New Profiles And Articles On TRAC

  • snapshot of VBIEDs from May 2013 gives a glimpse of the domino effect which ISIS hopes to achieve using explosives in densely populated areas of Baghdad.  Maliki helped sustain ISIS unintentionally by way of an amateurishly run counter-terrorism program. There has been a dramatic rise of ISIS IED attacks in Iraq since 2013 (up 90%)  as it is difficult to cultivate undercover programs and informants when the populace feel they are being targeted by the government that is requesting their assistance in flushing out terrorist networks and safe-houses.

  • Since the GICM formation there has been close collaboration with al Qaeda. According to Noureddine Nafia, a meeting was held with Ayman al-Zawahiri during July 2000, upon which al Qaeda provided support to establish a reception center in Jalalabad and a training camp referred to as Tarek ben Ziyad. At the training camp GICM members received training in how to falsify identification documents as well as handling of explosive devices and weapons.

  • Previous charts on TRAC reflected the Islamic State before the Caliphate was declared: IS then and IS now are not the same.  The ISIS of before the Caliphate was oriented on war; The Islamic State of today has added an entire governance section.  These structures are NOT mutually exclusive and reflect how the Islamic State is evolving in to a government with military capabilities, these are fluid expect the names in charge will change continously.

Critical Developments