollah’s military wing, the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO), developed plans to penetrate Israel’s defenses. Unit 1800 successfully infiltrated at least five Hezbollah operatives into Israel between 1996 and 2001, though none were able to carry out attacks. For its part, Iran sought to intensify and coordinate the terrorist operations of the various Palestinian groups it supported through Hezbollah. According to US officials, shortly after Palestinian violence erupted in September 2000, Iran assigned Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s terrorist mastermind, to bolster the operational capacity of Palestinian militant groups, specifically Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Mughniyeh also tasked his European networks with providing clandestine support for operatives who would use Europe as a launch pad for infiltrating operatives into Israel.[7]

Other aspirations of Unit 1800 include kidnapping Israelis and recruiting Israeli Arabs, both of which have seen some degree of success. In 2000, one of Mughniyeh’s key Unit 1800 deputies pulled off the abduction of a retired Israel Defense Forces colonel. It proved to be an intelligence bonanza for Hezbollah, and ultimately enabled them to secure the release of more than 400 prisoners from Israeli jails. There are also several known examples of Israeli Arabs working for Hezbollah, some of whom were arrested by Israeli security forces, but recruitment efforts continue to this day.[8] Finally, as part of its support to Palestinian groups, Hezbollah has found the minimally governed territory of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to be quite useful for smuggling operations across its border with the Gaza Strip, as well as for preparations for various plots.

Hezbollah’s “Egypt File”

Sometime in 2005, a Hezbollah operative named Muhammad Yousef Mansour traveled to Egypt on a Lebanese passport bearing the fictitious, Sunni sounding name, Sami Hani Shihab. In fact, Shihab was the name of a Sunni family from Beirut whose son, Sami, tragically died as an infant.[9] Mansour was in charge of Hezbollah’s “Egypt file,” part of a larger Hezbollah file involving the “Ring Countries” surrounding Israel such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.[10] Their shared borders with Israel made them obvious territories from which to conduct and support operations. In Egypt, Mansour worked closely with another senior Hezbollah operative, Mohammed Qabalan, to build a Hezbollah support network in Egypt. Qabalan, a senior operative within Unit 1800, focused on these ring countries and had considerable knowledge of Egypt—where he had visited in the past—and the Sinai Peninsula.[11] The men’s mission appears to have broadened over time, but it started out as an operation focused on smuggling weapons and funds through Egypt to Hamas and other Palestinian groups in Gaza. This “Egypt Branch” was also to help oversee the training of Palestinian militants and the facilitating of terrorist attacks targeting Israel.[12]

Then, following the February 2008 assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah personally vowed retribution against the Israelis, whom he accused of carrying out the killing. [13] In Egypt, some members of the Hezbollah network—by then comprising several dozen operatives, a few Lebanese Hezbollah operatives and many more local criminal facilitators and smugglers—began plotting a variety of terrorist attacks. Some were clearly still targeting Israelis, though by carrying out the attacks at Egyptian tourist resorts, the attacks would have had severe economic consequences and have likely killed or injured Egyptians unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Others, however, appear to
have targeted Egyptian targets more broadly, including conducting surveillance of critical infrastructure such as the Suez Canal.[14]

The cell was broken up in November 2008, when Mansour and two Palestinians traveling on Palestinian passports issued in Lebanon were arrested, but the public was only informed in April 2009 – possibly as part of an Egyptian effort to expose Hezbollah’s dark side in the run-up to the June 2009 Lebanese elections.[15] Of the 49 operatives Egyptian authorities identified, 26 were arrested, including Muhammad Mansour (aka Sami Shihab) and another Lebanese, five Palestinians, one Sudanese, and 18 Egyptians.[16] The others either fled the country, like Mohammed Qabalan, or escaped to the Sinai where authorities believed they went into hiding among the Bedouin smugglers deep in the peninsula’s mountains.[17]

**A Sunni Dangle Operation**

Much like a Hezbollah network recruited in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, the recruits to the network in Egypt were Sunni, not Shia. In Southeast Asia, however, the recruits were aware they were being recruited to work with Hezbollah.[18] In this case, the majority of the cell members appear to have believed they were being recruited into a militant Sunni group, not a Hezbollah cell, in what amounted to a simple variation of the classic “dangle” operation – they were recruited by one group by being led to believe they would be working for another. Using the Sunni-sounding name Sami Shihab, Mansour presented himself as a Palestinian living in Syria. An Egyptian member of the network, Nasser Jibril, told investigators he met Mansour through a Palestinian member of the group. Using the name Shihab, Mansour introduced himself to Jibril as a fellow Palestinian and invited Jibril, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, to break with the Brotherhood and join a new group dedicated to helping Palestinian militants. Jibril joined the group and was tasked with procuring 25 weapons for the network. Only after Jibril’s recruitment did Mansour reportedly confide that he was a Hezbollah operative. For most, the illusion of belonging to a militant Sunni group was maintained throughout.[19]

While the Hezbollah network had been collecting intelligence on Hezbollah’s behalf for several years, Egyptian authorities were reportedly unaware until several different foreign intelligence services, including Mossad and the CIA, brought the network to their attention.[20] It remains unclear if the Egyptians were completely unaware of the network’s existence, or if they were only unaware that the group was plotting attacks in Egypt as well as supporting Palestinian groups in Gaza, primarily Hamas. Egyptian authorities were especially concerned that several Muslim Brotherhood members had been recruited into the network. Commenting on the Muslim Brotherhood connection, then-President Mubarak made a comment several months after the cell’s exposure, suggesting that Egyptian authorities may have known the network had been supplying arms and money to Hamas. “They have contacts with Hamas. They have contacts with Hezbollah,” Mubarak said of the Brotherhood. “These are well known and they have contacts with many organisations. As long as they do not commit any terrorist crimes, I don’t care.”[21] By implication, had Egyptian authorities known that this or some other network was working with Hamas or Hezbollah but not planning attacks in Egypt, members of the network may have been left alone by local authorities.

**He Said, She Said**

Some questioned the strength of the Egyptian accusations, especially since Egyptian authorities originally asserted that the network had been supporting Palestinian militants, only later adding charges about surveillance and possible plans for attacks in Egypt.[22] The official charges – conspiracy to commit murder, weapons possession, and spying for a foreign organisation with the intent of conducting terrorist attacks –
appear to have been intentionally broad. The appearance in the Arab media of some more outlandish charges, including one unsubstantiated and apparently erroneous claim that some of the arrested cell members confessed a desire to target not only Israeli but also American interests in Egypt, further eroded confidence in the credibility of the Egyptian accusations.[23]

But the fact that the network engaged in smuggling and other logistical activities in support of Palestinian militants was never really in question, considering that Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah confirmed the charges himself days after they were aired. In a televised address, Nasrallah acknowledged that Mansour (Shihab) was a Hezbollah member who was in Egypt for “a logistical job to help the Palestinians get (military) equipment.” But charges that the Hezbollah network sought to destabilize Egypt or carry out attacks on Egyptian soil, he insisted, were “lies and fabrications aimed at setting the people of Egypt against Hezbollah.”[24] Nasrallah's deputy, Naim Qassem, was more adamant, insisting that “the investigation proved that Shihab was ordered by his commanders not to deal with the Egyptian issue, but only to transport weapons to the Gaza Strip.” That effort was done in secret, Qassem claimed, so as not to publicly embarrass the Egyptian regime.[25]

A month after the arrests, however, credible reports began to emerge, lending weight to Egyptian officials' charges. Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN's Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, reported to a meeting of the UN Security Council that “over the last few weeks, there has been a growing concern that Hizbollah has engaged in clandestine and illegal militant activities beyond Lebanese territory.” He said UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had been informed by the Egyptian government about the discovery that a Hezbollah operative led a cell in Cairo until his recent arrest.[26] In a sign that the UN took this information to heart, and that it was especially concerned that Hezbollah was acting abroad not in the best interests of Lebanon, but of Iran, Roed-Larsen stressed to the Security Council that Hezbollah “should cease any militant activities outside of Lebanon and complete its transformation into solely a Lebanese party.”[27]

Mubarak reportedly demanded that Hezbollah sign a statement that the party regretted having “used Egyptian soil for illegal purposes that could put it in danger.”[28] That did not happen. Instead, in October, Hezbollah deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem echoed Hezbollah's earlier acknowledgement of the party's weapons smuggling operations in Egypt. “We do not wish to enter the bazaar of tense positions with the Egyptian regime because our battle is with Israel and not with them,” he stated. “We do not think we committed a mistake by smuggling arms across the Egyptian territories,” he added. “This is an honorable act and not a sinful one.”[29]

**Hezbollah's Activities in Mideast “Ring Countries”**

In fact, the Egyptian Hezbollah network, Mansour told his Egyptian interrogators, was conceived as part of a wider plan aimed at establishing Hezbollah networks not only in Egypt but in Syria and Jordan as well – the so-called “ring countries” – under Mohammad Qabalan's command. To ensure the success of the Egyptian component of the plan, which was arguably the most important given the geographic reality of Gaza's border with the Egyptian Sinai, Hezbollah selected Qabalan as overall commander since he had visited Egypt several times and spent time in Sinai himself.[30] He too traveled on a fake identity, in his case an Egyptian passport bearing the name Hassan al-Ghul.[31] Mansour arrived on the scene in 2005 and, reporting through Qabalan and the Unit 1800 branch, operated under the guidance of several high-ranking Hezbollah operatives and the senior IRGC commander in Lebanon.[32]

Over the course of several years, the network facilitated the transfer of weapons from Sudan to Gaza, breaking up various responsibilities among the four distinct, compartmentalized cells that comprised the
overall network.[33] Mansour set up shop in the northern Sinai town of el-Arish, where he could provide close supervision to the smuggling operation. Additional apartments were procured as safe houses in the northern Sinai, including in the border town of Rafah abutting the Gaza border.[34] At one point, Qabalan personally went to Sudan “to attend to logistical matters” related to the smuggling of weapons and even a small number of foreign fighters into Gaza.[35] In other cases, Palestinian fighters were smuggled out of Gaza for onward travel to Sudan, Lebanon, or Syria to receive terrorist training or instructions.[36] Some cell members were responsible for procuring weapons and explosives, others for constructing suicide belts, and still others for raising funds. To facilitate their smuggling operation, Mansour and others purchased apartments near the Egyptian-Palestinian border.[37]

But the smuggling operation did not stop at the border with Gaza. Mansour reportedly told his interrogators that they “smuggled Palestinian fighters from Egypt deep into Israel, as well as into Gaza, as well as explosives.”[38] In the course of his trial, Mansour told Egyptian prosecutors that Qabalan trained would-be suicide bombers from Gaza in the use of explosive belts and helped infiltrate them into Israeli in September 2008, but Israeli police arrested the two before they could carry out their operation.[39]

Typical of Unit 1800 operations, the network sought to recruit Israeli Arabs to carry out or facilitate attacks in Israel. They also thought Israeli Arabs would be well-suited to help smuggle explosives and detonators into Israel. Under interrogation, some of the detained Hezbollah cell members reportedly confessed that the explosives and weapons authorities found on some of the accused were ready “for that purpose.”[40] The Hezbollah network was reportedly assisted by an individual who worked for the group’s satellite television channel, al-Manar. A Hebrew language speaker, the al-Manar employee was tasked with “contacting elements inside Israel through the Internet in order to collect information on Israeli tourists visiting Egypt.”[41] Following the exposure of Hezbollah’s Egypt cell, Mahmoud Sabri, an Egyptian lawyer, filed a motion to compel Nilesat—an Egyptian Satellite Company—to cease broadcasting al-Manar, based on the fact that the station disseminated false information and violated Egyptian legal ethics. A Cairo court rejected the motion, however, claiming that Sabri did not present enough evidence in support of his case and that al-Manar posed no threat to Egyptian national security.[42]

Operating in Egypt

The Hezbollah network’s interest in Israeli tourists appears to have solidified following the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. At that time, in early 2008, Mohammed Qabalan instructed Mansour and others to carry out surveillance and prepare for an attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt in retaliation for Mughniyeh’s death. The cell reportedly planned to carry out three simultaneous, large-scale attacks targeting Red Sea resorts popular among Israeli tourists, including Taba, Nuweiba, and Dahab. Cell members collected intelligence on Israeli tourists at Orgada, as well. Allegedly, the cell had already purchased a small van to be used as a car bomb – not unlike similar Hezbollah operations in Thailand and Argentina – and had prepared several suicide belts for the attacks. Ultimately, however, senior Hezbollah officials – by one account Hassan Nasrallah himself – ordered the attacks not to be carried out.[43]

Those attacks were likely cancelled for fear that costs of carrying out attacks in Egypt, the most populous Sunni country in the region and a leader of the Arab world, would outweigh the benefits. Better to simply use Egypt as a staging ground for attacks in Israel—for many a far less objectionable action. But the cell also conducted surveillance of the Suez Canal, which would have raised the stakes exponentially for a clash with Cairo. By some accounts, the canal was a target itself, as were ships passing through it. In a sign that the surveillance was more than a passing interest, members of the Hezbollah network reportedly rented property
along the canal to facilitate the surveillance operation. The Egyptian prosecutor cited “certain information” received from Egyptian intelligence that the Hezbollah network spied on the canal and the traffic traveling through it.[44] But the fact that Hezbollah seems to have been worried about the possible repercussions of carrying out an attack on Israeli targets in Egypt suggests that surveillance of the Suez Canal was probably collected as pre-operational intelligence, to have as off-the-shelf contingency planning in the event Hezbollah or Iran ever felt the need to carry out an attack in Egypt.[45] Indeed, Hezbollah modus operandi stresses such collection of pre-operational intelligence.[46]

Whatever the explanation, the Egyptian government was clearly shaken by the revelations and took them extremely seriously. Media reports subsequently cited government cables recording a conversation between Egypt's then-chief of intelligence, Omar Suleiman, and Admiral Mike Mullen, then-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which Suleiman indicated that Cairo took the Hezbollah plot so seriously that it prepared its own capability to “interfere” in Iran’s domestic affairs in retaliation, if necessary. “Egypt sent a clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran,” according to one cable quoted in the press. To that end, Suleiman stated, Egypt had trained agents for just such a mission.[47]

If true, it would not be the first time allegations arose that Hezbollah and Iran were targeting Egyptian interests at home. In February 1987, Egyptian press reported that Iranian intelligence met with Egyptian militants in Iran to discuss forming a Hezbollah-like organisation in Egypt. The MOIS office in Cairo was reportedly tasked with monitoring canal traffic and plotted to assassinate key Egyptian officials. Egypt subsequently expelled two Iranian diplomats and shut down the Iran special interests section for a period of time in May 1987. The following year, Egyptian intelligence announced it had foiled an Iranian-hatched plot to trigger a Khomeini-style Islamic revolution in Egypt through a series of sabotage attacks, bombings, assassinations, and the dissemination of subversive literature. According to Egyptian police, the cell was tied to Iran's MOIS, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Dawa Party.[48]

Nor would this be the last Iranian plot targeting Egypt. Even before verdicts were handed down in the case of the Hezbollah cell, Arab and Israeli media reported that a parallel, two-year investigation uncovered another cell, led by an Iranian intelligence officer who entered the country in the summer of 2006 under a forged Iraqi passport. The press reported the arrests in May 2009, but the Iranian intelligence officer, Muhammad Alam a-Din, and three other Islamic Revolutionary Guardsmen had been arrested five months earlier after Egyptian surveillance caught them making frequent trips to the Sinai, where they contacted Bedouin smugglers. The four hid in plain sight within the Iraqi refugee community near Cairo, and while under interrogation reportedly confirmed being sent by Qods Force commander Qassem Sulaimani to build an intelligence network in Egypt.[49]

The Verdicts

In April 2010, a year after the public was told the cell had been broken up, a judge in Cairo’s emergency state security court handed down life terms to three defendants, all Hezbollah members being tried in absentia (including Qabalan), and sentences of six months to 15 years to 23 more, including a 15-year sentence for Mohammed Mansour. Mansour's lawyers said their client admitted to recommending attacks against Israeli tourists in the Sinai, but noted Hezbollah officials told him not to carry out these attacks. As the judge read the verdicts, the defendants chanted “God is great” from their crowded prisoner's cage.[50] Rejecting their claim that they only used Egypt as a base from which to help Palestinian militants in Gaza, the court found the defendants guilty of plotting to blow up ships in the Suez Canal and to attack tourist sites in Egypt. “Is targeting ships in the canal support for the Palestinian cause?” the judge asked rhetorically in making his
ruling. “Is preparing explosives and targeting tourist resorts support for the Palestinians?”[51]

The extent to which surveillance of the canal presented a near-term, actionable threat remains a matter of speculation. Indeed, much of the case focused on the defendants’ preparation of explosives on Egyptian territory and the fact that they planned to target vacationers – likely Israelis – at Egyptian tourist resorts. Prosecutors screened video footage of explosives found at the premises used by the defendants, leading the judge to decide the group intended “to strike Egypt’s economy, destroy the bonds between its people and create chaos and instability.”[52] For his part, Hassan Nasrallah described the verdicts as “a badge of honour for these noble brothers of the resistance,” adding, “it is a source of pride to us for all Arab and Islamic peoples to know that we are detained and jailed for…standing by our brothers in Palestine and Gaza.” Challenging the court’s decision, Nasrallah reiterated that “these men are honourable brothers, fighters of the resistance, and not outlaws, terrorists and criminals, as the court verdict says.”[53]

The verdicts amounted to the latest volley in an ongoing tiff between Egypt and Hezbollah, and the Mubarak government surely worried about potential cooperation between Hezbollah and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In early 2004, for example, the Brotherhood’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, hosted a delegation of visiting Hezbollah officials and issued a statement stressing that the Brotherhood and Hezbollah shared “identical views with regard to resisting the Zionist enemy,” adding that “resistance” was the best route to confront “Zionist aggression.”[54] Popular support for Hezbollah ran high during the July 2006 war the group fought with Israel, and Cairo was further piqued by Hezbollah’s frequent criticism of Egypt’s decision to seal the border with Gaza once Hamas took over the Strip by force in the summer of 2007. In return, Egypt often accused Hezbollah of being an Iranian proxy and supported its Sunni political opponents in Lebanon.

Additionally, Hezbollah and Egypt found themselves in a war of words. In a statement to Kuwait’s al-Rai newspaper, Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah claimed that the verdicts “against the mujahidin who were offering aid to the mujahidin in the Gaza Strip” were “political adjudications” and “arbitrary decisions.” In response to his open support of those convicted and his criticism of the Egyptian legal system, the Egyptian media labeled Nasrallah “the monkey sheikh,” “an Iranian agent,” “a Lebanese from [the Iranian city of] Qom, "leader of the militias in the Iranian party in Lebanon," and “the son of garbage.”[55]

**Prison Break**

Not quite ten months into his fifteen-year jail term, Mansour and the rest of his network escaped from the Wadi al-Natroun prison amid the chaos of the revolution that brought down President Mubarak’s decades-long authoritarian rule in Egypt. According to the findings of a six-week investigation carried out by reporters for Egypt’s al-Masry al-Youm, it appears “the escapes were performed by Bedouin groups working at the behest of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the families of individual prisoners.” The breakout was well-coordinated, involving masked men on motorcycles shooting at guard towers and burning rice, straw, and tires outside the prison to create smokescreens covering the movements of the attackers. Three jeeps then pulled up to the prison gates carrying young men with machine guns. Civilians armed with machine guns and rifles can be seen in an 11-minute video clip of theraid. A larger crowd of some 20 men carrying clubs and knives then appears and surrounds the prison walls while others, including children, watch. Some of these people were organised to free Hezbollah, Hamas, and other prisoners, while others were drawn by the opportunity to steal the prison’s cattle, which they did. “We saw the Bedouins with their automatic weapons freeing the detainees of the cell block next door,” recalled Hassan al-Manakhly, a member of the Hezbollah network who escaped. “We knew they were Bedouins from the way they looked and from their accent.”[56]

Reverse-engineering the weapons-smuggling route they helped develop from Sudan through Egypt and
ultimately into the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah operatives reportedly smuggled Mansour across Egypt and into Sudan immediately following the breakout. Shortly after the breakout, Mansour was reportedly seen talking on a cell phone telling someone exactly what was happening, step by step, appearing absent-minded or confused by the sudden turn of events. It is likely the person on the other end of the phone gave Mansour instructions on where to go next, because the next time his colleagues saw him, Mansour was in Lebanon. [57]

How he got there underscores the flexibility and utility of Hezbollah’s standing support networks, in this case in Sudan. Working through the good offices of “an undercover Hezbollah station in an East African country,” Hezbollah contacted people in Syrian intelligence who arranged for the Syrian embassy in Cairo to provide Mansour a new false passport. Traveling on his new passport, officially claimed as a replacement for one he lost, Mansour was reportedly escorted across Egypt, into Sudan, and to the airport in Khartoum by Sudanese-based Hezbollah operatives.[58]

Even as he was being covertly smuggled out of the country and back to Beirut, Hezbollah officials happily boasted Mansour was “out of jail and safe.” Responding to a press query just days after the breakout, a Hezbollah official said that Mansour “is now in a safe location and will soon be back in Lebanon.”[59] Less than two weeks later, Mansour appeared unannounced at a major Hezbollah rally in Beirut. Televised on Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite station, Mansour waved a Hezbollah flag to the roaring applause of the audience as he took the stage.[60]

Conclusion

The precise details of Hezbollah’s role in the January 2011 Wadi al-Natroun prison break, if any, remain to be determined. What is clear, however, is that a Hezbollah network had been operating on the ground in Egypt. Its primary focus was smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip, but it was also tasked with providing logistical support to other operations and, eventually, assigned to carry out surveillance of potential targets in Egypt. As a case study, Hezbollah’s Egyptian network underscores three important themes critical to understanding how the group operates abroad:

First, Hezbollah networks are often called upon to provide logistical or other support for operations that go beyond their original remit. Describing Hezbollah’s financial support activity in the Ivory Coast, one U.S. official cautioned that even such support networks are “always a bit operational.”[61] In January 2012, Thai officials stumbled upon a similar case involving a Hezbollah logistician who had been running an explosives transshipment center out of Bangkok for at least a year before being arrested on suspicion of plotting attacks targeting Israeli tourists in Thailand.[62]

Second, Hezbollah has a long-established modus operandi of carrying out pre-operational surveillance of potential targets even when no plot is in the offing. According to FBI testimony, while Hezbollah has never conducted a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, “Hezbollah subjects have reportedly been tasked with surveillance of potential targets in the United States.” The FBI found that “such tasking to date appears to have been intended as a vetting tool to establish the individual’s loyalty to Hezbollah and Iran.”[63] Whatever the purpose, this Hezbollah surveillance enables the group to develop off-the-shelf operational planning that it can dust off and use at a future date, if it so desires.

Third, while most attention has been given to Hezbollah’s global footprint in places like South America and Europe, the group has a long and dangerous history of activities and operations in the Middle East, beginning as far back as terrorist operations in Kuwait in 1983 and 1985 (a series of seven bombings in two hours and
an assassination attempt targeting the Emir of Kuwait, respectively). Hezbollah’s terrorism persisted through the 1990s with the 1996 bombing of the US Air Force barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, into the 2000s with the deployment of Unit 3800—Hezbollah’s support mission in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq war—and continues today with Hezbollah’s massive investment in Syria.[64]

All told, fully appreciating the activities of this Hezbollah network in Egypt is important not only as a matter of historical interest, but also as a case study that underscores how Hezbollah operates around the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular. *Moqawama*, or “resistance” to Israel, is the core aspect of Hezbollah’s identity, and until its recent sectarian involvement in Syria, at least, was the basis for its broad appeal among both Shia and Sunnis. While it focused chiefly on Lebanon and the immediate area, Hezbollah demonstrated impressive reach with operations and networks from South America to Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, such capacity is not fundamental to its existence. The destruction of Israel is. Accordingly, even when it has limited international activities outside the Levant, Hezbollah has maintained a steady stream of activities under its “ring strategy” of undermining Israeli security—directly and by supporting Palestinian groups—from the countries bordering Israel.

Since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and then again after the 2006 war and Hezbollah’s takeover of downtown Beirut by force of arms in 2008, the group has struggled to justify its existence as a true “resistance” organisation battling to free occupied land and has focused primarily on tenuous claim that the Shebaa Farms are part of Lebanon and must still be liberated.[65] Today, Hezbollah is under far more significant fire for taking part in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime. Without an Israeli straw man to justify the maintenance of its arms as “legitimate resistance,” Hezbollah is left with precious little justification for its existence as an independent militia outside the control of the Lebanese government. Worse still, so long as Hezbollah continues to fight alongside Iran and the Assad regime against Sunni rebels, it will increasingly be seen as a sectarian fighting force undermining the security and political interests of the Lebanese state. Under such circumstances, it is all but certain Hezbollah will put renewed focus on the activities of Unit 1800—especially in the ring countries surrounding Israel—in an effort to buttress its reputation as a group primarily focused on “resisting” Israel.

**About the Author:** Dr. Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow, and Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism & Intelligence, at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of ‘Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God’ (Georgetown University Press, 2013). Previously, Levitt served as US Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and before that as an FBI counterterrorism intelligence analyst.

**Notes**


[21] “‘Hezbollah Cell’ to be Tried by Egypt Security Court,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2009


[38] Ibid.


Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism

by Heather S. Gregg

Abstract
Religious terrorism is typically characterised as acts of unrestrained, irrational and indiscriminant violence, thus offering few if any policy options for counterterrorism measures. This assumption about religious terrorism stems from two challenges in the literature: disproportionate attention to apocalyptic terrorism, and a lack of distinction between religious terrorism and its secular counterpart. This article, therefore, aims to do four things: define and differentiate religiously motivated terrorism from traditional terrorism; investigate three goals of religious terrorism (fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and establishing a religiously pure state); consider the role of leadership and target selection of religious terrorists; and, finally, suggest a range of counterterrorism strategies based on these observations.

Keywords: Religion, apocalyptic, counterterrorism

Introduction
A conventional wisdom has emerged that the current wave of religiously motivated terrorism propagates acts of unrestrained, indiscriminant violence, and that it is irrational, thus offering few, if any, policy options for counterterrorism measures. Jean-Francois Mayer asserts, for example: “When religious beliefs are used for justifying violence, violent actions tend to become endowed with cosmic dimensions, and there is nothing left to restrain them.”[1] Similarly, Bruce Hoffman argues: “For the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other terrorists.”[2]

These assertions about religion’s role in terrorism stem from two challenges in the literature. First, scholarship on religious terrorism tends to focus on one particular motivation—apocalyptic, millennial, or messianic terrorism, in which groups use violence to hasten the end of times and usher in an anticipated new world. Religious terrorists, however, have other goals, some of which are earthly in their aims; these goals are often categorised as political, not religious.[3] Second, religious terrorism has not been clearly distinguished from its traditional more secular counterpart with a definition of what makes it unique from other forms of terrorism, if it is unique at all.

In order to better understand religiously motivated terrorism, this article will do four things. First it aims to define and differentiate religiously motivated terrorism from traditional terrorism, including leftist groups, right wing groups, and ethnic-separatist terrorists. Second, it will provide a range of goals for religious groups and how terrorism serves these goals. In particular, the article investigates three objectives: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and establishing a religiously pure state. Third, within these goals, the article will consider the role of leadership and target selection of religious terrorists for their uniqueness and commonality with traditional terrorism. Finally, the article concludes by offering suggestions for mitigating religiously motivated terrorism.
Defining Traditional and Religious Terrorism

Before distinguishing traditional and religious terrorism from one another, terrorism needs to be defined in its own right. There is little consensus on the definition of terrorism, both within academic and policy circles. [4] Walter Laqueur argues that this lack of consensus is largely due to the fact that there is not one type of terrorism and that terrorism, as a tactic, is constantly changing its means, motives and actors. [5] Drawing primarily from Bruce Hoffman, this article defines the tactic of terrorism as a) the use or threat of violence; b) the targeting of civilians, property, or government; c) the intent of creating fear aimed at altering the status quo; and d) a group activity. [6]

This definition stresses that terrorism, first and foremost, is a tactic. As such, non-state and state actors can employ terrorist tactics. This article, however, will focus specifically on non-state actors. Second, this definition stresses the corporate nature of terrorists and their tactical use of violence with the goal of changing the existing political, social, military, or religious order. To be sure, individuals or “lone wolves” can employ terrorist tactics to achieve similar goals, but this article will concentrate on groups that use terrorism to achieve a stated goal. Finally, this definition is particularly useful for exploring religiously motivated terrorism because it considers goals that may not be strictly political, such as changing the social and religious order of a state or region. As will be described, religious groups that use terrorism have political goals, but they also have social and religious goals that are distinct from political objectives.

Traditional Terrorism: Left, Right and Ethnic-Separatist

Traditional terrorism is typically divided into three sub-categories: left, right and ethnic-separatist. [7] Terrorism of the left refers primarily to Anarchist, Marxist and socialist oriented ideologies. This type of terrorism was most active in the 20th century, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. Anarchist groups were most popular in Europe around the turn of the 20th century, particularly in Russia, where movements emerged with the aim of destroying the monarchy and the state. [8] Examples of left-wing Marxist groups include the Argentinian Montoneros and ERP, the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader Meinhof group), and the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). All of these groups were inspired by Marxist or socialist ideologies. [9] This sub-category of traditional terrorism, although active during the Cold War, has declined since the 1980’s. [10] Religious terrorism, by-and-large, has not been associated with this branch of terrorism. [11]

Right-winged terrorism refers to groups with racist, fascist, or nationalistic motives and goals. This type of terrorism was strong between the World Wars and reasserted itself beginning in the 1980’s and continues to the present. Early examples include the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, and fascist-inspired movements like the Rumanian Iron Guard of the 1930’s. [12] Resurgent right-wing terrorism includes groups like the neo-Nazis in Europe and the United States, and violent anti-immigration groups. [13] Religious terrorism has often been categorized as a new breed of right-winged terrorism. [14] However, as will be argued below, religious terrorism has traits that look like right-winged racism but also contains elements that do not fit into this category.

Ethnic-separatist terrorism [15] consists of groups that use terrorism to strive for autonomy or independence from a state or military force. Examples of ethnic-separatist terrorists include groups seeking independence from an occupying force, such as the Jewish Irgun in Palestine under the British Mandate, the PLO under Israeli occupation, and the IRA under British occupation. [16] Another example within this subset is groups that seek separation from an existing state such as the ETA in the Basque province of Spain. [17]
research also associates religious terrorism with this branch of traditional terrorism.[18] However, it is important to distinguish ethnic-separatist terrorists that contain religious elements but whose primary goals are non-religious from terrorist groups that have religious goals. An example of a religious-ethnic group with non-religious goals is the IRA. Although its constituency is primarily Catholic, the IRA's aim is to expel British forces in the region and reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic, not to create a religious government or state. By contrast, an example of a religious/ethnic group with religious goals is the Palestinian Hamas, which is pushing for the expulsion of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine.[19] Table 1.1 summarizes traditional terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defining Goals</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
<td>▪ Anarchist—destroy the government</td>
<td>▪ Argentinian Montoneros/ERP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Marxist—foment workers’ revolution</td>
<td>▪ Red Brigades, German/Japanese Red Armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Socialist—economic restructuring</td>
<td>▪ Palestinian PFLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Colombian ELM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
<td>▪ Racist—racial supremacy</td>
<td>▪ Ku Klux Klan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Fascist—state-sponsored, militant racism/nationalism</td>
<td>▪ Rumanian Iron Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Nationalistic</td>
<td>▪ Neo-Nazis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic-</strong></td>
<td>▪ Dispel foreign occupying force</td>
<td>▪ Irgun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Separatist</strong></td>
<td>▪ Create ethnically independent state</td>
<td>▪ PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ IRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Basque ETA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Religiously Motivated Terrorism**

Religiously motivated terrorism, although containing elements of all three branches of traditional terrorism, needs to be distinguished analytically from traditional terrorism in order to better understand its workings. However, similar to discussions on terrorism in general, current literature on religiously motivated terrorism lacks consensus on a definition and how it differs from traditional terrorism, if at all. David Tucker even argues that the term “religious terrorism” is not of much use because of confusion over its definition.[20] Mark Juergensmeyer suggests that religiously motivated terrorism came to the foreground in the 1980s and is marked by extreme brutality and seemingly irrational motivations and goals.[21] Bruce Hoffman argues that religion serves to uniquely legitimate and justify violence in religious terrorism but does not explain how religious ideology differs from Marxist or Fascist ideology in inspiring terrorist acts.[22] Walter Laqueur argues that religious terrorism is the “new terrorism of the right” and that it has more to do with nationalism than religion. But this definition fails to explain movements like Aum Shinrikyo, who desire to destroy the world, not assert their nationalist claims, or Al-Qaeda, which has transnational goals.[23]

Religious terrorism scholar David C. Rapoport offers another argument for what differentiates religious from secular terrorism. He posits that the justification and precedents of religious terrorism differ from traditional
forms; religious terrorists use sacred texts and historic examples that are not present in secular terrorism. Secular terrorism, in contrast, develops a culture of actions and boundaries that restrain the scope of violent acts.[24] This argument relies on the internal aspects of religion—its scriptures and traditions—without explaining why these internal traits justify and mandate violence by some groups at sometime and not others. In other words, his argument does not include factors external to a religious group and how these factors may bear on explaining the variation of peace and violence within religions.

Finally, Mark Sedgwick suggests that religious terrorism is best understood by considering its immediate and ultimate objectives. He proposes that “while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political.”[25] Sedgewick’s observation is useful for realizing that religious terrorists’ goals are not purely religious. However, this article will challenge his dichotomy between short and long term, and non-religious and religious goals, proposing that certain terrorists can have immediate goals that are religious, specifically apocalyptic terrorists, while others can have long-term objectives that are political, such as creating a religious government.

Finally, these debates within the literature and lack of consensus on what makes religiously motivated terrorism unique from traditional terrorism can be clarified by looking not just at the presence of scripture, religious symbols or adherents, but by focusing on uniquely religious goals for which these groups are fighting. In other words, the use of scripture or presence of religious symbols is not enough to distinguish a group and its use of terrorism as uniquely religious. As previously noted, there are examples of groups that use religion as a form of identity or draw from scriptures and symbols to motivate followers, but their goals fall within the confines of traditional terrorism. Furthermore, non-religious factors may cause groups to use terrorism for religiously salient goals. For example, groups may use terrorism with the aim of overthrowing governments that they believe are not upholding the tenets of a particular religion and installing a religious government in its place. The cause of the terrorist act is something outside of the faith, but the goal is uniquely religious.

Therefore, this article proposes that religiously motivated terrorism can be defined as: the threat or use of force with the purpose of influencing or coercing governments and/or populations towards saliently religious goals. The discussion below will elaborate on three goals in particular: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and religiously cleansing a state or area.

**Religious Terrorism’s Goals: Apocalypse, Theocracy, and Religious Cleansing**

In order to better understand religiously motivated terrorism and distinguish it from its traditional counterpart, it is useful to identify specific examples of uniquely religious goals for which groups may be striving. This article highlights three goals in particular: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and religiously cleansing a state. These goals are not exhaustive, but do cover the majority of religiously motivated violence seen today.

**Apocalyptic Terrorism**

Some groups have apocalyptic goals; their primary aim is to cause cataclysmic destruction to people, property, and the environment with the hope of fomenting the end of time and ushering in religious promises of a new world. This pursuit is uniquely religious and is perhaps the most common stereotype of religiously motivated terrorism. Apocalyptic terrorism exists both within traditional religions and “cults” or New Religious Movements (NRM). For example, Rapoport argues that apocalyptic terrorist groups—what he
calls millennialist groups—are inspired by longings for the coming of the messiah, which will coincide with the end of the world.[26] Mayer argues that apocalyptic imagining is a cause of terrorism in cults and NRM but, by itself, does not usually result in violence. Rather, groups that turn to terrorism are responding to a mix of millennialism, real world threats, and internal disputes.[27]

An example of an apocalyptic group within an existing religious tradition is the Gush Emunim in Israel. In 1984 members hatched a plot to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock Shrine in Jerusalem, the third most holy site in Islam, in order to spark a nuclear and chemical confrontation between Israel and Muslim countries. The goal was to create “catastrophic messianism,” disastrous circumstances that would hasten the coming of the messiah.[28] The most common example of a NRM group that used terrorism with apocalyptic aims is the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which deployed Sarin gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995. Its overarching goals was instigating World War III and ultimately “destroying the world to save it.”[29] The attacks killed 13 and injured more than 700 people.

Of the three religious goals outlined here, apocalyptic terrorism is the most dangerous for two reasons. First, the paradox of ‘destroying the world’—causing catastrophic death and destruction—to create a new and better world seems the furthest removed from rational thought and negotiation. This makes counterterrorism measures especially difficult; it appears that there is little the U.S. government, or anyone else, can give these groups to alter their aims.

Second, the goal of destroying the world is particularly ripe for the use of WMD as a means of achieving such ends, which makes apocalyptic groups particularly dangerous. However, it is also important to note that many apocalyptic terrorists have turned their violence inward in order to foment the apocalypse, as opposed to attacking those outside the group. Some examples of inwardly violent groups include the apocalyptic cult The People's Temple, headed by Jim Jones, in which over 900 members committed suicide en masse in anticipation of an apocalyptic standoff with the U.S. government. Another example is Heaven's Gate, which believed that suicide would free the members' souls.[30] The standoff between U.S. Federal agents and the Branch Davidians at the Mount Carmel compound in Waco, Texas, also fulfilled apocalyptic expectations of the cult group, and resulted in the death of 76 men, women and children.[31] Mayer notes that examples like these, while apocalyptic and violent, may not fall under the definition of terrorism per se, because their goals do not extend beyond the confines of their immediate group.[32] Nevertheless, they offer important clues about the conditions under which apocalyptic thinking emerges and results in mass violence.

The Creation of a Religious Government

Groups also use terrorism as a means of creating a religious government. This goal is most commonly associated with militant Islamic groups and their desire to establish a government run by Shari'a law. For example, the Lebanese Twelver Shia organization Hezbollah has used terrorism against the state of Israel and against its own government with the ultimate goal of creating a religious government in Lebanon, inspired by the theocracy in Iran. Somewhat similarly, the Sunni Palestinian Hamas has used terrorism against Israel with the immediate aim of ending its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and potentially all of Israel, but with the ultimate aim of creating a religious government in Palestine.[33]

The desire to create a religious government also exists in other traditions. “Reconstruction Theology” is one interpretation of Christian scriptures that calls for the creation of a Christian theocratic government in the United States. Reconstruction Theology has inspired groups such as the Christian Identity Movement, which is linked to the paramilitary training camp the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). This movement aims to use terrorism as a means of compelling change within the U.S. government. Oklahoma
City bomber Timothy McVeigh had ties to both Christian Identity and CSA. [34]

Terrorists vying for the creation of a religious government are often confined within a state's borders, such as the Christian Identity Movement in the United States. These groups, however, can also have transnational ties and goals through sponsorship from likeminded groups outside their borders and from other states. This is true of the Lebanese Hizbollah, which receives financial and material support from the government of Iran, which is also Twelver Shia. [35] Transnational ties are also evident in Kach and its successor organizations, which receives considerable support from likeminded Jews in the United States. [36] Hamas is also reported to receive money from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Iran. [37]

Transnational ties of religious terrorism groups also appear to stem from leaders that have ties to groups in other countries. This is true of Kach/JDL, whose leader, Meir Kahane, was born in the United States and co-founded the JDL there but then immigrated to Israel and formed Kach, which is made up primarily of American-born Jews who have moved to Israel. [38] Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbollah, has personal ties to Iran and Iraq, especially through his seminary training in both countries. [39]

In addition to the goal of creating a religious government within a state, there are groups vying to create religious regions or super-states. Currently, some groups are working to establish a pan-Islamic entity that will transcend state borders. Perhaps the best example of this type of transnational religious terrorism is Al-Qaeda. Following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989, Al-Qaeda spread its ideology of jihad through leadership ties and training centers to Muslim countries around the globe. After September 11th, bin Laden called for the restoration of the Caliphate as a necessary objective to unite and protect the worldwide Muslim community. [40] Like-minded groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula share these goals. Likewise, groups like Jemiyyah Islamia in Southeast Asia have named the creation of a regional Caliphate as one of their stated objectives. [41]

It is worth noting that non-violent pan-Islamic movements exist, which attempt to achieve their ends by means other than terrorism. The most notable example is the Muslim Brotherhood, which exists in over 70 countries, and is strongest in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Although initially a movement that used violence and terrorism, the Brotherhood has called for the creation of a pan-Islamic government by the “da'wa”, or calling Muslims back to the faith, and through political reform, education and service to Muslims, generally not by means of terrorism and violence. [42] Another organization that eschews violence, Hizb ut-Tahrir, has made the restoration of the Caliphate one of its stated goals. [43] Both of these groups, despite their official claims to non-violence, have been implicated in spreading intolerant ideologies that inspire acts of violence within cells or individuals acting on their own. For these reasons, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir are regarding with caution by countries in which they are active. [44]

The creation of religious governments, through violent or peaceful means, presents important domestic and international security concerns to the United States and the international community. The treatment of religious minorities and secular groups is a problem under governments that embrace and promote a particular interpretation of a religion, and could lead to basic human rights violations and spark internal instability. Regionally, the creation of theocracies could prompt refugees to flee an ideology they do not espouse. Theocracies could also stir up religious fervor in like-minded religious adherents beyond its borders, causing regional instability. The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 is a case-in-point for both domestic and international security concerns sparked by the creation of a religious government. Iran's theocracy has been notoriously intolerant towards religious minorities, particularly the Baha'i, as well as to secular opposition groups. Regionally, Iran has caused instability by spreading religious fervour to countries with Shia populations, especially Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, in addition to an all-out war with

Lastly, it is useful to note that groups agitating for the creation of a religious government often disagree among themselves as to the nature and scope of religion's involvement in the state. For example, religious political parties exist in countries ranging from Israel (Jewish) to India (Hindu) to Pakistan (Islamic and Christian) to Sri Lanka (Buddhist), but within each of these countries, there is a wide variance of opinions on how a religious state should work. Sri Lanka presents an interesting example. In 1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) ran on a platform that promised to give Buddhism a preferential place in the country, along with other allowances to the Sinhalese majority, which is primarily Buddhist. When the government failed to deliver on these promises, a Buddhist Monk assassinated the prime minster in 1959. Buddhist discontent later led to the creation of a Buddhist revolutionary movement that used terrorism to agitate for a Buddhist theocracy in Sri Lanka.[45] Somewhat similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was assassinated in 1995 by the Israeli Yigal Allon because he believed that Rabin was compromising the true integrity of the Jewish state by negotiating with the Palestinians.[46] Therefore, efforts aimed at creating a religious state are destabilizing because they throw into question what the state should look like and who speaks for the religion.

Terrorism and Religious Cleansing

Religious terrorists also aim to eradicate “infidels”—the unfaithful within their tradition or in other religions—in order to create a religiously pure state.[47] This goal differs from the creation of a religious government in that groups aim to make all the citizens within a state's border or region conform to their interpretation of the faith; it is religious cleansing, which includes battles with other religious groups as well as those within a religion whose interpretation of the faith differs from the group's.

Religious cleansing can be expressed in specific terms, such as the eradication of another group, or in broad terms, such as the cleansing of a culture, ideas or norms that do not conform to the group's worldviews. For example, Jewish settlers associated with the JDL/Kach movement in the West Bank, particularly in Hebron, have named as one of their goals the expulsion of non-Jews from land that they believe is divinely theirs.[48] This is a battle against other religions. In addition, however, the movement is battling Jews who do not conform to their interpretation of the faith along with the Israeli government, which it believes is not upholding the tenets of the faith. Rabbi Meir Kahane, the co-founder of the JDL and the founder of Kach stated in an interview in the 1980s that it is the requirement of Israel, as a Jewish state, to create a government based on the Torah, and that those who do not see this, are not truly Jewish. “A Jewish state means that, at a minimum, there must be a majority of Jews; a Jewish sovereignty with the power to make our own laws...My hope as a religious Jew, which is the hope of every sincere and religious Jew, is to have a state governed by the Torah.”[49] As previously noted, Kahane and his organisations inspired violent actions aimed at achieving these goals, including assassination, murder, and attempted destruction of religious sites.

Terrorism aimed at religious cleansing appears similar to non-religious terrorism aimed at ethnic cleansing. However, religious cleansing is different for the important reason that religion, not ethnicity, is the salient defining characteristic of both the terrorist group and the target. This means that religious terrorist groups can be multi-ethnic, such as Al-Qaeda, which is made up of Muslims from all over the worldwide community, but not multi-religious; they are all Muslim. Furthermore, terrorism aimed at religious cleansing may also look like religious fratricide, where violence is intra-religious. In these cases, groups use terrorism to rid an area or country of co-religionists that they believe are corrupting or not upholding the true tenets of the faith. In both cases, the salient characteristic between these groups is faith, not differing ethnicities. Table
1.2 summarises the goals of religious terrorism.

**Table 1.2 Religious Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining Goals</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apocalyptic</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Cataclysmic destruction to people, property, environment</td>
<td>§ Elements of JDL/Kach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Hasten arrival of a “new world”</td>
<td>§ Some strains of Christian Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Religious Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Abolish secular state</td>
<td>§ Lebanese Hizbollah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Create a state governed by religious law and doctrine</td>
<td>§ Christian Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Create trans-state religious government</td>
<td>§ Hamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Religiously Pure State</td>
<td>§ Elements of JDL/Kach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Remove groups from other religions</td>
<td>§ LeT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ Remove groups within same religion with different interpretations of faith</td>
<td>§ Shiv Sena/RSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Leadership and Targets of Religious Terrorists**

In addition to the goals for which groups are fighting, religious terrorism has additional attributes that distinguish it from its traditional counterparts, including unique sources of leadership and some of its targets. A common perception is that religious groups that use terrorism are led by a cleric, or a similar religious leader, such as an imam, ‘alim, rabbi, or swami. However, not all leaders of terrorist groups have such *bona fide* leaders; rather the origin of the religious leader’s authority comes from several key sources. For example, religious authority can be self-appointed, such as Shoko Asahara, the spiritual leader and founder of Aum Shinrikyo.[50] Religious authorities can also be charismatic figures from outside the clergy of a traditional religion, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, the key leaders of Al-Qaeda.[51] Religious authorities within terrorist groups can also be individuals who are trained as religious clerics or scholars. Examples of this type of authority are Sheikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Hizbollah, who was trained as a Shia cleric in Najaf, Iraq, and Qum, Iran, and Meir Kahane of the JDL and Kach, who was trained as a Rabbi in the United States.

These different types of leadership in religiously motivated terrorism may seem puzzling at a glance, but they emphasise that religious power has more than one source and its legitimacy resides with the followers. In the case of bin Laden, his influence was derived from a combination of charisma and admiration for his purported success as a warrior in the Afghan-Soviet war and with various terrorist operations. With others, such as Nasrallah and Kahane, it was religious training. Still, with some it is self-proclaimed divine connections, as will Asahara and Koresh. Nevertheless, despite the source of their religious authority, the presence of a religious leader who is recognised as legitimate and who is given the authority to speak on behalf of the faith by his or her followers is typical to most religious terrorist movements. Religious authority, in other words, rests with group’s followers.

Similarly, religious terrorists have an array of different targets, which reveals important clues about their goals. Broadly speaking, religious terrorists tend to have two types of targets: tactical targets that serve
specific, earthly goals and are no different from other forms of terrorism; and symbolic targets.

Tactical targets are means to a bigger, earthly campaign. For example, terrorists seeking to create a religious government target the workings of the state, including attacks on heads of state and government officials. Examples of these types of targets include the Egyptian Gamaat’s assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 and Yigal Amir’s assassination of Yitzak Rabin in 1994.[52] These types of attacks also include targeting a government’s infrastructure and sources of power, such as the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma in 1995, believed to be inspired in part by the Christian Identity Movement.[53]

Religious terrorists also target the presence of foreign governments within their borders or region, including military forces, such as Israeli soldiers in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. Palestinian Islamic militants have targeted Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as part of their aim of liberating the land from foreign occupiers. Likewise, the Lebanese Hizbollah targeted IDF soldiers occupying southern Lebanon with the aim of their expulsion.[54] Religious terrorists also targeted U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden named the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, the home of Islam's holiest cities, as threatening and humiliating to Islam. In 1996 and again in 1998, he declared that attacks against “Satan’s U.S. troops” were necessary for the protection of Muslims and for cleansing infidel forces “out of all the lands of Islam.”[55] Another example of these targets is religious terrorist groups who have attacked foreign embassies, including Egyptian Islamic extremists’ bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan in 1995 and Al-Qaeda's 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

In addition to specific domestic targets, religious terrorists often have targets that extend beyond the borders of the state in which they reside. Religious terrorists have targeted third party states that support domestic regimes. For example, radical Islamic militants in Egypt named the United States as one of its targets for its support of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes, which they saw as oppressive and un-Islamic.[56] Likewise, Islamic militants in Pakistan have named the United States as a target for its support of the Pakistani regime, which is mainly secular in its outlook and goals.[57]

These tactical targets look no different than secular, Marxist, anarchist or ethnic-separatist terrorists bent on political change or revolution.[58] For example, Anti-U.S. sentiment is strong within the non-religious Colombian FARC terrorist group, particularly for U.S. aid to the current Colombian government.[59] This sentiment could potentially translate into attacks on U.S. civilians and property.[60] Likewise, British troops in Northern Ireland have been the target of republican terrorist groups with the end-goal of expelling these forces and reuniting Northern Ireland with the Republic, which is not a uniquely religious goal.[61] What makes terrorism towards these targets ultimately religious is that they are stepping-stones to greater religious goals—the creation of a religious government.[62]

In addition to tactical targets aimed at changing regimes or compelling the withdrawal of foreign influences, religious groups also use terrorist tactics to attack individuals and groups that they believe are threatening their interpretation of the faith. For example, religious terrorists target citizens and property that represent the religious “other.” Examples include attacks on Christian churches in Indonesia in December of 2000, believed to be the work of Islamic terrorists in the region, and more recent attacks on Christians in Pakistan.[63] Other examples include the Indian Hindu militant group Shiv Sena, which aims to promote Maharashtria Hindus in Mumbai and drive Muslims from India. Bal Thackeray, Shiv Sena’s founder, called for the creation of Hindu suicide bombers to target Muslims in 2002 and 2008.[64] Religious terrorists can also target other groups’ religious sites. Examples include the above-mentioned church bombings, and the plot by Jewish extremists in Israel to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock shrine in Jerusalem. These targets tend to be unique to religious terrorists and support the aim of cleansing the land of the religious
These types of attacks also include intra-religious attacks on those believe to be apostates within the faith. An example of this type of targeting is takfir violence in Islam, where militant groups draw from religious sources to justify killing Muslims that they believe are not upholding the true practice of the faith. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, for example, has attacked Iraqi Shia, claiming that they are apostates to Islam.[65] These attacks look similar to ethnic-separatist attacks on minorities in regions they believe to be their own, but are unique in that the targets are focused on cleansing an area of perceived religious impurities.

Religious terrorists also have symbolic targets, which mostly operate on an abstract level and tend to be specific to religious goals and objectives. Most notably, religious terrorists can attempt to attack “culture,” values and norms that do not conform to the religious ideals of the terrorist group. Examples of this include attacks on movie theaters, discos, bars and other social gathering points. For example, Muslim extremists set fire to a hotel in Turkey in 1993, targeting “leftist writers and intellectuals,” killing over 40 people.[66] Warring fundamentalist groups in Algeria violently suppressed Rai music in the 1990s for its mix of Western and Mediterranean styles, including attacking and then eventually exiling the singer Khaled.[67] In India, Hindu militants have destroyed numerous paintings of Muslim artist Maqbool Fida Husain, particularly works depicting Hindu deities.[68] In the United States, Christian Identity activists bombed a lesbian bar, targeting what they perceive as symbols of the secular, immoral state.[69]

These targets are abstract because the definition of culture is largely amorphous; it is difficult if not impossible to find the source of culture and remove it fully. Therefore, unlike the state, the source of culture cannot be targeted specifically and abstract targets become the only real choice. Abstract targets, however, require a certain degree of decoding by counterterrorism forces and often the meaning and significance behind certain attacks may be missed.

Finally, apocalyptic groups aim to maximize violence and mass casualties; the goal is chaos with the hope of ushering in a new era, either in this world or the next. Aum Shinrikyo, for example, sought total destruction, which knows no bounds between domestic and international and names no specific targets. For groups such as these, the end-goal, at least on an earthly plane, is mass violence and destruction. The cataclysmic nature of apocalyptic terrorism is an additional reason why this specific type of religious terrorists needs to be considered as a distinct and unique category. Its use of violence to achieve transcendent goals is different from other forms of religious terrorism with more limited goals.[70] Table 1.3 summarizes religious terrorisms domestic and international targets.
### Table 1.3 Religious Terrorism’s Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Targets</th>
<th>Abstract Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic</strong></td>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Workings of the state—assassinate leaders, attacks on infrastructure, undermine authority of state</td>
<td>- States that support regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Foreign government presence/militaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International tourists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- “Secular” or “Western” culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- “Globalization”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusion

This article has argued that religious terrorism has characteristics that make it uniquely different from traditional secular left-wing and right-wing terrorism, specifically in the goals for which religious terrorists are striving. Three salient religious goals were presented: the apocalyptic aim of destroying the world, the creation of a religious government, and the creation of a religiously pure state. Of these three goals, apocalyptic actions aimed at ‘destroying the world to save it’ are the most threatening because they suggest the use of WMD with mass casualties and damage to property. In addition to goals, religious terrorism is also differentiated by the presence of religious leaders, which do not derive their authority from one source, but rather are given legitimacy by their followers. Finally, religious terrorists tend to have two types of targets, specific and abstract. Specific, tactical targets include the state or adversarial groups; as such, they look similar to targets of left and right wing terrorists. However, religious terrorists also have symbolic targets that represent secular or other religious cultures and values, both within states and internationally targets that are unique. Apocalyptic terrorists make no distinction between domestic and international, specific and abstract. Instead, they are concerned with the one pursuit of cataclysmic destruction.

These arguments suggest several counterterrorism measures aimed at mitigating or eradicating terrorism performed in the name of religion. All of these courses of action require a basic understanding of the group, its leadership, and the goals for which the group is fighting. Furthermore, none of these types of religiously motivated terrorism can be countered by the use of force alone.

First, apocalyptic terrorism presents unique counterterrorism challenges. Groups that believe that causing mass casualties and chaos will hasten the end of times are operating on a rationale that does not conform to earthly logic. Their acute worldview and goals suggest that they are not open to negotiation or compromise. With this in mind, a strategy of containment combined with targeting leadership is the best path to undermining these groups. Specifically, counterterrorism strategies should first focus on preventing the spread of the group’s apocalyptic worldview. An important means to this end is to avoid fulfilling the group’s prophecies. If the group is anticipating persecution or a fiery confrontation with the alleged ‘forces of evil’, a state’s excessive use of force could make this dream come true. Rather than targeting the group, a better counterterrorism approach would be to understand the role that leadership plays in generating the apocalyptic worldview and, if the group is driven by one or a few key leaders, target those individuals. Research and empirical examples suggest that apocalyptic groups are highly leadership driven, especially in New Religious Movements; therefore targeting the leaders may cause the group to fall apart.[71] The goal
with this approach is to change the group's worldview by taking out its propagator or, at a minimum, render the group unable to carry out its apocalyptic dreams.

Groups that use terrorism with the goal of creating a religious government have several counterterrorism options. As previously described, groups vying for the creation of a theocracy often disagree on how the state should look and who should speak for the faith. These fissures offer important opportunities for creating infighting within and amongst groups and weakening the overall movement. In particular, if governments can help foster a culture of debate and create public opportunities for airing groups’ plans for creating a religious government, these disagreements could build. The overall goal with this strategy is to cause the movement to implode. Using force against these groups and their leaders may be counterproductive, especially if the groups have a base of support, active or passive, and the population is not supportive of the state. In these cases, force would most likely validate the group’s criticisms of the state and could possibly turn popular support in the group’s favour.

Groups that use terrorism bent on religiously cleansing an area within a state are best countered by treating these groups as criminals and by using law enforcement to monitor and punish their actions. This approach serves two important counterterrorism functions. First, treating these groups and their acts as criminal and illegitimate undermines their ideology and authority. Second, using law enforcement, as opposed to greater, more kinetic approaches, minimises national and international exposure of the group and makes them appear like any other criminal group, as opposed to a world-changing religious movement. In other words, deploying greater force against these groups could send a message that they are a big threat and raise awareness of their cause and seeming success. The goal, rather, is to minimise the group’s publicity and delegitimate their actions. The challenge with this approach is that states may not have the law enforcement capacity to monitor, arrest, and prevent these groups from taking action. Anti-Christian terrorism in Nigeria is a case-in-point.

Within these three types of religious terrorism, paying attention to leadership is critical. As argued, religious groups that use terrorism have leaders that are recognised as legitimate by their followers, but do not necessarily possess bona fide qualities such as religious education or clerical training. A useful path for undermining these religious leaders is through other religious leaders that also have legitimacy. For example, beginning in 2002, key leadership of the Egyptian Gamaat have written treaties and spoken out against Al-Qaeda’s leadership and interpretations of Islam, especially Jihad.[72] One of the leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Dr. Fadl, followed suit in 2008 with his own denunciation of Al-Qaeda’s ideology.[73] These debates suggest that scriptures, beliefs and tenets are open to debate and that no single leader can corner the market on truth.

Finally, it is important for counterterrorism forces to pay attention to what religious terrorists attack, because these targets offer important clues for the groups’ goals, which in turn affect the type of countermeasures employed. Groups that are focused on state targets are more likely to be vying for political control, whereas targeting other groups within the faith or other religions suggest a goal of religious cleansing. Mass casualties and damage that seem indiscriminate, illogical and excessive suggest apocalyptic aims.

Just as there is more than one type of religious terrorism, there is more than one countermeasure to undermine a group’s goals. Better understanding of such groups, their leadership and goals, will allow for a more nuanced approach and, hopefully, lead to greater success in undermining their message and their use of terrorism in the name of religion.
About the Author: Heather S. Gregg is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis, where she works primarily with Special Operations Forces. Prior to joining NPS, she was an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is the author of the ‘The Path to Salvation: From the Crusades to Jihad’ (Potomac 2014) and is co-editor of ‘The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq’ (Potomac 2010).

Notes

[4] Laqueur claims that the term “has been used in so many different senses as to become almost meaningless, covering almost any, and not necessarily political, act of violence.” See: Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 11. Bruce Hoffman includes a large-n summary of 109 definitions of terrorism and the frequency of certain words used to describe the phenomenon. In addition, Hoffman notes that the U.S. government has a number of definitions of terrorism. For example, the State Department, the FBI and the Department of Defense all have different definitions of terrorism that demonstrates the disagreement on what defines the act. See: Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 37-39.
[6] Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Hoffman further lists five criteria that define terrorism: political aims and motives; violence or threat of violence; generation of fear beyond the initial act of violence; conducted by an organisation with a chain of command; and a non-state group. See: Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 43.
[7] David C. Rapoport calls this last category “anti-colonial terrorism,” which he identifies as the third of four waves of terrorism. However, ethnic-separatist covers anti-colonial as well as other movements that aim to create autonomous regions, independence, or self-determination but are not under colonial rule, such as Basque Spain or the Kurds in Turkey. See: David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audry Kurth-Cronin and James M. Ludes (eds.), Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46-73.
[11] It is interesting to note that Orsini argues that Marxist-based terrorist, including particularly the Italian Red Brigades, had eschatological goals that made it not unlike a religion and, therefore, their acts could be understood as religiously motivated terrorism. See: Alessandro Orsini, Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mindset of Modern Terrorists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
[15] Laqueur’s term. He also calls this sub-category “nationalist extremist” and “nationalism and separatism terrorism,” The New Terrorism, p. 127; and The Age of Terrorism, chapter 6, respectively. Hoffman calls this sub-category “Ethno-Nationalist Separatist Terrorism,” Inside Terrorism, p. 85.

[17] For further details on these groups, see: Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, pp. 32-36.


[33] Islam is divided between two major branches, the Sunni (the majority) and the Shia. There are further subdivisions within each of these branches, including the Twelver and Ismaili Shias. For more details on the Hizbollah, see: Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); for Hamas, see Mishal and Sela.

Kach and other Kahane-inspired groups were designated "foreign terrorists" by the U.S. State Department in 1997, making U.S. domestic fund-raising for the groups illegal. However, these groups continue to raise money, especially for the Kahane Memorial Fund, which supports the cleansing of Arabs from what is believed to be Israeli land. See: Steven Erlanger, "US Labels 30 Groups as Terrorists: Omits IRA," *New York Times*, October 9, 1997; and Dean E. Murphy, "Terror Label No Hindrance to Anti-Arab Jewish Group," *New York Times*, December 19, 2000, respectively.

Two further hypotheses on Iranian and Saudi funding of these groups deserve mention. First, Khashan argues that Iranian funding was more an attempt of Iran to assert itself in regional politics, and particular to counter U.S. containment, than to spread the revolution abroad. This explains why Iran funded Shias and Sunnis alike. See: Khashan, pp. 15-16. Gilles Kepel argues that Iran and Saudi Arabia have been embroiled in a form of religious spiraling, trying to counter each other's influence by both funding the same radical Islamic groups, preventing one or the other's ideology from taking hold. See: Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, translated by Anthony F. Roberts, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 5-6. This latter hypothesis is also argued by Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 56-81.


It is important to note that the Brotherhood engaged in violent and terrorist activities in the early years of the movement in Egypt, including the assassination of a judge and an assassination attempt on President Nasser. The movement also acknowledges that violent movements, such as Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Group, have emerged from within the ranks of the Brotherhood. See Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27 (1995), pp. 321-339; and Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival," in John E. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 67-99.


Bin Laden holds a degree in business administration, but has no formal clerical training. However, it is worth noting that Islamic Studies is compulsory in Saudi Arabian Universities. See: "A Biography of Osama Bin Laden," *Frontline*, www.pbs.org, downloaded on 6/27/02.


[54] Ranstorp, pp. 53-55. IDF forces withdrew from the “security zone” in southern Lebanon in May of 2000, but have remained in the disputed Shebba Farms area.


[57] This is one of the believed goals of the April 2002 attack on a Protestant church in Pakistan, see: Paul Watson, “Bomber Died in Church Blast, Pakistani Authorities Conclude,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 30, 2002.

[58] Sedgwick refers to these acts of terrorism within religious groups as immediate, and “almost purely political,” p. 795.

[59] See, for example, Rafael Pardo, “Columbia’s Two Front War,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2000), pp. 64-70.

[60] The FARC has been named as the only non-Islamic terrorist group with both capabilities and motivation to target the United States, see: “Coding Terrorist Groups, Project Air Force Counter Terrorism Threat Team (Santa Monica: RAND, May, 2002 briefing).


[70] Tucker, p. 4.


Locating Cyberterrorism: How Terrorism Researchers Use and View the Cyber Lexicon
by Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald

Abstract
This article reports on findings from a survey on the concept of cyberterrorism from researchers working in twenty-four countries across six continents. Our aim is to contribute to the definitional debate in this area by exploring the boundaries between cyberterrorism and potentially related terms. Focusing on two questions from our survey in particular, we ask: First, how does cyberterrorism relate to adjacent concepts such as hacktivism, cybercrime and cyberwar? And, second, how familiar, frequently used, and useful are these concepts amongst the global research community? Our findings include: First, high levels of familiarity with the terms cyberwarfare, information warfare and cybercrime. And, second, concerns over, and widespread avoidance of, other terms including cyber jihad and pure cyberterrorism. The article concludes by exploring the importance of these findings for definitional debates around cyberterrorism and terrorism more broadly, before outlining a number of suggestions for future research.

Keywords: cyberterrorism, terrorism, terrorism studies, definition, cybercrime, cyberwar, hacktivism, survey

Introduction
Arriving at a satisfactory definition of terrorism has proved a notorious and longstanding challenge for academics, policymakers and other potentially interested parties. There are multiple reasons for this elusiveness [1]. Inter alia, these include, first, the term's pejorative connotations and the difficulties this creates for attempts to apply it objectively [2]. Terrorism is a word, as Richard English notes, that “is almost always used to express something of one's revulsion at the acts one is describing or the people involved in them” [3]. A second reason concerns embedded political interests and the temptation to define or use the language of terrorism in flexible or misleading ways in order to condemn (or refuse to condemn) the violence of others. As Shanahan puts it: “Defining socially important concepts is seldom a disinterested activity. …It hardly needs pointing out that governments have a strong interest in promulgating definitions of 'terrorism' that emphasise its unlawful, anti-social, and morally illegitimate nature” [4]. A third issue relates to historical transformations in the meaning of terrorism, not least its original formulation to describe violence ‘from above’ rather than 'below' or beyond the state [5]. Fourth is the challenge of capturing the diversity of types of terrorism under one overarching label. And, fifth, is the term's propensity to 'travel' such that it is readily stretched to incorporate new behaviours and prefixes, as, for instance, in the case of 'narco-terrorism', 'eco-terrorism' and 'cyberterrorism' [6].

This article engages with an additional, and particularly significant, factor within this problem of definition: the issue of terrorism's terminological boundaries. Specifically, this is the challenge of attempting to distinguish or isolate terrorism from other types of violence (such as war), other forms of political communication (such as propaganda), or other potentially related activities [7]. As one recent contribution put it, "the label is all too often used without any real rigour as to what terrorism is and what its parameters are” [8]. Perhaps the best illustration of this boundary problem can be found in debates over whether it is ever appropriate, useful or desirable to describe state violence of any sort as terrorist. For many authors, there exists a fundamental ontological distinction between terrorism and state violence of any sort precisely because they are conducted by different actors. Additional reasons for such a distinction include the
pragmatic challenges of researching such a diversity of violent behaviour [9], and a desire for analytical clarity in the usage of terminology relating to terrorism [10]. Other authors, in contrast, argue that the boundary is far less clear than this, and that state violence – including acts of war – may justifiably be deemed terrorist should it fulfil specific criteria [11]. The point is that part of the challenge of determining what is included ‘inside’ a definition of terrorism involves being able somehow to distinguish this ‘inside’ from that which is excluded.

As with terrorism, cyberterrorism has also proved to be an equally elusive concept. This neologism offers one of the most recent additions to our already burgeoning terrorist lexicon, having become increasingly prominent within political and media discourse since it was first coined in the 1980s [12]. The meaning of cyberterrorism has proved as troublesome as its ‘parent’ concept in part because the definitional challenges surrounding terrorism have simply migrated along with its application in the digital realm. This is compounded, however, because the digital realm is itself a site of constant change which is often, as a consequence, poorly understood by researchers and analysts. An outcome of this, as Weimann notes, is a profusion of ill-specified and ill-understood vocabulary such that it has become:

*especially common when dealing with computers to coin new words simply by placing the words “cyber,” “computer,” or “information” before another word. Thus, an entire arsenal of words – cyber-crime, cyberwar, infowar, netwar, cyberterrorism, cyber harassment, virtual-warfare, digital terrorism, cyber-tactics, computer warfare, information warfare, cyberattack, cyberwar, and cyber break-ins – is used to describe what some military and political strategists describe as the “new terrorism” of these times* [13].

This profusion of new terminologies throws up considerable challenges for clarifying terms such as cyberterrorism. Not least amongst these is the inconsistent and interchangeable use of such terms whereby, as Weimann illustrates: “…the mass media frequently fail to distinguish between hacking and cyberterrorism and exaggerate the threat of the latter” [14]. Thus, while authors such as Stohl argue that it, “continues to be very important to distinguish between cyber crime and cyber terror and that we restrict cyber terrorism to activities which in addition to their cyber component have the commonly agreed upon components of terrorism” [15], doing so is far from straightforward.

This article seeks to contribute to these ongoing discussions by reporting on a recent research project which attempted to capture current understandings of cyberterrorism within the global research community. The project employed a survey methodology, which was designed, first, to explore how academics, research students and others conceptualise and understand cyberterrorism, and second, to chart the prominence and rationale of perspectives on derivative debates around the threat and appropriate responses to this phenomenon, amongst others. The exercise as a whole represented an effort to build on earlier projects which had captured the state of knowledge within terrorism research [16]. Where those earlier publications sought to consolidate and portrait terrorism research at a particular historical moment, this article attempts to do likewise for the concept of cyberterrorism.

Following a brief discussion of our research methodology, this article explores responses we received to two questions asked in our survey. As detailed further below, the first of these questions sought to gauge the level of experience different academics had with twelve terms that occur within academic and policy discussions of cyberterrorism. The second question asked whether respondents to our survey purposefully avoid any of these twelve terms, and if there were particular reasons for doing so. Together, the two questions were designed to explore the terminological boundaries of cyberterrorism, and to investigate what sort of role these ‘adjacent’ or ‘supporting’ concepts perform in attempts to make sense of cyberterrorism [17]. Thus,
following Buzan and Hansen, do terms such as ‘hacktivism’, ‘pure cyberterrorism’ and ‘cyber jihad’ function as complementary concepts that work to narrow down the meaning of cyberterrorism by pointing to specific aspects of this phenomenon? Alternatively, are these better thought of as parallel concepts that are used in place of cyberterrorism but in different discussions? Or, are they oppositional concepts: preferred alternatives to, or potential replacements for, cyberterrorism perhaps because of this concept’s own complexities? Underpinning all of this was an effort to explore two overarching research questions. First, for contemporary researchers, how does cyberterrorism relate to other concepts? And, second, how familiar, frequently used, and useful are particular terms within the cyber lexicon?

Methodology

The project on which this article reports employed a survey that was distributed to over six hundred terrorism researchers between June and November 2012. A purposive sampling strategy was used to identify potential respondents, a list of which was generated via four methods. The first of these was a targeted literature review, which was employed to identify authors who have published specifically on cyberterrorism on, or since, 1 January 2004 within peer-reviewed journals, monographs, or other scholarly literature. This search was completed using the main catalogue of the British Library and 47 online databases of research [18].

Second, we added to our sample individuals who had published within the four most prominent journals in terrorism research since 1 January 2009, or who were members of the editorial boards thereof: Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism, and Critical Studies on Terrorism. Although these authors may not have published on cyberterrorism specifically, their standing within the terrorism research community made it reasonable to assume a familiarity with definitional debates around terrorism more widely. Third, we used a ‘snowball’ method to contact potential respondents identified by researchers who had already returned our survey. And, fourth, we employed targeted advertisements distributed via academic mailing lists maintained by the Terrorism and Political Violence Association, and the British International Studies Association Critical Terrorism Studies Working Group.

Our use of a purposive sampling strategy was, we argue, appropriate to the survey’s ambitions given the fluid boundaries of this (and, indeed, any) research community. Although this involves sacrificing any claim to statistical representativeness, it is unclear that such a claim could ever be justified given that research communities constantly change and evolve [19]. In total, our survey generated 118 responses from researchers working in 24 countries across six continents. 117 of these provided geographical information about their working lives, of whom 41 (35% of the total) worked in the United States of America; 32 (27%) in the United Kingdom; 7 (6%) in Australia; and, 4 (3%) in Canada. This weighting toward Anglophone countries is unfortunate but to be expected given the dominance of US – and UK – based researchers within terrorism research. In terms of professional status, 75 (64%) of our respondents were permanent academic staff, with a further 16 (14%) temporary academic staff, and 9 (8%) research students. The remainder of our sample was made up of independent researchers, retired academics and individuals fitting none of the above criteria. In terms of disciplinary background, our sample described themselves in the following way: Political Science/International Relations: 69 (50%); Psychology/Anthropology: 20 (15%); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber 17(12%); Law/Criminology: 15 (11%); Literature/Arts/History: 9 (7%); Independent Researchers/Analysts: 5 (4%); and, Economics/Business: 2 (1%). This high proportion of researchers identifying with the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations resonates with earlier studies of terrorism research [20].
The survey included a total of twenty questions designed to generate quantitative and qualitative data. These focused on: demographic information; definitional issues around terrorism and cyberterrorism; the cyberterrorism threat; perspectives on countering cyberterrorism; and, assessments of the state of current research in this area. Responses to the survey were anonymised and ordered numerically from R1 to R118.

Findings and Analysis

The two questions explored in this article were numbered eight and nine of our survey. Question eight listed the following twelve cyber-related terms: cracktivism; cybercrime; cyber dissidence; cyber espionage; cyber jihad; cyber militarism; cyber sabotage; cyber vandalism; cyberwarfare; hacktivism; information warfare; and pure cyberterrorism. For each of these terms, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed with any of the following four statements: ‘This term is one I am familiar with’; ‘This term is one I use personally’; ‘This term is one that I think is useful’; and, ‘This term overlaps with cyberterrorism’. Question nine then asked respondents whether they purposefully avoid using any of the twelve listed terms – and, if so, why – providing a free text box for responses. The following discussion draws on completed responses to each of these questions – responses totalling 89 (response rate 75%) and 73 (62%) respectively. Importantly, 50 respondents indicated that they purposefully avoid using one or more of the 12 terms.

As Chart 1 demonstrates, the three terms most familiar to our respondents were also those most likely to be used. These were cyberwarfare, information warfare and cybercrime. By contrast, four terms included in our survey were familiar to less than 30% of respondents: cyber dissidence; cyber militarism; cracktivism; and pure cyberterrorism. Cyber militarism and cracktivism also emerged as rarely used terms, and were the least likely of all of the twelve options to be employed by those familiar with them. As demonstrated in Chart 2, only 22% of those familiar with the term cracktivism reported using it, whilst the figure for cyber militarism was a mere 5%.

The lack of usage of the terms cracktivism and cyber militarism by those familiar with them can be explained, in part, by their deliberate avoidance (as opposed to, for example, having no occasion to use them). As Chart 3 shows, 13 respondents stated they purposefully avoid the term cyber militarism, describing it as ambiguous [21], vague [22] and ill-defined [23]. Whilst some respondents also described cracktivism as vague and ambiguous [24], further reasons were given for avoiding this term. One respondent explained that the term’s focus upon one particular technique – cracking (or criminal hacking) – is unhelpful, arguing it is preferable to situate such techniques within broader frameworks of political activism. Others stated that the term adds nothing to existing terminology [25] and risks trivialising this phenomenon [26].
Chart 1: With reference to your own work, what is your experience with the following terms?

- Cyber warfare: 83% familiar, 69% used personally, 51% useful
- Information warfare: 83% familiar, 62% used personally, 52% useful
- Cyber crime: 78% familiar, 69% used personally, 62% useful
- Hacktivism: 70% familiar, 69% used personally, 37% useful
- Cyber espionage: 61% familiar, 48% used personally, 33% useful
- Cyber jihad: 61% familiar, 48% used personally, 15% useful
- Cyber sabotage: 53% familiar, 42% used personally, 16% useful
- Cyber vandalism: 51% familiar, 31% used personally, 15% useful
- Cyber dissidence: 27% familiar, 20% used personally, 9% useful
- Cyber militarism: 24% familiar, 20% used personally, 1% useful
- Cracktivism: 20% familiar, 20% used personally, 4% useful
- Pure cyberterrorism: 16% familiar, 20% used personally, 12% useful
The two terms which respondents were most likely to purposefully avoid were cyber jihad (27 respondents) and pure cyberterrorism (24 respondents). The most common reasons given for avoiding cyber jihad were that it is a distortion of the term jihad [27] and that it has damaging social and political consequences [28]. Respondents stated that the term is “unnecessarily loaded except in very specific situations” [29], and that it is, “dangerous because it increases the moral panic already associated with the term Jihad” [30]. Others criticised the term’s emphasis upon one particular religion, describing this as “misleading and nonsensical” [31] and “possibly racist” [32], pointing out that non-Muslim groups and states may commit acts of cyberterrorism [33]. Two respondents stated that the term is also unnecessary. One described it as “unjustified” since “there haven’t been any acts of cyberterrorism committed by Jihadists” [34]. The other questioned the need to create subcategories of Jihad, asking “Where do we stop? Bus Jihad, Knife Jihad, Shoe Jihad?” [35]. Others still stated that they avoid this term because of how loosely it is used by the media [36] and due to its association with “the problematic concept of new terrorism” [37]. Lastly, one respondent noted avoiding it because it “can be a positive term to many” [38] whilst another said they prefer the term electronic Jihad because this is the term Jihadists “tend to use” [39].
The second most avoided term – pure cyberterrorism – was coined by Gordon and Ford in a much-cited contribution to the literature on cyberterrorism [40]. In their view, a narrow focus on pure cyberterrorism – digital attacks against “computers, networks, and the information storied therein” [41] – has the potential to obscure the “true impact” of the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. Accordingly, they put forward a case for a broad conception of cyberterrorism which encompasses the full range of terrorists’ online activities and so recognises the “true threat posed by the addition of acts in the virtual world to the terrorists’ playbook” [42]. Narrower understandings of cyberterrorism nonetheless remain far more prevalent in the academic literature [43], and so it is perhaps unsurprising that many respondents avoided using the term pure cyberterrorism. Several stated that the word ‘pure’ serves no obvious purpose in this context [44], whilst others suggested that its meaning is unclear [45]. Others still argued that the term merely generates additional complexity and uncertainty [46], with one remarking that “it creates more confusion than it seeks to resolve” [47]. At the same time, however, it was apparent that some researchers do find the term useful. Of all twelve terms included in our survey, it was the third most likely to be used by a respondent who was familiar with it.

A number of respondents also used our survey as an opportunity to caution against overly expansive uses of the term cyberterrorism. One commented that terms like cyberterrorism are “problematic” when they are used to “cover all sorts of activity that may not be accurately described as terroristic in nature” [48]. Similarly, another respondent stated:

_Terrorism is normally understood as a political strategy involving violence or its threat. Therefore, the idea of cyberterrorism would seem to be an oxymoron, as it involves no direct violence against individuals. I take the term cyberterrorism to be a state propaganda tactic of demonising certain kinds of_
online criminal behaviour by tarring it with the brush of ‘terrorism’ [49].

This was echoed by another respondent, who warned against “labelling cybercrime and cyber activism as terrorism” since to do so would “permit a much wider cross section of society to be brought under the terrorism label” [50]. This respondent also warned against using the term cyber dissidence, arguing that it is “loaded”. Another respondent criticised the term cyber sabotage for similar reasons, saying that it allows the state to “designate acts of sub-state ‘dissidence’ or ‘resistance’ as ‘sabotage’, resulting in the exaggerated vilification of groups such as “Anonymous” [51].

The final part of question 8 asked respondents to indicate which terms they believed overlap with cyberterrorism. As Chart 4 shows, the highest scores were for cyber Jihad (46%) and pure cyberterrorism (40%). This sense of synonymy, again, may help to further explain the avoidance of these terms by researchers, in that cyberterrorism may be seen as a preferable alternative to these potential ‘parallel’ concepts.

There was a similar divergence of opinion regarding the relationship between cyberterrorism and cybercrime. Whilst 27% of respondents stated that these two terms overlap, there were others who emphasised the importance of distinguishing clearly between the two. Various reasons were given for this, including the importance of delineating the scope of special terrorism-related investigative powers and offences [55] and the need to distinguish between law enforcement and intelligence [56]. However, one respondent doubted
whether it will continue to be possible to draw a sharp distinction between cybercrime and cyberterrorism, asking “When terrorists pay criminal organizations to launch an attack, is that crime or terrorism?” [57]. This respondent went on to suggest that “The term ‘cyber-disruption’ may be more useful for the future”. A similar suggestion was advanced by another respondent, who said that the term cyber security is a useful one since it “combats all forms of threats to cyber space” [58].

It is also worth noting that several respondents stated that they avoid using terms within the cyber lexicon altogether. One commented that the “cyber prefix often gets in the way” [59] whilst another stated that trying to distinguish between the cyber and physical realms “usually obscures rather than illuminates the subject” [60]. Others regarded the cyber terminology as sensationalist, describing it as “over-dramatic” and “ambiguous” [61], “overused” [62], jargonistic [63] and “overly contentious and invented for purpose” [64]. In the opinion of one respondent, indeed, the terms “belong to the media rather than academic research” [65].

Finally, Table 1 shows the disciplinary backgrounds of the respondents who stated that they purposefully avoid using one or more of the twelve specified terms.

Table 1: Disciplinary backgrounds and the purposeful avoidance of cyber terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplinary Background</th>
<th>Number of respondents to the survey: n (%)</th>
<th>Number of respondents who stated that they purposefully avoid using one or more of the 12 terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Science/International Relations</td>
<td>69 (50%)</td>
<td>27 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law/Criminology</td>
<td>15 (11%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics/Business</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber</td>
<td>17 (12%)</td>
<td>10 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology/Anthropology</td>
<td>20 (15%)</td>
<td>8 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature/Arts/History</td>
<td>9 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Researchers/Analysts</td>
<td>5 (4%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>137</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note that some respondents selected more than one disciplinary background)

Three interesting points emerge from this data. First, whilst 11% of the respondents to the survey came from the Law/Criminology disciplinary group, only 5% of those who stated that they purposefully avoid using one or more of the 12 terms came from this group. Similarly, whilst nine of the respondents to the survey were from a Literature/Arts/History background, only two of these (i.e., 22% of this disciplinary group) stated that they purposefully avoid using one or more of the twelve terms. This is significantly lower than the corresponding figure of 42% for the overall group of respondents (50 out of 118). Second, the fact that slightly less than half of the overall group of respondents stated that they purposefully avoid using one or more of the twelve terms may be contrasted with the findings for three of the disciplinary groups: ten out of seventeen respondents (59%) for those from an Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber background; four out of five (80%) for Independent Researchers/Analysts; and both of the respondents from an Economics/Business background. Third, researchers from all disciplines – spanning both the social and the physical
sciences – demonstrated an appreciation of, and sensitivity to, the terminological issues that have been described above. This was evidenced, amongst other ways, in the depth and sophistication of the qualitative answers we received in response to these questions, some of which are included in the above discussion.

Conclusion

Given the amount of attention that definitional debates have attracted within terrorism research, it is perhaps unsurprising that respondents to our survey engaged at length with questions designed to explore the connections between cyberterrorism and potentially adjacent concepts. To return to the first of our original research questions – how does cyberterrorism relate to other concepts – a number of our respondents noted that cyberterrorism overlaps with other, related terms especially cyber jihad, pure cyberterrorism, cyber warfare and cybercrime. For a number of researchers in this area, therefore, these terms appear to be adjacent to, or supporting of, the concept of cyberterrorism. Yet, as the qualitative responses discussed above suggest, the relationships between these are complex and open to contestation, with these concepts seen variously as complementary, oppositional, or parallel to cyberterrorism by different researchers.

In terms of our second research question, many of our respondents articulated clear – and frequently persuasive – reasons for the use or avoidance of specific terms in this lexicon. Some of these focused primarily on the terms’ explanatory value. Our research encountered considerable overlap between familiarity with a term, its perceived usefulness, and its actual use. Thus, the more settled concepts of cyberwarfare, information warfare and cybercrime topped each of these tables. At the same time, as demonstrated in Chart 3, less familiar terms including pure cyberterrorism and cyber espionage were used by a majority of those familiar with these. This, perhaps, points to the potential future prominence of concepts that are not widely used at present.

Importantly, researchers from the full range of disciplinary backgrounds present in our survey reflected at length on the politics of specific choices of terminology. Here again we can see similarities with discussions on the definition of terrorism that have long combined analytical as well as policy-related justifications for engaging in this activity [66]. As demonstrated above, our respondents’ choices of terminology were made on substantive grounds as much as for semantic or aesthetic reasons. These included a desire to avoid stigmatising or criminalising potentially legitimate protest activities (in the cases of ‘cracking’ and ‘hacktivism’), as well as a desire to avoid adding further suspicion to minority communities (in the case of ‘cyber jihad’). These concerns, we suggest, demonstrate a widespread sensitivity to the connotations of the cyber lexicon as much as to its denotative functions.

Although important in their own right, the above findings are further significant, we suggest, for two additional reasons. In the first instance, they both demonstrate and provide some empirical measure of contemporary debates around labelling and terminology within research on cyberterrorism. This matters not only because our findings therefore speak to, and allow comparison with, related research projects focusing on terrorism more generally [67] but also because the lexicon surrounding cyberterrorism is still in its infancy. There is, as such, a real opportunity for terrorism researchers to reflect on, engage with, and shape the ways in which activities associated with this terminology are discussed, debated and understood. Therefore, taking stock of researcher attitudes – as this article attempts to do – is a crucial first step toward this.

Second, the findings of our survey are also significant in their pointing to important future research agendas with potential to further contribute to our understanding of the ways in which researchers engage with this – and related – lexicons. To conclude our discussion, we point to three of these now. First, would be a temporal
A second obvious future research agenda would be a comparative analysis of engagements with the cyber lexicon by constituencies away from the academic research community. Such an agenda would involve the exploration of attitudes to, and the use of, terms such as cyber jihad amongst journalists, contributors to social media, policy advisors, employees at cyber security corporations, police forces and so forth. The value here would include an assessment of whether terrorism researchers as an epistemic community (if they may be thought of as such) are particularly attuned to the importance and politics of labelling. Or, whether such concerns travel beyond their discussions in the pages of academic journals and books.

A third area requiring further research is the distinctiveness of the online realm here. For instance, do terrorism researchers encounter similar problems in differentiating espionage, sabotage and war from terrorism? And, do ‘offline’ equivalents of the twelve terms listed above – such as jihad, militarism, activism and vandalism – display similar levels of familiarity, use, and perceived value? Or, on the other hand, is the distinctiveness of cyberterrorism more blurred than ‘terrorism’ in general because of the newness of this term and its surrounding lexicon? Work of this sort, we suggest, would complement other on-going research – both by ourselves and by others – on the extent to which there exist differences in the dynamics of terrorists’ activities in the online and offline realms.

**About the authors:** Lee Jarvis is a Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of East Anglia, UK. He is author of ‘Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror’, and co-author (with Richard Jackson, Jeroen Gunning and Marie Breen Smyth) of ‘Terrorism: A Critical Introduction’. His research has been published in journals including Security Dialogue, Political Studies, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, International Relations, Terrorism and Political Violence, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.

Stuart Macdonald is Associate Professor in the College of Law at Swansea University. He has published articles on anti-terrorism policy and legislation in a number of leading international journals, including the Sydney Law Review and the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy. He has held visiting scholarships at Columbia University Law School, New York, and the Institute of Criminology at the University of Sydney. His recent research on security and liberty was funded by the British Academy.

Support for this research was provided by the Swansea Academy of Learning and Teaching (SALT), based at Swansea University, UK. The authors wish to express their gratitude to Simon Lavis for his excellent research assistance in this project, and to Tom Chen, Joanna Halbert, Lella Nouri, Andrew Whiting and other members of The Cyberterrorism Project for their time, support and help throughout the research. We also express our thanks to all those who responded to our survey. Any errors remain the fault of the authors alone.

**Notes**


[18] The full list of these databases is as follows: ACM Digital Library; Anthropological Index Online; Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts; Bibliography of British & Irish History; BioMed Central Journals; British Humanities Index (CSA); British Periodicals (XML); Business Source Complete (EBSCO); CINAHL Plus (EBSCO); Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (Wiley); Education Resources Information Centre; Emerald; HeinOnline; HMIC (Ovid); IEEE Xplore; INSPEC (Ovid); International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; IOP Journals Z39; JISC Journals Archives; JSTOR; Kluwer Law Journals; Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer Link); Lexis Library; MathSciNet (AMS); Medline (EBSCO); MLA International Bibliography; Oxford Journals; Periodicals Archive online; Philosopher's Index (Ovid); Project Muse; Proquest Business Collection; PsycARTICLES (Ovid); PsycINFO (Ovid); PubMed; Royal Society Journals; SAGE Journals Online; Scopus (Elsevier); Social Care Online (SCIE); Springer Link (Metapress); Taylor & Francis Online; Web of Knowledge (Cross Search); Web of Knowledge (ISI); Web of Science (Cross Search); Web of Science (ISI); Westlaw; Wiley Interscience; and, Zetoc.


[22] R106.


[26] R53.
[27] Seven respondents: R5, R12, R15, R19, R43, R77, R97.


[29] R79.


[31] (R5)


[33] R43.

[34] R45.


[37] R101.

[38] R107.


[41] Idem, p. 637.


[47] R35.


[50] R97.

[51] R45.

[52] R64.

[53] R1.


[55] R33.

[56] R21.

[57] R59.

[58] R42.

[59] R34.


[61] R111.

[63] R72.

[64] R36.


II. Resources

Bibliography: Muslim Brotherhood (Part 1)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2014-2]

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Muslim Brotherhood. It is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to early March, 2014. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing recent publications of more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of terrorism studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval tools have been employed for expanding the pool of sources and locating older publications.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Muslim Brotherhood, al-ʾIkhwān al-Muslimūn

NB: All websites were last visited on 09.03.2014. – See also Note for the Reader at the end.

Bibliographies and other Resources


Ogawa, Hiroshi (n.d.): ムスリム同胞団関連文献一覧表（欧米語）| [Muslim Brotherhood Relevant Literature List (Western Language)]. URL: http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/gr/gsce/d/m01.htm

Books and Edited Volumes


Murtaza, Muhammad Sameer (2011): *Die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft: Geschichte und Ideologie*. Berlin:
rotation.


**Theses**


Abdul Malek, Zulkifly (2011, April): *From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur: The Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)*. (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC, United States). URL: [http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552814](http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552814)


and Egypt. (Master’s Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-1247


Dokka, Åsmund Gram (2011, Spring): Restraining Radicalisation: The Muslim Brotherhood as a Force of Moderation within the Islamist Student Movement in Egypt. (Master’s Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway). URL: https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/24352


Eft, Natalie Darlene (2011, March): Advocating for Greater Political Participation: Feminisms in Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC, United States). URL: http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553313


Fahmy, Sherin Hamed (1999): The Relationship between Fatah and the Palestinian Muslim Brothers. (Doctoral Dissertation, American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt).


Kessler, Harrison (2010, May): One Person, One Vote...One Time? The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as Moderates and Democrats from Inception to the Present. (Master's Thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham, United States). URL: http://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/23880

Khan, Amber (2011, May): The Quest for Hegemony: An Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and Tagammu's Attitudes towards Sharia. (Master's Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway). URL: https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/35095


Journal Articles and Book Chapters


Amghar, Samir (2008): Europe Puts Islamists to the Test: The Muslim Brotherhood (France, Belgium and Switzerland). *Mediterranean Politics*, 13(1), 63-77. DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390701864844](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390701864844)


Frampton, Martyn; Rosen, Ehud (2013, September): Reading the Runes? The United States and the Muslim Brotherhood as Seen through the Wikileaks Cables. The Historical Journal, 56(3), 827-856. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X13000150


Harnisch, Chris; Mecham, Quinn (2009): Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's ”Civil State”. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(2), 189-205. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200802611408


Lebl, Leslie S. (2013, Winter): The EU, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. *Orbis*, 57(1), 101-119. DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2012.10.007](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2012.10.007) URL: [http://teroauvinen.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/1-s2-0-s0030438712000804-main.pdf](http://teroauvinen.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/1-s2-0-s0030438712000804-main.pdf)


Monier, Elizabeth Iskander; Ranko, Annette (2013, Winter): The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt. *Middle East Policy*, 20(4), 111-123. DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12050](http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12050)


Shadid, Mohammed K. (1988): The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza. Third World Quarterly, 10 (2), 658-682. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436598808420076


Soage, Ana Belén (2009): Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 10 (2), 189-203. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14690760903119092


Stacher, Joshua (2010, April): Brotherly Intentions? The Egyptian Muslim Brothers and the Politics of a Debate. History Compass, 8 (4), 345-357. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2009.00675.x


Vidino, Lorenzo (2009): Islamism and the West: Europe as a Battlefield. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 10(2), 165-176. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14690760903192081


Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky (2011): The Muslim Brotherhood and Democratic Transition in Egypt. Middle East Law and Governance, 3(1-2), 204-223. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633711X591558


Winder, R. Bayly (1954, July): Islam as the State Religion: A Muslim Brotherhood View in Syria. The Muslim


Grey Literature


**Note**

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only
be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

**About the compiler:** Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
Bibliography: (Countering) Violent Extremism and Terrorism


Compiled and selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents/only more information.


Non-conventional Literature


**Prime Journal Articles**


Heydemann, S.: Countering Violent Extremism as a Field of Practice *USIP’s Insights Newsletter* 1 (Spring)


Vidino, L.: Toward a radical solution *Foreign Policy* 5, January 2010[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/05/toward_a_radical_solution]


*About the Compiler: Eric Price* is a professional information specialist. Before he joined ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ as Editorial Assistant, he was a librarian with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.
III. Book Reviews

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – 27 Books on Terrorism & Counterterrorism Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of two parts: capsule reviews of nine books on terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics, and — continuing the series begun in previous columns of highlighting books by significant publishers (listed in alphabetical order) — capsule reviews of 18 books published by Hurst, Oxford University Press, Polity Press, and Rowman & Littlefield. Please note that most of these books were recently published, with several others released over the past few years but deserving renewed interest.

Note: Future columns will review books by publishers such as Routledge, Springer, Stanford University Press, and the University of Chicago Press.

General Reviews


A methodologically innovative account of how certain radical religious sects turn to terrorism to achieve their religio-political objectives and the methods they employ in managing such entities, including recruiting and indoctrinating their operatives to conduct such warfare on their behalf. The author's conceptual framework is applied to the cases of Hamas, Hizballah, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban. Readers may not agree with the author’s thesis that such religiously-based terrorist groups are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife or in imposing rigid theocracies over their societies, but are “rational altruists” in pursuit of generally secular objectives, such as improving their own communities. However, he makes the valid point that, like their secular terrorist group counterparts, these groups are successful at maintaining the loyalty of their operatives and supporting constituencies through various mechanisms such as what he terms “the defection constraint” and the provision of basic social welfare services, including educational institutions. The author recommends that government counterterrorism services need to incorporate into their response measures components that provide alternatives to such social welfare services in order to effectively turn their supporting constituencies over to the government side in order to defeat religiously-based terrorism in the long term. The author is Professor of Economics at the University of California, San Diego.


The contributors to this highly interesting edited volume apply methodologies from the disciplines of economics, social science and political science to examine the phenomenon of terrorism. Chapters focus on topics such as defining terrorism, examining the identity, strategy and values of terrorism as “a political world,” the economic determinants of terrorism, modeling terrorist attacks, using the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) to measure the impact of terrorist attacks, using economic analysis to examine lone wolf terrorism, examining the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism, analysing cyberterrorism, examining the link between
terrorism, organised crime and what the authors term “new wars,” and examining the effectiveness of the components of security measures against terrorism. Raul Caruso is a professor at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, and Andrea Locatelli is a professor at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, both in Milan, Italy.


An interesting, comprehensive and succinct overview of terrorism and counterterrorism. Focusing primarily on the United States, the book is divided into three parts: the threat (the nature of terrorism and citizens’ vulnerabilities to being attacked by terrorist actors), the strategy (the components of a grand counterterrorism strategy), and the future (what needs to be done in response and how terrorist groups have been defeated in the past). The author, a veteran academic expert on terrorism and counterterrorism, is Horner Chair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University, in Quantico, Virginia.


A theoretically interesting account of the role of violence in political life, whether as “law-preserving violence” to maintain social order or as a means, such as insurrection, to bring about social and political change. The book’s chapters cover topics such as governmental bureaucracy and violence, America as a “tough nation,” the balance between morality and violence, and the role of violence in bringing about change. The author’s conclusion, while highly provocative, is also quite insightful: “Violence is terrible, but its alternative is not the Kingdom of Heaven. Not only is violence a great engine of political change but, much as we dislike admitting it, violence is also the great driver of science and even culture. After all, along with love, violence inspires poetry, art, music, and literature.” (p.176) The author is the David Bernstein Professor of Political Science and the director of the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies at Johns Hopkins University.


An empirically-based examination of the impact of the relationship between the policies that promote social cohesion and those that promote judicial and law enforcement counterterrorism measures in resolving the problem of violent extremism in the United Kingdom. The authors point out, for example, that the imposition of counterterrorism measures often serve to erode fundamental civil rights within Muslim communities, thereby undermining policies that attempt to promote social cohesion in such communities. To examine their thesis, the authors discuss the basis for their conceptual framework, the nature of the governmental policies that promote social cohesion at the community level, the components of British counterterrorism policies in the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005, the prevalence of what they term “anti-Muslimism” in British society, and the implications of their data on the implementation of the British governments’ community cohesion and counterterrorism measures. Charles Husband is a fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, and Professor of Social Analysis at the University of Bradford, UK, and Yunis Alam is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Bradford.
The contributors to this special volume of the quarterly journal had initially presented their papers at the conference “Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism” that was held at Uppsala University, Sweden, under the auspices of the university’s Center for Police Research, on September 24-26, 2012. Following an introductory overview by the special issue’s editors, the contributors discuss issues such as counterinsurgency, law enforcement tactics, lone wolf terrorism, profiling lone wolf terrorists, governmental responses to lone wolf terrorists prior to the First World War, case studies of lone wolves such as Carlos Bledsoe, Anders Breivik, loners and autonomous cells in the Netherlands, school shootings as examples of lone wolf violence, lone wolf terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and detecting “linguistic markers” for signs of extremist violence in social media. Although one might argue that some of the lone wolves discussed in the volume may have actually been part of larger “packs of wolves” and were radicalised in social media by more “conventional” terrorist groups, this volume represents an important contribution to advancing our understanding of this important phenomenon.


A valuable handbook for courses on homeland security which examines in an interdisciplinary manner how to address significant issues in homeland security through the examination of all – hazard type case studies of major state and national events. Each chapter begins with an overview and two cases that illustrate those topics. The chapters cover issues such as law and policy (e.g., the use of drones in counterterrorism), terrorist incidents (e.g., the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and eco-terrorism), environmental security (e.g., arctic security and the impact of hurricane Katrina on the U.S. Gulf Coast's security), the role of intelligence (e.g. how terrorists used intelligence in conducting their attack on Mumbai, India, in November 2008), critical infrastructure protection (e.g. the impact of cyber threats against critical infrastructure), transportation security (e.g., the impact of the 9/11 World Trade Center attack on transportation), and emergency management (e.g., lessons learned from the 2010 Haiti earthquake). James D. Ramsay is the chair of the department of Security Studies and International Affairs at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Linda Kiltz is director of a master's program in public administration and policy at Walden University.


A highly interesting and authoritative account by a veteran American military journalist of the operations of the various elite units that make up the United States special operations forces in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The author is currently a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.


The contributors to this conceptually innovative volume apply a multidisciplinary approach to analyse all the dimensions involved in prison radicalisation and effective countermeasures. The book, which is divided into
five parts, covers theoretical topics such as an overview of the processes of prison-based radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement from violent extremism, issues in prison management, risk assessment and reform, as well as case studies from the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Indonesia, German Federal Republic in the 1970s, and Spain. This reviewer, for full disclosure, contributed a chapter on a model of prison radicalisation, including (in the worst case) post-release re-incarceration. The volume’s editor is Head of Criminology and Director of Terrorism Studies at the University of East London.

*Hurst/Oxford University Press*


The contributors to this conceptually innovative volume assess the economic impact of terrorism in all its manifestations, focusing on the bombings of the Madrid trains in March 2004 as their primary case study. The volume’s chapters discuss issues such as how terrorists fund their operations, theoretical approaches to analysing the economic impact of governmental responses to terrorism, the direct and sectoral impacts of the attacks on Madrid including the country’s stock market, and the effect of the terrorist attacks on the outcome of the 2004 Spanish election. Mikel Buesa is Professor of Applied Economics at the Computense University of Madrid and Thomas Baumert is Professor of Applied Economics at the Catholic University of Valencia.


An authoritative, comprehensive and important examination of the challenges involved in applying and enforcing international humanitarian law in prosecuting those suspected to be engaging in activities that target civilian populations such as genocide, asymmetrical warfare, and terrorism. As the author points out, effective prosecution requires making the important distinction between the deliberate targeting of combatants and civilians. This is explained in chapters covering topics such as the principle of distinction in identifying civilians and combatants; the protection afforded to civilians, the rights of combatants; the shift in such categories, with civilians, under certain circumstances, falling under the concept of direct participation in hostilities; blurring the concept of combatant, and the impact of trends in warfare, especially the use of weapons of mass destruction, in the evolution of such conflicts in categorising civilians and combatants. The author concludes that “The role of international humanitarian law is to regulate the conduct of conflict and to protect civilians and individuals hors de combat,” which is why it should be distinguished from laws governing armed conflict. (p. 162). The author, an international human rights jurist, is a lecturer in law at the University of Exeter, UK.


An important account of the origins and evolution of terrorism in Greece, which was expected to have terminated in summer 2002 with the downfall of the 17 November group (17N). However, due to a number of factors that are explained by the author, other types of anarchistic urban terrorist groups have emerged since then, accompanied by an upsurge and intensification of violence. Following an introductory chapter that provides historical context to political violence in Greece, the author discusses the nature of 17N in
terms of its leadership, organisation, activities, and eventual downfall. This is followed by a discussion of the new terrorist groups that have emerged since then, such as the Revolutionary Struggle (RS) and The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF). The author concludes that the threat of terrorism is likely to worsen because “The fault lines in Greek society are deepening,” especially due to the increasing popularity of the Golden Dawn neo-Nazi party, with “its supporters [staging] pogroms against immigrants and [doing] battle with leftist youths and anarchists” (p.121). Such worsening polarisation and division in society are likely to put Greek democracy “at unnecessary risk,” the author concludes. (p. 121). The author, a long-standing analyst of Greek terrorism, is Reader in Terrorism Studies at Wolverhampton University, UK.


An important empirical and theoretical examination of the psychological impact of terrorism in spreading fear and anxiety throughout its targeted society. The authors analyze how terrorism affects its targeted population on various levels, whether individual or societal. The authors also point out that while the fear induced by terrorism negatively impacts people and societies, such fears can also be reshaped to build resilience and post-traumatic growth following such incidents. Also discussed are topics such as how to communicate threat warnings prior to expected terrorist attacks (which may also be thwarted) in order to build resilience among the targeted populations. Mr. Sinclar is Assistant Professor at Harvard Medical School and Mr. Antonius is Assistant Professor at the University of Buffalo, State University of New York.

Polity Press


Part of the publisher’s “Key Concepts” series that provides concise overviews of significant topics by leading academic experts, this is an updated edition of the author’s previously published 2000 book. Fundamentalism, the author explains, especially as it applies to violent movements, aims “to reshape the world at large” through violence (p.7) because of its opposition to secularising and egalitarian (especially in male-female relations) forces of modernity at the communal and individual levels. ‘Fundamentalists’ are those who “claim that some source of ideas, usually a text [such as a religion's holy book], is complete and without error” (p.12). They seek to return to “the existence of some perfect social embodiment of the true religion in the past” (p.13). This general framework is then applied to discuss Islamic fundamentalism and Christian fundamentalism in the United States. The author’s conclusion is worth noting: “Why some people respond by becoming fundamentalists while others do not is a matter for the particulars of each circumstance. There is simply no need and no warrant for constructing fundamentalism as a gross psychological abnormality that deserves an explanation based on the idea of abnormality” (p.122). The author is Professor of Sociology at the University of Aberdeen, UK.


This well-written textbook provides a comprehensive examination of key security threats, challenges and developments affecting global security. The book is divided into four parts, with each of the eleven chapters concluding with a section on further reading, questions for research and discussion, and useful reference
resources, including websites. The first part, “Analytical Framework,” discusses how to theorize about security in the post-Cold War era. The second part, titled “The ‘New Wars’ and Intervention,” covers topics such as the nature of contemporary wars and conflicts (including terrorism), dilemmas and challenges of intervention, and the nature of collective security, alliances and security cooperation. The third part, “Environment, Resources and Migration,” examines the nature of environmental security, the competition over scarce resources such as oil and water, and the migration of populations and refugees as a security issue. The fourth part, “Asymmetric Power and Asymmetric Threats,” discusses significant threats facing the international community in the form of international terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the new threats of cyber-warfare. The concluding chapter presents the author’s summation of significant issues raised by the preceding chapters. The author is head of the department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, UK.


A well-written, theoretical examination of whether the conventional (i.e., liberal) governmental approach to security towards the perceived threats represented by terrorist attacks, natural disasters or other unexpected catastrophes, is, in fact, making the world safer. The author criticises the way liberal governments and their security services respond to such perceived threats [as described in the book’s back cover] as “a new catastrophic topography of interconnected planetary endangerment,” which is accompanied by a “desire to securitise everything,” thereby rendering “all things potentially terrifying.” This leads, the author argues, to a liberal paradox in which “The more we seek to secure, the more our imaginaries of threat proliferate. Nothing can therefore be left to chance. For everything has the potential to be truly catastrophic. Such is the emerging state of terror normality we find ourselves in today.” While such a polemic against the liberal approach to countering the spectrum of disasters, ranging from man-made (i.e., terrorism) to natural, is not entirely faulty, the study would have benefited from an equally critical treatment of the terrorist adversaries, especially since those who are religiously fundamentalist-based, represent the very anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, and anti-egalitarian tendencies that surely must offend the author’s sense of righteousness. The author is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristol, UK.


A provocative discussion of what the author considers as “the distinctive wrong of terrorism” in the form of what he terms the “morally disvalue” acts of killing, maiming and kidnapping civilians and destroying property not belonging to them (p.1). At the same time, he argues, since terrorism is “first and foremost a political tactic: frightening people for political advantage,” (p. 1), it should be judged with greater nuance because of its political component. Moreover, in the author’s analysis, states can be considered as terrorists; profiling potential terrorist suspects can, like ‘terrorism,’ also instill fear in a targeted population; and government warnings about potential terrorist attacks can (since they are generally ‘exaggerated’) be ‘misheard’ and misunderstood, thereby spreading the very types of fears they are originally intended to redress. Although the book is well written, its short sections make it appear more as a diatribe than a well-researched academic study. The author is Distinguished Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Australian National University.

A highly interesting conceptual and descriptive account of the origins and evolution of the strategic appeal to states of using proxy insurgents to battle their adversaries as a form of ‘warfare on the cheap.’ The book's chapters discuss the rise, nature and appeal of proxy wars, the major players engaged in such state-sponsored warfare, how such warfare is fought, and the future of such warfare. The author is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK.


An interesting and authoritative philosophical examination of how to define terrorism in all its manifestations, and whether it can be considered morally justified. To accomplish these objectives, the book's chapters discuss how to define terrorism, state terrorism, and counterterrorism; whether terrorists are justified in targeted civilian populations as ‘complicit’ to their perceived injustices; the consequences of terrorism, and whether terrorism is morally distinctive since it involves the deliberate targeting of civilians (as opposed to the armed military). The author’s conceptual framework is applied to the case studies of the British air force's bombing of German cities during the Second World War and Palestinian terrorism against Israel. The author is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Professorial Fellow at Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia.


A highly interesting account of the important role of the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants into their societies in the aftermath of conflicts, because in the absence of such a process, the affected combatants will likely hold on to their weapons and resume their warfare. The author points out that an effective DDR process is not based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach because a conflict's unique social and psychological contexts need to be taken into account in promoting the trust by all contending sides that is essential for DDR to succeed in the long term. The author is Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, in Quantico, Virginia.


An interesting thesis about the influence of what the author terms as a society’s “power dynamics” in shaping the way conflict and extremism are analyzed. In the book’s first part, the author bases her conceptual framework on Michel Foucault writings on power and discourse, where she finds that mainstream views of power relations, especially where power is used repressively, tend to restrict the conceptual insights needed to resolve conflict, whereas in situations where power is used progressively, there is greater understanding of how such conflicts can be resolved. In the book's second part, this conceptual framework is applied to examining the case studies of American far right militias, the Branch Davidian standoff against the FBI in Waco, Texas, Pauline Hanson's far-right and anti-government party in Australia, Theodore Kaczynski (“the..."

A well-informed and authoritative account of the origins and magnitude of the threat of Somali piracy and terrorism plaguing the waters of the Horn of Africa. The author explains how the collapse of the Somali state and the ensuing chaos and anarchy created the environment for piracy and terrorism to proliferate and become major threats – embodied in the rise of terrorist groups such as al Shabaab and sharp spike in pirate attacks off the Somali coast. The author concludes with a critique of the measures employed to mitigate such security threats and offers a series of recommendations, such as establishing an all-inclusive reconciliation process, increased funding for peacekeeping operations, port security, eliminating ransom payments, challenging the religious legitimacy of terrorist organisations, monitoring and countering the internet propaganda by terrorist organisations, and developing other long-term strategies. The appendices include a timeline of major events in Somalia, a listing of the country’s clans, key people and institutions, and definitions of terms and acronyms. The author is professor political science at Florida A&M University.


The contributors to this important edited volume discuss the expanding threat of terrorism in Africa in terms of the affected states, terrorist groups and critical issues that shape the context for understanding these dynamics. As explained by the volume’s editor, the book is divided into three themes: (1) the diversity of the terrorist threat among states in the region (e.g. terrorism in Somalia, West Africa, and North Africa), (2) the nature of the dynamics of terrorism (e.g. terrorism and Islam, terrorist safe havens), and (3) regional solutions to the threat of terrorism in Africa (e.g. evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Africa, the roles of good governance and developmental assistance, and assessing the progress of regional organizations such as the African Union in countering terrorism). This volume is one of the very few studies that examine the threat of terrorism in Africa and counterterrorism measures in response in all their dimensions, making it indispensable for those studying these issues. The editor is professor of political science and international relations at Howard University.


This textbook comprehensively and authoritatively covers the significant threats challenging United States national security and the governmental mechanisms established to respond to such evolving threats. Following a discussion of the national security apparatus and its policies, much of the volume discusses the nature of the threats against specific sectors, such as the maritime supply chain; the nature of cyber threats against critical infrastructure; the distinction and similarities between terrorism and crime; the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction; and the response measures required to counter such threats, including through public-private partnerships. The author is a veteran academic expert on national security issues and has taught at several universities.

An interesting and important account of the role of certain types of social movements in originating and causing terrorism. The author points out that while many terrorist organizations had begun as social movements seeking to achieve their objectives through nonviolent tactics, over time terrorist tactics became their “method of choice.” To explain how such transitions from non-violence to violence occurred, the author examines the individual characteristics, group dynamics, and external forces in how such phenomena occurred in the case studies of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Basque ETA in Spain, the FARC in Colombia, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The author finds that terrorist groups emerge from social movements under certain conditions that include the presence of frustration “that led to aggression” and leadership by a charismatic leader that possesses a “violent personality” (pp.141-142). Also of interest is the author’s recommendation for future research, particularly the call for scholars to “study why terrorist organizations disaffiliate or die.” (p.143) The author is assistant adjunct professor of political science and women’s and gender studies at the University of South Carolina.


An important account of the neo-Nazi White Supremacist movement in the United States. Drawing on extensive field work, including numerous interviews, the authors explain the movement’s various groupings, their “infrastructure of hate,” their extremist ideologies and agendas, how they radicalise, recruit and indoctrinate their members (including through private homes, “hate” parties, rituals, music festivals and online), and response measures to effectively counter and marginalise the influence and activities of these militant groups. The appendix includes a valuable guide for academic researchers to make contact and develop rapport with such militants (while avoiding the ethical dilemma of building “too much” rapport with them) in order to understand their mindsets and activities. Pete Simi is associate professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, and Robert Futrell is associate professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska, Las Vegas.


An authoritative, comprehensive and well-written examination of the legal dimension in countering terrorism by the United States government, focusing on the cases of responding to terrorist insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The author is a leading expert on these topics, having served as a former Marine Corps judge advocate and legal counsel to the U.S. Defense Department. The book’s chapters cover topics such as the legal dimension required in the operational context of counterterrorism, including the use of covert action; the international legal and political context for countering state-sponsored terrorism; the law of self-defense as applied to the terrorist threat; developing rules of engagement in countering terrorism; the application of Habeas Corpus in the detention of enemy combatants; torture and the interrogation of detainees; the dilemma of turning to federal courts or military commissions in trying suspected terrorists; international law and maritime terrorism and piracy; outsourcing military support operations in counterterrorism; the legal dimension in countering cyberterrorism, and the relationship between counterterrorism and media access to information. The concluding chapter presents the author’s views on
future perspectives in countering the terrorist threat.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
IV. Notes from the Editors

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as 'nontraditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal's articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

*Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism*

Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief

James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor

Joseph J. Easson, Associate Editor

Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor

Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor

Eric Price, Editorial Assistant

Judith Tinnes, Editorial Assistant
Members of the Editorial Board

The Editorial Board of Perspectives on Terrorism currently consists of 19 experienced researchers. They are (in no particular order):

Shazad Ali (Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan)

Joost Augusteijn (Leiden University, The Netherlands)

Jeffrey M. Bale (Monterey, United States)

Michael Boyle (LaSalle University, Philadelphia, United States)

Jarret Brachman (North Dakota State University, USA)

Richard Chasdi (Wayne State University, Detroit, United States)

Paul Gill, Lecturer at University College London’s Department of Security and Crime Science.

Beatrice de Graaf (ICCT, The Hague, The Netherlands)

James ‘Chip’ O. Ellis (Vancouver, Canada)

Leah Farrall (USSC, Sydney)

Jennifer Giroux (ETH, Zürich, Switzerland)

M.J. Gohel (CEO, Asia-Pacific Foundation, London)

Thomas Hegghammer (FFI, Oslo, Norway)

Bradley McAllister (Washington, DC, United States)

John Morrison is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of East London

Assaf Moghadam (ICT, Herzliya, Israel)

Thomas Riegler (historian and journalist, Vienna)

Simon Shen, Chinese University, Hong Kong

Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the Georgetown University Medical School, USA.

Currently there are several vacancies on the Editorial Board. Readers of Perspectives on Terrorism are invited to submit names of possible candidates. Selection will take place on the basis of the publication record of those nominated, taking also into account their contribution to a better gender and geographical balance of the Editorial Board.

Members of the Editorial Board act as peer-reviewers for articles submitted to Perspectives on Terrorism. In addition, the Editorial Board relies on the special expertise of other experienced researchers. In particular we would like to acknowledge the contributions of

Dr. Dean Alexander

Dr. O. Shawn Cupp
Dr. Alessandro Orsini
Dr. Brian Philips
Dr. P. Daniel Silk
Dr. James Wirtz

People Behind the Terrorism Research Initiative

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) has three Directors: Robert Wesley (President), Alex P. Schmid and James J.F. Forest. TRI has an International Advisory Board (currently 11 members), a Consortium of Participating Institutions (currently 17 institutions and centers) as well as Group of Individual Researchers (currently 110) guiding and supporting its efforts. They are listed below.

International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Adam Dolnik, University of Wollongong, Australia.

Javier Jordán is a Professor at the Universidad de Granada, Spain, and Director of Athena Intelligence.

Gary LaFree is a Professor of Criminology at the University of Maryland and the Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

David Rapoport is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at UCLA, a Mellon Foundation Emeritus Fellow, Founding and Co-Editor of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence.

Marc Sageman is a Consultant on transnational terrorism with various governmental agencies and foreign governments and the author of Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad.

Michael Scheuer is currently a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation, prior to which he served in the CIA for 22 years where he was the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999.

Yoram Schweitzer is a Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and Lecturer at Tel Aviv University.

Michael S. Stohl is Professor of Communication at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB).

Jeff Victoroff is an Associate Professor of Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry at the Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.

Consortium of Participating Institutions

Athena Intelligence, Spain.

Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, USA.
Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, Netherlands.

(Handa) Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA.

Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Department of International Relations, University of Minas (PUC), Brazil.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA.

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece.

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

University of the Pacific, School of International Studies, USA.

University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory, USA.

**TRI's Individual Participants**

**Mahan Abedin** is a former editor of the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor and currently the Director of Research at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, London. He is editor of Islamism Digest - a monthly academic journal specialising on the in-depth study of Islamic movements.

**Gary Ackerman** is Research Director at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

**Shaheen Afroze** is Research Director and Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Division at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).

**Abdullah Alaskar** is Professor of History at King Saud University, columnist, Riyadh daily newspaper.

**Mustafa Alani** is a Senior Advisor and Program Director in Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

**Rogelio Alonso** is Professor in Politics and Terrorism at Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, where he holds the position of Ramón y Cajal Fellow in Political Sciences.

**Ramiro Anzit Guerrero** is a Senior Advisor in the Argentine National Congress and Professor at the University del Salvador and University del Museo Social Argentino.
Victor Asal joined the faculty of the Political Science Department of the University at Albany in Fall 2003 and is also the Director of the Public Security Certificate at Rockefeller College, SUNY, Albany.

Omar Ashour is Director, Middle East Studies, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies University of Exeter.

Scott Atran is Presidential Scholar at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Research.

Edwin Bakker is Professor of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University and Director of its Center for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague.

Daniel Baracskay is a full-time faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University, where he also teaches public administration courses.

Michael Barkun is professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

Shazadi Beg is a Barrister in the United Kingdom and an acknowledged expert on Pakistan.

Gabriel Ben-Dor is Director of the School of Political Sciences and Head of the National Security Graduate Studies Program at the University of Haifa, where he teaches and conducts research in the fields of political violence, civil-military relations and national security.

Eddine Benhayoun is a Professor of Cultural Studies and Director of the Research Group on Culture and Globalisation, Abdemalek Essaadi University, Tetuan, Morocco.

Andrew Black is the Managing Director of Black Watch Global, an intelligence and risk management consultancy headquartered in Washington, DC.

Mia Bloom is Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachussetts (Lowell Campus).

Randy Borum is a Professor at the University of South Florida and a behavioral science researcher/consultant on National Security issues.

Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa.

Amel Boubekeur is a Research Fellow and the leader of the Islam and Europe programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, focusing on Political Islam in Europe and North Africa.

Jarret Brachman is a member of the faculty of North Dakota State University and an independent Al-Qaeda analyst. He runs a jihadist monitoring blog.

Jean-Charles Brisard is an international consultant and expert on terrorism and terrorism financing.

Francesco Cavatorta is a lecturer in International Relations and Middle East politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland.

David Charters is a military historian and senior fellow at the Gregg Center, University of New Brunswick, Canada.

Erica Chenoweth is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and a visiting scholar at Stanford University, California.
David Cook is an Associate Professor of religious studies at Rice University, specializing in apocalyptic literature and movements, radical Islamic thought and West African Islam.

Victor D. Comras is an attorney and consultant on terrorism, terrorism-financing, sanctions and international law. He served as one of five International Monitors appointed by the Security Council to oversee the implementation of measures imposed against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated terrorist groups.

Maura Conway is the MA Programme Director at the School of Law & Government, Dublin City University.

Steven R. Corman is the Director of the Consortium for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen is the Head of Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

Luis de la Corte is a Professor of social psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and an investigator at Athena Intelligence.

James Dingley is a sociologist and former lecturer on terrorism and political violence at the University of Ulster. He is now running his own consultancy on terrorism (Cybernos Associates) and chairs the Northern Ireland think tank Northern Light Review.

Vera Eccarius-Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics at Siena College in Albany, NY, specialized in Latin American and Middle East politics, and, in particular, on revolutionary and social movements in Central America and Muslim Minority activism in Europe.

Rodney Faraon is Director of Intelligence and Threat Analysis for the Walt Disney Company’s Global Security Division.

Shabana Fayyaz is an Assistant Professor with the Defense and Strategic Studies Department at the Quaid-IzamUniversity, Islamabad and is also a Doctoral Candidate at the Political Science Department, University of Birmingham, UK.

James Forest is one of the three directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative and co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism. He is Director of the Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts at its Lowell Campus and was the first director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University in Tampa, Florida.

Jennifer Giroux is a CRN Researcher in Terrorism and Political Violence at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

Sebestyén L. v. Gorka is the Founding Director of the Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security (ITDIS) Hungary, and the Director for Policy Studies at the Educational Initiative for Central and Eastern Europe (EICEE), USA.

Beatrice de Graaf is Professor for the history of International Relations and Global Governance at Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

Bob de Graaff is Socrates Foundation Professor for political and cultural reconstruction from a humanist perspective at Utrecht University and former Director of the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Campus The Hague/Leiden University.
Stuart Groombridge holds a Masters of Justice (Strategic Intelligence) from Queensland University of Technology, specialising in Organised Crime and recruitment methodologies utilised by Islamist Terrorist Groups. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Wollongong’s Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention.

Rohan Gunaratna is the Head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Dipak K. Gupta was, until his retirement, Fred J. Hansen Professor of Peace Studies and Distinguished Professor in Political Science, San Diego State University.

Abdulhadi Hairan is a Kabul-based researcher and security, governance and terrorism analyst.

Irm Haleem is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at Seton Hall University, currently researching and publishing on Islamist extremism in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.

Muhammad Haniff Hassan is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

John Horgan is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell Campus.

Brian K. Houghton is an Associate Professor of Public Policy & Management at BYU-Hawaii, and the former Director of Research at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.

Russell Howard, a former US Army General, is currently at the Monterey Institute of Non-Proliferation Studies.

Richard Jackson is founding editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism.

Jolene Jerard is a Research Analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a center of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore.

George Joffé teaches Middle Eastern and North African Affairs at the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge.

Ranga Kalansooriya is a journalist from Sri Lanka with wide experience in terrorism and political violence and a PhD Candidate in journalism and political violence.

Jeffrey Kaplan is Associate Professor of Religion and Director of the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory.

Emmanuel Karagiannis is an investigator at the START center, University of Maryland, and a lecturer at the University of Macedonia, Greece.

George Kassimeris is a Senior Research Fellow in Conflict and Terrorism at the University of Wolverhampton and co-editor of the journal Critical Studies in Terrorism.

Robert E. Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of International Studies at the University of the Pacific.

Jesmeen Khan is a Research Analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism.
Research (ICPVTR), a centre of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.

**Brian Kingshott** is Professor of Criminal Justice at Grand Valley State University, USA.

**Jorge Lasmar**, is head of the Department of International Relations at the University of Minas, Brazil.

**Faryal Leghari** a researcher at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

**Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky** is a retired Career Minister in the U.S. Foreign Service. He teaches international relations at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and is Senior Fellow of the School's International Policy Center.

**Pete Lenti** ni is Co-founder and Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia. He is currently researching neo-jihadism; extremism and terrorism in Australia and Russia.

**Brynjor Lia** is Associate Research Professor at the University of Oslo and also Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI). He is a historian by training.

**Douglas Macdonald** has taught at Colgate University for twenty years and Director of its International Relations Program.

**Lieutenant General Talat Masood** served in the Pakistan Army for nearly 40 years with his last assignment being Secretary for Defence Production in Ministry of Defence. Since retirement he is closely associated with think-tanks and universities regionally and globally, working to promote peace and stability in the region.

**William McCants** is the founder of Jihadica and also co-founder of Insight Collaborative, a Washington, D.C. -based company that provides education and expertise on Islamism.

**Andrew McGregor** is the Director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada.

**George Michael** is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Administration of Justice at the University of Virginia's College of Wise.

**Mansoor Moaddel** is a Professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University, where he teaches sociology of religion, ideology, revolution, Islam and the Middle East.

**Fathali M. Moghaddam** is Professor of Psychology at Georgetown University and author of Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context.

**Gregory Miller** is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma and is one of the Director's of the Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism (SWOTT).

**Will H. Moore** is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Florida State University with research interests in violent political conflict within and between countries.

**Sam Mullins** gained an MSc in Investigative Psychology from the University of Liverpool, and is currently teaching at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong, Australia.

**Kevin R. Murphy** is Department Head and Professor of Psychology at Pennsylvania State University.

**Brigitte L. Nacos** is a journalist and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, specialized in mass media, public opinion and decision-making; terrorism and counterterrorism. Blog
Peter Neumann is Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Prior to this appointment, he was Director of the Centre for Defence Studies (2005–2007) at King’s College London.

John M. Nomikos is Director of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS).

Mariya Y. Omelicheva is an Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas.

Raffaello Pantucci is a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, UK.

Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge and a visiting scholar at Pembroke College.

Reuven Paz is a long-time researcher of radical Islam, and the founder and director of the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) in Herzliya, Israel.

Gregory Pemberton is a graduate of the Royal Military College Duntroon and the University of Sydney and is currently Manager of Postgraduate Programs of the Centre of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism at Macquarie University.

Keli Perrin is the Assistant Director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University.

James A. Piazza is Professor at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism, at Pennsylvania State University.

Nico Prucha is Affiliated Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP) and a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Vienna.

Gilbert Ramsay is a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, Scotland where he is also a Teaching Assistant.

Muhammad Amir Rana is the Director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Magnus Ranstorp is the Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm.

Xavier Raufer is a Professor at the EDHEC Business School in Paris, a Member of the Council on Global Terrorism, and a Member of the Terrorism Studies Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.

Fernando Reinares is a Professor of Political Science and Security Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, and Director of the Program on Global Terrorism, Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid.

Louise Richardson is Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Karl Roberts is a Forensic Psychologist, Principal Lecturer in Psychology at Sunderland University and a consultant to UK police forces on risk assessment in terrorism and investigative skills for law enforcement.

Hanna Rogan is a Research Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

Johnny Ryan is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of International and European Affairs.
Alex P. Schmid is one of the three Directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and Editor-in-Chief of its online journal 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He is a Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague.

Richard J. Schmidt is an Associate Professor at the University of Nebraska with interests in intelligence analysis, counterterrorism, terrorism and political violence.

Mark Sedgwick is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Unit for Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Aarhus, Denmark.

Abdel Aziz Shady is Director of the Terrorism Studies and Research Program at the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University, Egypt.

Stephen M. Shellman is a Research Scientist within the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William & Mary and is Director of the Violent Intranational Political Conflict and Terrorism (VIPCAT) Research Laboratory.

Dmitry Shlapentokh is an Associate Professor-Indiana University, South Bend and author of several books and many articles.

Joshua Sinai is a Washington DC based educator and consultant; he is Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

Stephen Sloan is Emeritus Professor and Fellow of the Global Perspectives Office of the University of Central Florida.

Jeffrey Sluka is an Associate Professor in the Social Anthropology Programme at Massey University, New Zealand.

John Solomon is global head of terrorism research for World-Check.

Guido Steinberg is a former advisor on international terrorism in the German Federal Chancellery. Currently he is serving as Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, specializing in Middle East and Gulf Affairs.

Michael Stohl is Professor of Communication Studies at the University of California-Santa Barbara.

Nicole Stracke is a Researcher in the Department of Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editor for The Hindu and Frontline magazine in India.

Andrew T. H. Tan is an Associate Professor in Social Science and International Studies at the University of New South Wales, Australia.

Manuel R. Torres Soriano is a professor of political science as the Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla, Spain.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Carl Anthony Wege is professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia.

Leonard Weinberg is a Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.
Clive Williams is an Adjunct Professor at PICT, a Visiting Professor at ADFA, and a Visiting Fellow at the ANU; his specialised field is politically motivated violence.

Phil Williams is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. Currently he is a Visiting Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA. His research interests include the relationship between organized crime and terrorism, and terrorist finances.

Mark Woodward is an anthropologist and Islam specialist who teaches in the Department of Religious Studies at Arizona State University.

David Wright-Neville is a former senior intelligence analyst with the Australian government and is now Deputy Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre and an Associate Professor at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, where his research and teaching focuses on the political psychology of terrorism and counter-terrorism, especially in Southeast Asia.

Sherifa Zuhur is Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic and Strategic Studies.

Legal Note: Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) hosts articles that reflect a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein, and the empirical evidence cited in their support, remain the sole responsibility of the contributing authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the journal's Editorial Team and Editorial Board or PT’s parent organizations, the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS).