New Profiles and Articles on TRAC

  • The ISM is the first indication of organised IS presence in the Maldives, a country known for extremists favouring support to al Qaeda affiliates, like Jabhat al-Nusrah.

  • The ABT objectives include the radicalisation of youths in Bangladesh, inciting active participation in a local jihad and seeking control of areas in Bangladesh. The group reflects a young generation of jihadist in Bangladesh, which uses cyberspace extensively in propagating jihadist ideology.

  • In addition to updating hundreds of existing TRAC group profiles, TRAC continuously profiles key individuals.  To date there are 5 individual profiles within Islamic State; 4 within al Shabaab 3 within AQAP; 2 within AQC; 2 within Caucasus Emirate; 1 with in AQIS.  Please click for complete listing and profile links.

  • On 10 November 2014, Ansar Jerusalem pledged allegiance to the IS. The pledge of allegiance was preceded by two envoys of Ansar Jerusalem meeting with IS leaders in Syria.

  • Dwekh Nawsha is a Christian militia brigade in Iraq’s Ninawa province opposed to the Islamic State (IS).

  • Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria is a splinter group from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that has pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS). The group's leadership and composition are updated.

  • In September 2014, Al-Zawahiri released a video in which he announced the appointment of Maulana Asim Umar as the Emir of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Umar’s appointment follows his extensive presence and associations with various jihadist groups in Pakistan. His appointment is the continuation of a long standing relationship between al-Qaeda Central Command and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whereby al-Qaeda is the ideological inspiration for the TTP, with the latter providing support and safe havens for al-Qaeda militants.

  • In addition to updating hundreds of existing TRAC group profiles, in September and October 2014, TRAC compiled 26 completely new profiles. Click link for complete list with links to the profile pages.

  • After months of research, TRAC has compiled the first definitive list of all the known Islamic State brigades, including leaders and headquarters, as well as the first list of governmental offices including the names, common alternate spellings, and aliases of those who fill these positions. It is the integration of both that lends a complete understanding of the synthesis of network and hierarchy that is the secret to structuring Baghdadi's war machine.

  • Burkina Faso has moved from an expectation of a "Faso Spring" to a Coup within three days, creating an environment of instability and the possibiity of continued protest actions. Opposition parties and civilian organisations have rejected the military leading the country during a transitional phase preceding elections and has called for mass meeting. Le Balai Citoyen, becomes the hope of a minority who is protesting, the group is led by two musicians using social networks, music concerts and demonstrations to mobilise support for its cause.

  • Dawn Freedom Brigades leader Abu al-Layth privately confided in October 2014 that 90 of his fighters defected to Islamic State when he sent them to Kobami to aid the YPG.  Note: the exact numbers are not confirmed, a representative of the Sun of the North/Northern Sun Battalions- the contingent of Dawn of Freedom Brigades in Kobani- only affirmed the presence of roughly 70 fighters for the group in a 12 October conversation with Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi.

  • When Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi was killed in fighting with the Iraqi Army (IA) in Nineveh during June 2014, Shishani was named the new IS Military Operations Chief. Shishani led several campaigns such as taking over of Mosul, followed by the coordination of attacks to dislodge the Peshmerga from Sinjar, POE Rabiah and the Mosul Dam. More recent IS successes in Anbar in September and October 2014 are also attributed to the leadership of Shishani.

  • White Shroud is a guerrilla warfare group of approximately 300 men that attacks Islamic State (IS) fighters in Albukamal (Deir al-Zor province in Syria), which is an IS stronghold. The group relies on guerrilla warfare tactics and claimed to have killed more than 100 IS fighters.

  • The general profile of Australians fighting in Syria/Iraq has changed since November 2013. Changes in a general profile relate to gender, choice of groups to support, a history of association with either crime or radical individuals/groups and assuming leadership positions within specific jihadist groups.

  • Each new release of an Islamic State video generates much analysis on the content of the videos, but until now little has been talked about how the Islamic State is able to produce high-quality videos.  Every editor leaves his or her forensic foot print on a video, study the videos and one can decipher which human being(s) edited which video.  TRAC had each video "stripped down" and evaluated by a digital analyst, the results lend us much more insight into the group's abilities.

  • The The Khorasan Group / The Wolf Unit (WU) was integrated into the Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) rank system and was not created as an independent autonomous unit as portrayed in some reports.  Expereinced foreign fighters who had been vetted by JN are used as part of the WU.

  • The Tunisian government announced the dismantling of a terrorist cell that was planning to launch a terror campaign ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for 26 October 2014. The plan reportedly included the killing of liberal politician Ahmed Nejib Chebbi of the Jomhouri Party with a car bomb.

  • As much mystery that surrounds the Islamic State, there is equally as much complexity that surrounds this manifesto. Signed off on the final page by Abu Kassem's alias "al-Mashhadani al-Iraqi," the document reads like a hybrid between Islamic State goals and ex-Baathist and Republican Guard concepts left over from Saddam Hussein's era.  Beginning on page 19, the document has three distinct topics that intertwine to create an unprecedented insight into the Islamic State’s policy, economics and goals. What is particularly of note is the manner in which the Islamic State views itself both in the near and long term.  The term “United Sunni States” is a reference to these goals that cross into a hundred years in the future and include seventy (70) objectives.